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chapter 1
Affect and Material Culture
Perspectives and Strategies
Jonas Frykman & Maja Povrzanović Frykman
Becoming attuned
At that wonderful concert you attended, did the music fill your body, 
did your feet dance uncontrollably and did your voice crackle in the 
sing-along with people you had never met before? Do you remember 
the sweet pain in your palms after applauding and the almost suffocat-
ing throng of bodies? Was the atmosphere uplifting? Did it encapsulate 
sounds, sights, smells, bodily sensations, and feelings simultaneously? 
What about the sudden feeling of power and togetherness when you took 
part in a demonstration, the sudden shouting and rush of blood to the 
head when your home team scored a goal?
By posing questions like this about the body, senses, feelings and 
atmosphere, we hope to attune readers to affect – the subject to which 
this book is devoted. We will look at how affects matter in general and, 
in particular, how they are related to the body, the environment, and 
things. This, we believe, is the contribution to which ethnology and 
anthropology are best suited, considering the changing yet persistent 
importance of material culture in these disciplines and of fieldwork for 
understanding the affective potentialities of objects.1
Interdisciplinary studies of affect and emotion have produced ‘a vir-
tual explosion’ of research and theoretical writings in the last decades, 
writes the psychologist Lisa Feldman Barrett (2010: 203), who heads an 
interdisciplinary affective science laboratory. These studies are not only 
marked by differing and sometimes conflicting theoretical perspectives 
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and research strategies – ‘old debates continue to rage on’ (ibid.), espe-
cially when body and language are concerned – but also lack a common 
scientific language that would enable ‘an epistemologically objective 
scientific enterprise about something that is so ontologically subjective’ 
(ibid.) and eludes ‘conventional semiotic and semantic procedure’ (Gib-
son 2013: 243).2 As always in academia, this dilemma is characteristic 
of perspectives that are in the process of breaking new ground. The 
fact that the words affect, emotion, feeling and sentiment are often used 
interchangeably makes dialogue across disciplinary borders difficult and 
confusing. Being a truly interdisciplinary field, genealogical influences 
are still clearly visible (Pellegrini and Puar 2009). Although definitions 
vary, the common keywords when describing affects seem to be intensity, 
contingency and potentiality.
A commoner way of approaching what affects stand for is found in the 
writings of geographer Ben Anderson, who reflects on ‘affective atmos-
pheres’ and uses the vague term ‘something’ in many of his texts. To 
him, affective atmospheres express ‘an ill-defined indefinite something, 
that exceeds rational explanation and clear figuration. Something that 
hesitates at the edge of the unsayable’ (Anderson 2009: 78). Being ‘at the 
edge’ implies that they ‘mix together narrative and signifying elements 
and non-narrative and asignifying elements’ (ibid. 80). In line with our 
introductory questions about the atmosphere at a concert, Anderson 
(ibid. 77) reflects more on what such atmospheres do and less on what 
they are. Affective atmospheres ‘may interrupt, perturb and haunt fixed 
persons, places or things’ (ibid. 78). They are indeterminate with regard 
to the distinction between the subjective and objective and are ‘imper-
sonal in that they belong to collective situations and yet can be felt as 
intensely personal’ (ibid. 80).
We claim that ethnographic research provides a fertile ground from 
which to capture the ambiguities of affective and emotive experience. For 
an ethnographer, that ‘ill-defined indefinite something’ is always related 
to particular people, places, situations and objects. Lingering moment-
arily with the examples of music and atmosphere, when Elisabet Hauge 
(Chapter 9) writes about the background of a successful Norwegian black 
metal band and its lead guitarist, she portrays a man whose music draws 
inspiration from his immediate material environment – a ‘very sensu-
ous interface of people, places and things’ (Bille et al. 2015: 37). The old 
building housing ‘The Mill’ studio in his home village, its waterfall, the 
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surrounding forest and the carefully scythed fields are all objects that 
put him ‘in the mood’, make him feel that there is ‘something in the air’ 
and inspire his compositions and performances. This ‘mood’ and this 
‘something’ are not only physically experienced by him, but also by the 
other musicians, producers, record managers, volunteers and audiences, 
and contributes to an affective attunement to the world of metal music.
The effect of an atmosphere, as suggested above, is deeply personal 
and embodied, yet is hard to describe. When listening to music, we 
can feel the goose pimples on our skin and let our fingers snap to the 
rhythm. Music does not have to engage the mind’s cognitive func-
tions, but has the power to move our bodies and make us dance, jump 
and turn. A concert becomes ‘a surface resonant with the rhythms of 
music, as well as of bodies, crowds, calendar events, trucks, heart rates, 
musc le contractions and more’ (Clough 2010: 228, citing Henriques 
2010). Music may fill us with joy or sadness. Regardless of which, it is 
almost always a mix of bodily motion, affect and emotion. The moment 
we engage in the scholarly practice of analysing such experiences and 
try to understand their history, symbolic significance and what they 
represent, their complexities are too easily reduced and the beat of the 
music – that ‘something in the air’ that affects us but is so hard to put 
into words – too easily lost.
Changing perspectives on affect
Nils Gilje (Chapter 2) states that, by definition, affect deals with the 
pre-theoretical conception of the world. He sees the present interest in 
the field as linked to how a cognitive bias has left whole territories of 
human life uncharted, where moods and emotions are largely omitted 
from an understanding of the human condition. But this turn to affect 
is not new, as the two professors of gender studies, Ann Pellegrini and 
Jasbir Puar, indicate:
What some have hailed as a recent ‘affective turn’ in fact draws 
across older formations of sentiment studies; theories of emotion; 
‘structures of feeling’ (to invoke Raymond Williams’s oft-cited for-
mulation); the work of Gottfried Leibniz, Baruch Spinoza, Henri 
Bergson, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, among others; 
and science and technology studies. Thus, what appears to be a 
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‘new’ critical, conceptual lens that has gained significant intel-
lectual and scholarly cachet in the last decade is in fact indebted 
to multiple, and often contradictory, genealogical threads. (Pel-
legrini and Puar 2009: 36)
When Gilje traces the fate of affects and emotions back through the history 
of Western philosophy he ends up with Spinoza, who, unlike Descartes, 
could not accept that human consciousness was independent of the body 
and free from the intensity of affects. But Gilje does something more 
than trace these intellectual forefathers. By going back to the fifteenth 
century philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and forwards to 
Søren Kierke gaard and the phenomenologists of the twentieth century, 
he hints at the occurrence and recurrence of the same theme at times of 
major social change and development. The most elaborate philosophical 
discussions of mood, attunement and affect are to be found at turning 
points like the Rennaissance, the Scientific Revolution, Romanticism 
and the decisive years around the first World War.
The novelty of this particular ‘turn’ is that it follows a general ques-
tioning of theory in the humanities and social sciences, and especially 
in cultural studies and critical theory. For instance, the focus on texts 
becomes less prominent than the emphasis on readers’ affective responses. 
In their introduction to The Affect Theory Reader, Gregory J. Seigworth 
and Melissa Gregg (2010) list no fewer than eight main approaches to 
affect, among which the phenomenological and postphenomenological 
approaches are the most influential. What they see as a clear humani-
ties-related approach is a diverse attempt to ‘turn away from the linguistic 
turn and its attendant social constructionisms’ (ibid. 7). They note that the 
research within this approach focuses on ‘those ethico-aesthetic spaces 
that are opened up (or shut down) by a widely disparate assortment of 
affective encounters’ (ibid. 8).
Deriving from the Latin afficere, the word affect implies passivity, in 
that it means ‘to have had something done to one’. The general agreement 
is that affect encompasses the various capacities of bodies to affect and 
be affected, and that it therefore refers to forces and intensities that are 
visceral (see Cichosz 2014: 56). Hence, the interest in affect in the first 
place involves a focus on bodies and embodiment, on ‘the very fabric 
of the body and those forms of embodied experience that often remain 
unseen, unnoticed and unrecognised’ (Åhäll and Gregory 2015b: 5).3 By 
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introducing ‘an empiricism of sensation’ (Clough 2010: 224) into the social 
sciences and the humanities, affect studies ‘intensified the difference or 
differance of subjectivity and the human body while turning attention 
to the sociality of the transmission of force or intensity across bodies, 
and not only human bodies’ (ibid.), thereby including non-humans in 
the study of affects.4
Seigworth and Gregg (2010: 8) see the effort to understand the working 
of affect as ‘how the “outside” realms of the pre-/extra-/para-linguistic 
intersect with the “lower” or proximal senses (such as touch, taste, smell, 
rhythm and motion-sense, or, alternately/ultimately, the autonomic nerv-
ous system)’. Philosophical inquiries into bioscience suggest that affect 
is ‘both a “precognitive” attribute (not in terms of a telos, but in terms 
of a quality) of the body as well as emotion’s trace effect’ (Pellegrini and 
Puar 2009: 37). Such a conception of affect implies a distinction between 
sensation and the perception of that sensation: ‘Affect, from this per-
spective, is precisely what allows the body to be an open system, always 
in concert with its virtuality, the potential of becoming’ (ibid.). Affect 
may therefore ‘anchor claims about the materiality of bodies and physio-
logical processes that are not contained or representable by language or 
cognition alone’ (ibid.).
However, the idea that affect can be analysed as a ‘precognitive’ 
phenom enon has been criticised by scholars such as Margaret Wetherell, 
a professor of social psychology who finds the idea that our bodies are 
shaped by an outer force prior to sensemaking unsustainable: ‘we cannot 
create a split between a semi-conscious, automaton-like, reactive body 
and the reflexive, discursive, interpreting, meaning-making, commu-
nicating social actor’ (Wetherell 2015a: 160). In line with recent neuro-
science and psychobiology research, Wetherell advocates an analysis that 
‘does not presume a strongly, pre-organized, built-in set of innate affect 
programs’ (ibid.). She sees affective practice as ‘a moment of recruitment, 
articulation or enlistment when many complicated flows across bodies, 
subjectivities, relations, histories and contexts entangle and intertwine 
together to form just this affective moment, episode or atmosphere with 
its particular possible classifications’ (ibid.).
The affect studies pioneer, Brian Massumi, claims that affects works 
synesthetically, which ‘implies a participation of the senses in each 
other’ (1995: 96). The simultaneous activation of senses such as taste, 
smell and touch has often been mentioned by scholars of affect (see e.g. 
sensitive objects
14
Highmore 2010). This ‘dismisses any hierarchical separation between 
soma and matter’ (Boscagli 2014: 4). For instance, when Povrzanović 
Frykman (Chapter 4) writes about how memories of humanitarian aid 
are triggered by specific objects, it is clear that people’s physical reac-
tions are activated by the sensations of taste, smell, sound and touch. 
The synesthetic quality of affects can also be used to set the stage for a 
total experience, something that is of particular importance to Hauge’s 
analysis (Chapter 9) of the concerts at ‘The Mill’. Here, the black metal 
concerts are intertwined with a material surrounding that includes good 
food, the aroma of newly mown meadows, and torchlight illuminating 
the darkness of night.
Affect and emotion
Affect and emotion are often paired up in the literature. However, invok-
ing one or the other ‘has come to signal a basic orientation to the self, 
world and their interrelation (as well as in some cases a particular politics 
and ethics)’ (Anderson 2009: 80). Scholars who agree that affects precede 
conscious knowing place it beyond emotions depending on how cultur-
ally defined the emotions seem to be. Massumi (1995: 86) defines affect 
as ‘a state of suspense, potentially of disruption’, expressed through an 
array of physiological reactions (muscular contraction, secretions) and 
visible symptoms (voice changes, facial expressions). Emotion, on the 
other hand, is ‘the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience 
which is from that point onward defined as personal’ (ibid. 88).
In Nigel Thrift’s words, affects refer to ‘complex, self-referential states 
of being’, whereas emotions are ‘cultural interpretations’ of affects, 
culturally constructed ‘everyday understandings of affects’ that have a 
distinctive vocabulary and serve as a means of relating to others (Thrift 
2008: 221). As summarised by Anderson (2009: 80),
the distinction between affect and emotion has been caught up in 
the subjective/objective problematic via two oppositions: narrative/
non-narrative and semiotic/asignifying. The terms have fallen 
on one or the other of those divides – affect with non-narrative 
and asignifying and emotion with narrative and semiotic. Affect 
with the impersonal and objective. Emotion with the personal 
and subjective.
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While ‘the emotions of anger, regret, jealousy or empathy, are best com-
municated by describing the personal circumstances and sociocultural 
context of their staging’ (Henriques 2010: 82; see also Bendix 2015), affects 
have ‘the kind of significance that has to be embodied, felt and experi-
enced’ (ibid.). Affects are often equated with ‘intensities’ (Massumi 1995; 
Stewart 2007). Emotion, then, is ‘qualified intensity’, ‘intensity owned and 
recognized’ (Massumi (1995: 88). For Massumi, a linguistic expression 
that ‘qualifies’ is not simply in opposition to intensity: ‘The relationship 
between the levels of intensity and qualification is not one of conformity or 
correspondence, but of resonation or interference, amplification or damp-
ening’ (ibid.). However, ‘matter-of-factness dampens intensity’ (ibid. 86).
This ‘dampening of intensity’ raises significant questions about the 
methodology of studying affect in the frames of ethnographic research. 
What happens when affects are ‘translated’ as representations? What 
happens to affect in the process of narration? In psychology, theorising 
about affects is based on controlled observations of physical reactions, 
often in experimental situations where expressions, movements and 
utterances can be registered in a systematic way. But in several chapters 
of this book we are faced with interviews, memories and recollections 
of significant events that are narratively framed, and thus by definition 
stand out as emotions or a mix of affect and emotion. It is therefore of 
crucial importance to explore how the cognitively defined emotions that 
are encountered in interviews can be used to investigate affective states. 
In Povrzanović Frykman’s contribution (Chapter 4) we see this dilemma 
drawn to its extreme. Corporeal memories of war are narrated two dec-
ades after the events took place. As a researcher she was not even present 
at most of the interviews. So how can she possibly grasp the multilayered 
affective reactions that took place in the interview situations? We have 
to qualify the background given so far by discussing some of the basic 
features of contemporary approaches to analysing affect.
The problem of naming
The power that resides in the affect perspective is to be found in what 
it promises to open up. Kathleen Stewart (2007) consistently refers to 
‘forces’ and ‘intensities’ as a vague ‘something’. If nothing is defined, 
there is a strong potential for something new and unexpected to take 
place: ‘Once captured in the content nets of specific emotions, affects lose 
sensitive objects
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their capacity for movement and change’ (Cichosz 2014: 56). Massumi 
also claims that any definition ‘annuls the potential’ and ‘turns formless 
affective expression into content, such as a discernible emotion’ (ibid.). 
The moment we name/define affect we choose how to deal with it and 
probably engage in a culturally appropriate emotional reaction.
However – and this is comforting for those working with interviews 
– even if affect is not entirely ‘containable in knowledge’, Massumi sees 
it as ‘analyzable in effect, as effect’ (ibid. 107, n. 2). His explanation of 
how affective and emotional layers are connected captures how (e.g. in 
Chapter 4) an interviewee slows down, starts to breathe heavily, sighs 
and pauses as the narration touches on more demanding topics.
Researchers such as Sara Ahmed take a different stance by focusing 
on what affects do rather than what they are. She explores ‘how nam-
ing emotions involves different orientations towards the objects they 
construct’ (Ahmed 2004: 14) and takes clearly circumscribed emotions 
as the starting point when analysing affects. She notes how affect can 
accumulate around a sign or figure and argues that the circulation of 
affect occurs through specific cultural processes (see Wetherell 2015a for 
a critical discussion of Ahmed’s work). An example of how to use such 
an approach can be found in this volume, in the analysis of the multifac-
eted (post)colonial relations between the state and the Sámi population. 
Kramvig and Flemmen (Chapter 8) also describe how discriminatory 
names and frequently used blanket terms form the basis for a wide array 
of unspoken, affective attitudes that are difficult to get rid of.
Again the focus on practice – what affect does – also tends to widen 
the scope for what it is. When, for instance, bodily memories of war are 
brought to the surface (Chapter 4), when traumatic conflicts are played 
out in families (Chapter 7), or in the humiliation of having your cultural 
heritage faked and appropriated for commercial purposes (Chapter 8), 
affects do not appear as significantly ‘dampened’ by being narrated or 
framed in wider socio-historical understandings of the issues in question. 
By juxtaposing corporeal and cognitive processes in fieldwork or interview 
situations, much of the potential for understanding affect seems to get lost.
This is fully in accord with Wetherell’s critique (2013) of how affect 
is too quickly contrasted with the discursive and the cognitive and dis-
tinguished from ‘domesticated’ emotion. She claims that the ‘splitting 
of affect from everyday talk, discourse and meaning-making and the 
presentation of affect as something pre-conscious, to do with just bodies 
affect and material culture
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and events, makes little social psychological sense’ (ibid. 349). She further 
argues that ‘the objective of affect research is to produce textured, lively 
analyses of multiple modes of engagement’ (ibid.), for which purpose the 
studies of discursive practice are more apt than ‘non-representational’ 
methodological approaches (see also Wetherell 2015b).5
Approaching affects ethnographically
This collection of essays does not try to turn the tables on language, nar-
rations, or any other representations or trends within cognitive studies.6 
Instead, it is born out of a curiosity about how more established ways 
of analysing culture could benefit from advances in the growing field of 
affect and emotion studies. For more than a century anthropologists and 
ethnologists have investigated everyday life, where affects and emotions 
have always played an important role, but have until recently ‘not often 
been explicitly articulated as a force in themselves in theories of culture, 
history, and ways of life’ (Stewart and Lewis 2015: 236).7
Most of the contributors to this volume are ethnologists and anthro-
pologists with an extensive experience of fieldwork and a pronounced 
sensitivity for the material objects embedded in their respective (his-
toricised) contexts. Nils Gilje, who is a philosopher, Elisabet Hauge, 
a cultural geographer, and Lesley Stern, a professor of visual arts are 
the only contributors from other disciplines. Presented in more detail 
below, some contribute brand new ethnographic material and engage 
in autobiographical writing, whereas others revisit material gathered in 
earlier ethnographic studies or reach for examples from popular culture. 
The contributors invite us to their fieldwork sites in Norway, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the US, yet these sites serve only as a back-
ground for their examination of how objects embody or trigger affects 
and produce affective atmospheres. The book starts with theoretical 
and methodological discussions (chapters 1–3), and moves on to specific 
analyses of when, how, for whom, and why particular objects become 
sensitive (chapters 4–8). The final chapters (9–11) place the discussion of 
this sensitivity in the wider frame of their authors’ professional interest 
in innovation and culture tourism, while the last chapter (12) lends the 
book a finishing twist towards experimental writing.
As discussed above, the influence of philosophy on research into 
affects can hardly be overstated. Consequently, many contemporary 
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studies pursue elaborate theoretical discussions rather than analysing 
ethnographic material. When Nils Gilje (Chapter 2) traces studies of 
affect to their historical settings, he is trying to close the gap between 
philosophy, ethnology and anthropology: ‘Philosophy has always been 
good at asking questions but cultural and behavioural sciences are then 
called upon to come up with interesting answers’ (Frykman & Gilje 
2003: 8). This book sets out to overcome this divide and put theoretical 
concepts and approaches into use.
Stef Jansen (Chapter 3) critically examines the advantages and disad-
vantages of adopting contemporary theories of affect and the possibilities 
of integrating the perspectives they offer with established procedures 
of ethnographic work. As a point of departure he refers to his research 
in present-day Sarajevo (Jansen 2015), but also to a film evocative of the 
affective atmospheres in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 1990s war. 
Why are ‘intensities’ experienced unequally, what does it take to ‘get’ the 
affective state of the other, and how should we write about it?
Maja Povrzanović Frykman (Chapter 4) discusses the range of meth-
odological issues that can arise in interviews, with a particular focus on 
objects and their ‘sensitivity’. How can describing a tin of hardly edible 
minced meat received as part of a humanitarian aid parcel in wartime 
Sarajevo, or the cherished memory of sharing a carefully tended tomato 
grown on the windowsill, release bodily reactions and emotional out-
bursts some twenty years later?
Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Sanja Potkonjak (Chapter 5) write 
about a birthday party in postsocialist Zagreb that was ruined when an 
object from the past – a huge dusty portrait of former Yugoslav President 
Josip Broz Tito – unexpectedly turned up as a gift. In the twinkling of 
an eye the atmosphere at the party became suffocatingly thick. What 
can this example, entangled as it is with objects that have changed their 
meaning but retained their impact, tell us about the affective charge of 
history, politics and place?
Orvar Löfgren (Chapter 6) asks how things harbour hopes and dreams, 
traumatic memories and a hard-to-verbalise sense of abandon and adven-
ture when they are thrown together in a suitcase. The packing of ordinary 
luggage means both preparing for a journey and assembling objects that 
might appear ‘sensitive’ inasmuch as they trigger affects. By employing 
a historical perspective, Löfgren also demonstrates the malleability and 
formation of emotions due to the learning processes facilitated by films.
affect and material culture
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The undoing of a home and its objects is discussed by Jonas Frykman 
(Chapter 7), who analyses situations relating to the division of an inher-
itance – a ‘material, affective and multisensory environment, interpreted, 
known and acted in by domestic practitioners, through various sensory 
embodied ways of knowing’ (Pink et al., 2014: 428). When parents die, 
some things attain a pronounced affective value and at the same time 
serve as symbols, as the focus of narrations and as starting points for 
a return to past worlds, like Proust’s famous madeleine. Emotions run 
high and siblings, once close, become enemies who might never see or 
talk to one another again.
Britt Kramvig and Anne Britt Flemmen (Chapter 8) use the theories 
of affect to explain what happened when a traditional Sámi costume was 
mocked by the display of Chinese-manufactured copies at a Norwegian 
food-chain kick-off. Some of the Sámi community engaged in a fierce 
debate in which strong feelings, stemming from centuries of discrimina-
tion, were revived.
The essay by Elisabet Hauge (Chapter 9) about innovation and affect 
in the black metal musical world has been introduced above. This is the 
first of three essays based on the study of culture as a motor for innov-
ation and regional development, which has become the hallmark of 
Agderforskning institute.
Locating their research in a small Norwegian coastal town, Kirsti 
Hjemdahl Mathiesen and Jonas Frykman (Chapter 10) discuss how a 
female entrepreneur runs a successful hotel more or less on intuition. 
The proprietor has developed a hard to formalise or calculate ‘sense’ for 
what present and future customers want, how to choose between different 
cultural activities and, moreover, how to communicate this to the staff. 
Considering the overall materiality of the hotel and its environment, and 
the mobile phone as part of the proprietor’s subjectivity, the researchers 
explain the success of the hotel with the aid of affect theory.
Can applied research contribute to theoretical advances in the field 
of affect studies? Sarah Holst Kjær (Chapter 11) pursues this question 
by describing how Chinese and European visitors reacted to the storm-
swept lighthouse museum of Lindesnes in southernmost Norway. The 
place spurred reactions that were poles apart. For example, the European 
tourists felt exhilarated at being exposed to the elements, and the wind 
and waves enhanced their feeling of uniqueness, whereas the Chinese 
tourists shivered in the biting winds and longed for protected barbecue 
sensitive objects
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sites. The same milieu was experienced in accordance with how the 
senses, affects and emotions are culturally organised. This poses further 
questions about how we should study the interrelations between body, 
culture and place and how perspectives on affect can best be used to 
refine such analyses.
The book concludes with an essay by Kathleen Stewart and Lesley 
Stern (Chapter 12). They take us on a journey in which affective rela-
tions to places and objects are central. At the same time, it becomes 
an excursion into the art of writing ethnography as recomposing brief 
moments of affective encounters and testing the limits set by academic 
traditions and scholarly expectations – something that is also discussed 
by Stef Jansen (Chapter 3). Their writing responds to the philosopher and 
psychologist Ruth Leys (2011), one of the most experienced researchers 
of affect, who encourages its scholars to get out of their armchairs in 
order to ‘provide thick descriptions of life experiences of the kind that 
are familiar to anthropologists and novelists but are widely held to be 
inimical to science’ (ibid. 471). This resonates perfectly with the art of 
haiku writers, who
attend to a moving configuration of perceptions – a glimpse of 
colour, let’s say, plus a special tincture or texture combined with 
a peculiar sound pressing through a moment – that can resonate 
in the reader sensibility so that … ‘the mind is struck as with a 
hammer, bringing the senses up short and releasing a flood of 
associations’. (Gibson 2013: 246)
Affects and objects
With some significant exceptions, such as Navaro-Yashin (2009, 2012), 
Gibson (2013), Jansen (2013, 2015), and Bille et al. 2015), few ethnographers 
have worked on affects in relation to material culture.8 As ethnologists 
and anthropologists we are interested in practices and lived experiences 
that are always historically embedded. We therefore do not understand 
objects as having an independent affective ‘charge’. It is the practices of 
the people using the objects or who are inspired by environments that 
we observe, and it is the people we ask who tell us how they understand 
their practices ‘as goal-oriented, meaningful and affectively loaded’ 
(Jansen 2013: 35).
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Kramig and Flemmen (Chapter 8) align with the anthropologist Yael 
Navaro-Yashin (2009, 2012), who has done a lot of systematic fieldwork 
on affects. In her work on Turkish Cypriots inhabiting expropriated 
Greek dwellings, Navaro-Yashin challenges the way in which affect has 
been theorised, using metaphors that invoke abstraction, imaginaries 
of immateriality and conceptualisations of invisibility (ibid. 203). She 
also claims that affect is contained and emitted through the solidity, 
presence, visibility and tangibility of objects – a view of material cul-
ture that has been discussed at length by Hannah Arendt in the Human 
Condition (1958).
Arendt’s approach sums up most of the contributors’ perspectives on 
material culture as well as the inspiration they draw from phenomenol-
ogy. Here, inspiration is taken from Martin Heidegger, from phenome-
nology in general, and from postphenomenology in particular (see Ihde 
1990; Ahmed 2004; Frykman and Gilje 2003; Frykman 2012) in order to 
pull philosophy – transformed into ‘a more contemporary, flexible and 
effective philosophical toolcase’ – down from the commanding heights 
to ‘the trenches’ (Ihde 2003: 4).
Heidegger’s unique contribution is not so much his well-known 
statement that it is impossible to perceive the world cognitively without 
being tuned into or in a certain mood, but his combination of mood 
and material culture. Who else ventured to connect affects to something 
as mundane as tools and practical work? At times Heidegger has been 
caricatured for thinking from the perspective of a workshop or farmer 
engaged in different routines of tool use, although that perhaps says 
more about academic snobbery than his philosophical aptitude. From 
such a standpoint, tools such as hammers, scythes, axes, saws and knives 
could be seen as part of the countryman’s ‘equipment’ to be used for the 
purposes that their owner intended at a particular moment. With his 
scythe in his hands, the farmer perhaps envisaged fields to be mown, 
barns to be filled, flour to be milled and bread on the table. These things 
were zuhanden, or ‘ready-to-hand’, that affected his body as well as his 
intentions. His thoughts were given direction without the objects per se 
being the centre of his attention. On the other hand, the moment the 
scythe broke, the farmer had to reflect on its construction: whether it 
was really meant to be used on such stony fields and whether a better 
brand was available. The tool itself became vorhanden, ‘present-at-hand’, 
an object to be named, mulled over, something that found its cultural 
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significance in the inventory of other objects. As such, it presented itself 
to him as a symbol or a representation.
To Heidegger, the material as well as the social environment – Umwelt 
– was essential for understanding what ‘being there’ – Dasein – is all 
about. By using the notion of Befindlichkeit, he simultaneously referred to 
people’s moods and situations. The German phrase sich befinden means 
being situated in the sense of meeting the situation in a mood that makes 
its potential matter. Heidegger used the word mood – Stimmung – to 
denote this affective attitude to the world. Moods make it clear how 
things present themselves, how they are given substance and are selected 
from an otherwise neutral or indifferent environment. Any environment 
is thus perceived as sensitised prior to being intentionally explored. In 
his chapter on inheritance conflicts, Frykman (Chapter 7) describes an 
upset woman who in her Stimmung of anger is about to smash a crystal 
vase into smithereens on the pavement – a situation that leaves us in no 
doubt about affects being related to objects. This is the kind of moment 
that aptly captures what Heidegger meant by Befindlichkeit: a situation 
where affects make things matter, a complex chain of relations that is 
instantly felt and made tangible.
As the ways of approaching affects in this book are predominantly 
ethnographic, they tend to focus on what Bourdieu (1977) called situated 
praxis. Several contributors begin their analyses from similar points of 
departure – an event, a situation, or a scene. This is the case with the 
appearance of a fake gákti in a Sámi area (Chapter 8), eagerly received 
humanitarian aid in a besieged town (Chapter 4), the sudden display 
of a contested politicised portrait at a birthday party (Chapter 5) and 
tourists turning up at a lighthouse (Chapter 11). Similar to zooming in 
on the moments of despair, grief and quarrelling when parents die and 
objects from their estate are to be distributed (Chapter 7), they all in 
their different ways attempt to ‘catch’ the affects associated with objects 
at the moment of perception. Such moments reveal what people experi-
ence and know but perhaps cannot clearly articulate – the contingencies 
and junctures, the ‘tentative, charged, overwhelming, and alive’, to echo 
Kathleen Stewart (2007: 128–129).
As Hjemdahl and Frykman (Chapter 10) show, when the researchers 
visited Hotel Norge and its dynamic manager they literally ran with her 
from room to room and from one panorama view to another. Interviewing 
her about her activities and plans for the future was a bodily enterprise. 
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Talking was not enough, they had to move together through the hotel 
environment, look out of the windows, feel the wallpaper, see the size 
of the ballroom and so on. Similarly, as Hauge (Chapter 9) documents 
in her study of how place is important to musical entrepreneurs, a place 
is not simply a location, but a site where people live out their lives and 
where objects serve as useful tools.
There is a striking similarity between how Massumi juxtaposes affects 
as non-cognitive, irreducibly bodily and non-signifying and emotions as 
cognitive, vocal, laden with meaning and culturally embedded and how 
Heidegger describes relations to objects. According to Heidegger, the 
affective relation to material culture is zuhanden, which means bodily 
and non-signifying, while the emotional dimension has many traits in 
common with vorhanden, which is cognitive, symbolic and culturally 
embedded.
However, Orvar Löfgren’s study of suitcases and baggage (Chapter 6) 
shows the danger of dichotomisation. Things are constantly on the move 
between zuhanden and vorhanden, necessity and symbol, ‘intensity’ and 
‘qualification’. A suitcase contains the things that are essential for your 
travel and at the same time is an outer shell filled with prestige, social sig-
nificance, dreams, aspirations and commercial value. Löfgren uses Doreen 
Massey’s concept of thrown togetherness to denote how haphazard the 
packing can sometimes be and how the contents gain affinity by virtue of 
them being in the same bag. He also hints at another important dimension 
in Heidegger’s theory of how objects are attached to one another, namely 
the concept of worlding. The notion of worlding nowadays frequently 
appears in philosophy, ethnography, cultural studies, and technology 
studies, where it functions as a floating signifier. In this book it is applied 
in the same way as Heidegger used the concept of Welt – with reference to 
the totality of things that can be zuhanden, present-at-hand in the world. 
Toiletries, stockings, underwear, trousers, shirts and pullovers already had 
a strong attraction before ending up in the suitcase. Worlding here implies 
that things are brought together by being understood, handled and used. 
More or less out of habit they make themselves present and ‘call for each 
other’ before the suitcase is taken out of the closet. Their interrelation is 
so contingent that it can only be partially verbalised and intellectualised. 
When things are worlding they need no words, but are there, ready-to-
hand. Just as the farmer’s tools refer to one another, a wardrobe contains 
items that are ingrained prereflectively from an early age.
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How things are worlded through use is made especially clear with 
regard to the generational differences observed by Povrzanović Fryk-
man (Chapter 4) among former recipients of humanitarian aid. Here, 
the age of the interviewees during the war accounted for the difference 
in the affective charge of their narratives. Growing up under siege, the 
children in wartime Sarajevo absorbed the material world around them 
as it unfolded through their senses. While the happily recollected bar of 
chocolate – a standard item in an aid package – helped them to estab-
lish the world as they knew it through their palates, the same chocolate 
effectively ‘un-worlded’ the adults’ world, because it was an affective 
reminder of the material losses and changes in their environment that 
challenged their identity and dignity.
Objects become sensitive through use, but also serve as beholders of 
affects. The photograph of a long-dead president of a now non-existent 
state (Chapter 5) reveals the affective powers that are ‘activated, reacti-
vated and also altered … in the sparking gap between the picture and the 
viewer’ (Gibson 2013: 256). This and other contributions to this volume 
show that tangibility is crucial for the transmission of affects.
With this collection of essays we ground our analysis of affects in the 
relevant philosophical traditions, review some of the achievements in 
the humanities and social sciences, and raise important methodological 
issues. The objective has been to examine the potential for epistemic 
gain from material culture research in connection with studies of affect. 
Things explored in the context of closely observed situated practices have 
given us insights that are not attainable from textual or visual sources.
We therefore believe that ethnologists and anthropologists, together 
with other scholars doing ethnography, can make an important contri-
bution to the field of affect research. Our hope is that this book will be 
read across disciplines, not only to promote the value of ethnographic 
work, but also to further theoretically informed empirical approaches 
to affect and material culture.
Notes
1 In the field of material culture studies a sustained focus on affect is still quite rare. See e.g. 
Chadha 2006; Navaro-Yashin 2009, 2012; Townsend-Gault 2011; Beckstead et al. 2011; Gibson 
2013, Hafner 2013; Jansen 2013; Pink et al. 2014; Springwood 2014; Bille et al. 2015. See also 
the special issue of the Journal of Material Culture from 2010, which was devoted to emotive 
materiality and the affective presence of human remains (see Krmpotich et al. 2010).
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2 An exhaustive review is beyond the scope of this chapter, although some of the publications 
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tioning. These include the overviews of affect research provided in Clough and Halley 2007, 
Gregg and Seigworth 2010, and Wetherell 2012. See also Protevi 2009, Groenendyk 2011, 
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selection of articles published in the journal Cultural Anthropology. Margaret Wetherell’s 
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3 See e.g. Paterson 2007a, where the affective nature of touch is emphasised in a discussion of 
Reiki massage (see also Paterson 2007b). Analysing how the hand plays a vital role in both 
the intellectual and affective dimensions of healthcare, Pink et al. (2014) ‘bring together 
discussions of materiality with those of tactile knowing to develop a theoretical route to 
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(ibid. 427).
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embodiment as the prevailing affective mode by which these objects affect the world.
5 Wetherell (2015a) proposes that affective practice should become the topic of affect research, 
not the circulation of emotion or affect in itself. Similarly, Monique Scheer (2015) discusses 
emotional practices and argues that ‘a definition of emotion informed by practice theory 
promises to bridge persistent dichotomies … such as body and mind, structure and agency, 
as well as expression and experience’ (ibid. 193).
6 See Boscagli 2014 on ‘new materialism’.
7 European ethnologists’ recent attempt at such an articulation can be found in Bendix 2015.
8 In the introduction to a special issue on ‘staging atmospheres’, Bille et al. 2015: 35 note that 
‘what is needed is a stronger emphasis on the material dimension of atmosphere to balance 
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Chapter 2 shows how affects, moods, and emotions are treated by Spinoza 
and philosophers of existence, and how existential philosophy is a source of 
inspiration for empirically oriented social and cultural research. According 
to Spinoza, human consciousness can never be analysed independently of 
the body and its affects: joy implies an increase in the power of acting and 
sadness a decrease. By leaving the philosophy of the mind and concentrating 
on the philosophy of the body he has become a constant point of reference 
for scholars promoting the ‘affective turn’. For Kierkegaard and Heidegger 
our primary access to the world is also affective: the perceiver is always in 
some kind of mood – distracted, indifferent, anxious, or bored. Although 
fundamental to an understanding of how the world is constantly ‘attuned’ 
through affects and emotions, they both leave out what ethnologists and 




Some Philosophical Reflections 
on the ‘Affective Turn’
Nils Gilje
A cognitive bias has dominated the humanities and the social sciences for 
a long time. Most researchers have neglected the importance of moods 
and emotions in understanding the social and cultural dimensions of 
the human condition. Even those interested in the deeper and ‘inner’ 
realms of experience have often avoided the affective aspects of social 
interaction. In recent years, especially within what could be called exis-
tential sociology and ethnology, there has been a new focus on emotions 
– including those of the researcher. Subjectivity is on the agenda. With 
the new ‘affective turn’, some highly interesting work has been done to 
investigate feelings and emotions from an empirical perspective (Povr-
zanović Frykman 2003; Clough and Halley 2007; Greg and Seigworth 
2010; Frykman 2012). Some of the older sociological literature on the 
existential predicament is also highly relevant with regard to the ‘affec-
tive turn’ (Douglas and Johnson 1977; Ellis 1991; Scheff and Retzinger 
1991). With the new focus on moods and emotions, existential philosophy 
could be a source of inspiration for more empirically oriented social and 
cultural research. Philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger 
and Sartre suddenly become sparring partners for researchers analysing 
strong and challenging emotions and feelings.
In this chapter I will take a step back and look at how affects, moods 
and emotions are treated by some of the philosophers of existence.1 
Even though Heidegger uses terms like Affekt, Affektion and affizieren 
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(Heidegger 1996: 137–142, 341–346), his most important contribution 
to the ‘affective turn’ is his analysis of attunement (Befindlichkeit) and 
moods (Stimmungen). As it is understood in present-day philosophy 
and ethnology, the ‘affective turn’ also seems to reflect how Spinoza 
understood basic affects such as joy (laetitia) and sadness (tristitia). It 
would therefore be interesting to take a closer look at the affinities and 
differences between Spinoza and Heidegger. In doing so I will initially 
discuss a possible conceptual difference between moods and emotions, 
for example anxiety and fear. Even though anxiety and fear are some-
times treated as synonymous, some existential philosophers insist that 
this is not necessarily the case. It is often claimed that anxiety has no 
intentional object, but that fear always has, as for example in a fear 
of empty spaces, criminals or wild animals. The most existential of 
the existentialist philosophers is probably Kierkegaard. He is rightly 
famous for his analysis of anxiety, and he will therefore be the point of 
departure in this essay.
Starting at the beginning
In what sense could Adam and Eve be said to have been fully self­conscious 
human beings before the Fall? Were they perhaps closer to natural phe-
nomena without self-consciousness? As far as I know, the cliff outside 
my window has no consciousness. My cat, on the other hand, is quite a 
different story, and seems to have a high level of consciousness. In the 
world of nature there seem to be different degrees of self-awareness, but 
despite this we still think that human beings have a self-consciousness 
that is unique. There is also, of course, the fact that infants and young 
children gradually become self-conscious and aware of themselves in 
new ways. According to Kierkegaard, all infants reflect the experience 
of Adam and Eve in their journey to self-awareness.
In The Concepts of Anxiety (1844), Kierkegaard retells the biblical 
story of Adam and Eve and the meaning of original sin. Before the fall, 
Adam and Eve lived a preconscious, or not fully self-conscious, life. This 
state is described by Kierkegaard as one of innocence and ignorance. 
In the Garden of Eden their lives were happy, and they knew nothing 
of pain and sorrow. They could eat anything, except the fruit from the 
tree of knowledge. So far they had no experience of good and evil. After 
sinning, they were driven out of the garden and had to live the life of 
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human beings. Kierkegaard obviously treats the biblical story of the Fall 
of Man as an allegory: every human being has to make the passage from 
the preconscious life of infancy to self-conscious adulthood. Freedom, 
spirit (Ånd) and morality are not given, but are phenomena that develop 
in human beings (Pattison 2005).
In Kierkegaard’s language, Adam and Eve were not fully awake in 
the Garden of Eden, being ignorant and without spirit. But even in this 
state they had the capacity to experience something, namely to become 
aware of something that is really nothing, but that still gives birth to the 
human feeling of anxiety. Nothing begets anxiety. That is the first step 
out of the Garden of Eden; a step that has to be repeated by every human 
being (Kierkegaard [1844] 1980: 41).
Kierkegaard’s style of writing is not always easy to understand. What 
he seems to be saying is that anxiety is triggered by the child’s first 
awareness of a way of living (‘eating from the tree of knowledge’) that it 
still does not understand. Neither can it avoid the temptation to move 
in the direction of this ‘nothing’. In this moment, anxiety becomes part 
of the human condition:
The anxiety belongs so essentially to the child that he cannot do 
without it. Though it causes him anxiety, it captivates him by its 
pleasing anxiousness … The more profound the anxiety, the more 
profound the culture. (Ibid. 42)
According to Kierkegaard, this kind of anxiety is not found in animals. 
Animals have no spirit and do not have the freedom to commit original 
sin. It is difficult to say whether this argument is consistent with Kierke-
gaard’s gradualism or not, but we do not need to go into detail here.
Kierkegaard’s probably best known argument in The Concept of 
Anxiety is the claim that anxiety is not the same as fear, or that anxiety 
cannot be reduced to fear. Only a nothing can bring anxiety. The con-
cept of anxiety is therefore very different from fear and similar concepts 
‘that refer to something definite, whereas anxiety is freedom’s actuality 
as the possibility of possibility’ (ibid. 42). This is another argument for 
the thesis that anxiety is not found in animals – they simply lack the 
possibility of freedom. It is only for human beings that ‘freedom’s pos-
sibility announces itself in anxiety’ (ibid. 74). Understood in this way, 
anxiety is a reality sui generis. I can take the necessary steps to avoid 
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fear, but this is not so easy when it comes to anxiety. If someone asks 
me ‘What is it?’, a possible answer could be ‘I don’t know. It was prob-
ably nothing.’ And that is a good answer. But how can I be troubled by 
something that cannot be found anywhere in the world? How can I be 
worried about nothing? Of course, it can sometimes be psychologically 
difficult to distinguish between anxiety and fear, and the two states can 
also be intertwined in different ways.
What is really at stake here is the idea that anxiety and fear are 
two very different concepts. Kierkegaard never tires of repeating that 
the object of anxiety is nothing: ‘If we ask more particularly what the 
object of anxiety is, then the answer, here as elsewhere, must be that 
it is nothing’ (ibid. 98; see also 77, 97). But in Kierkegaard’s case, it is 
problematic to claim that anxiety is a non-intentional object and some-
thing that can never be an object of knowledge. This is especially so 
when it comes to children: ‘In observing children, one will discover this 
anxiety intimated more particularly as a seeking for the adventurous, 
the monstrous, and the enigmatic’ (ibid. 42). Anxiety, of course, is not 
identical with these phenomena, although they do point in that direc-
tion. Sometimes Kierkegaard seems to be saying that anxiety announces 
itself in the enigmatic. When the distinction between good and evil is 
finally established, then ‘the object of anxiety is a determinate some-
thing and its nothing is an actual something, because the distinction 
between good and evil is posited in concreto’ (ibid. 111). But this will 
not eliminate anxiety. For the adult human being, the possibility of 
freedom will never erase the distinction between good and evil. There 
are always possibilities and therefore new – so far unimaginable – sins: 
‘So anxiety again comes into relation with what is posited as well as 
with the future’ (ibid. 111).
Even though the relation between anxiety and fear is not crystal clear 
in Kierkegaard, I still think he is right to argue the difference between 
these two concepts. In the existentialist tradition, it is often claimed 
that what Kierkegaard calls anxiety is a mood – a Stimmung – to use 
the terminology of Heidegger and his pupils, while fear is an emotion. 
We are afraid of something, while when anxious we become conscious 
of a ‘possibility of a possibility’ (Kierkegaard). Human beings are always 
open in this way. Every ‘no’ – as in the Garden of Eden – makes us con-
scious of a new, as yet undiscovered possibility. A ‘no’ makes us aware 
of a border, beyond which we should not move.
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Being itself is not an object
The literature on Heidegger’s relations to Kierkegaard is huge (for some 
interesting contributions, see Magurschak 1985; Caputo 1993; Mulhall 
2001). We have seen that in Kierkegaard anxiety and nothingness always 
correspond with each other, and that nothingness produces anxiety. We 
can find similar statements in all of Heidegger’s work: ‘Anxiety discloses 
Nothingness’ (Heidegger 1967: 9), and ‘Anxiety is the basic attunement 
that confronts us with Nothingness’ (Heidegger 1973: 231). Such similari-
ties in terminology hide some important differences. Heidegger’s project 
in Being and Time was to develop an interpretation of being as such – a 
universal fundamental ontology. Despite all the external similarities, 
this project was very different from Kierkegaard’s thinking. In Being 
and Time, Kierkegaard is only mentioned in three footnotes. Seen from 
Heidegger’s point of view, ‘Kierkegaard got furthest of all in the analysis 
of the phenomenon of Angst’, he had ‘explicitly grasped and thought 
through the problem of existence … in a penetrating way’, but this ‘does 
not mean that he was also successful in the existential interpretation of 
it’ (Heidegger 1996: 405, 407, 412). According to Heidegger, the funda-
mental ontological problematic – the question of being as such – was 
foreign to Kierkegaard and he complained that the Danish philosopher 
was ‘completely under the influence of Hegel’ (ibid. 407). In Heidegger’s 
interpretation, Kierkegaard was still dominated by Western metaphysics. 
Strictly speaking, Kierkegaard was ‘not a thinker, but a religious writer’ 
(Heidegger 1977: 91).
Heidegger’s basic criticism of Kierkegaard in Being and Time could 
perhaps be summed up in the following way: Kierkegaard’s thinking 
never moves away from an ontic and psychological level (with the excep-
tion of The Concept of Anxiety) and he was alien to the question of being, 
even if he had interesting things to say about ‘das Existenz problem’. 
Heidegger was right: Kierkegaard was not interested in uncovering the 
deep ontological structures of human existence. But as Pattison has 
pointed out, Kierkegaard could have criticised Heidegger in more or 
less the same terms as he criticised Hegel: a thinker interested in the 
subjective and passionate approach to existence would not be inter-
ested in developing a universal ontology. He/she would be interested 




Karl Jaspers was influenced by both Kierkegaard and Heidegger. 
He took over Kierkegaard’s understanding of anxiety, freedom and 
human existence, never missing subjectivity and personal Existenz, 
and reformulated Heidegger’s question of being in his own vocabulary. 
In many ways it is much easier to understand Jasper’s version of the 
question of being:
The first answer to the question of being arises from the following 
basic experience: Whatever becomes an object for me is always a 
determinate being among others, and only a mode of being. When 
I think of being as matter, energy, spirit, life, and so on … in the 
end I always discover that I have absolutized a mode of determi-
nate being, which appears within the totality of being, into being 
itself. No known being is being itself. (Jaspers [1937] 1971: 17)
As finite human beings we never attain a standpoint where the limiting 
horizon disappears and from which we can survey the whole, like a view 
from nowhere. Seen in this way, it seems a difficult – if not impossible 
– project to construct a universal fundamental ontology. What Jaspers 
calls being itself is not an object and not a being, and disappears the 
moment it announces itself in new beings. Trying to capture being itself 
is like trying to capture our shadow. This being itself is what Jaspers 
calls the encompassing (das Umgreifende): ‘The encompassing always 
merely announces itself – in present objects and within horizons – but 
it never becomes an object. Never appearing to us itself, it is that wherein 
everything else appears’ (ibid. 18). A similar distinction can be found 
in Kant. According to Kant, everything we can know is in the world, 
but the ‘world itself ’ is not an object of knowledge. There is astronomy, 
physics, chemistry and so on, but no science of the ‘world itself ’ (Kant 
[1787] 1970: 384 ff.).
Like anxiety, I cannot point my finger at the encompassing. Anxiety 
and the encompassing are not open to ostensive definitions. I cannot 
show you where they are. This understanding of the encompassing is 
close to Heidegger’s own position in the 1930s. But Heidegger would 
probably have added something to Jasper’s description, namely that the 
encompassing is always already affective and characterised by certain 
moods (despair, boredom, the feeling of estrangement etc.).
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Everything is so strange …
The Norwegian poet Sigbjørn Obstfelder (1866–1900) – who died of tuber-
culosis at the age of 34 – wrote a beautiful poem describing something 
that perhaps could be called a ‘mixed mood’, involving both the feeling 
of estrangement and that of anxiety. This mood ‘colours’ everything that 
is observed; every object is experienced from a certain affective perspec-
tive, or a certain mood. The poem is called ‘I look’, ‘Jeg ser’:
Jeg ser på den hvide himmel.
Jeg ser på de gråblå skyer.
Jeg ser på den blodige sol
Dette er altså verden.
Dette er altså klodernes hjem.
En regndråpe!
Jeg ser på de høye huse,
jeg ser på de tusinde vinduer,
jeg ser på det fjerne kirketårn
Dette er altså jorden.
Dette er altså menneskenes hjem.
De gråblå skyer samler sig. Solen blev borte.
Jeg ser på de velklædte herrer,
jeg ser på de smilende damer,
jeg ser på de ludende heste.
Hvor de gråblå skyer blir tunge.
Jeg ser, jeg ser …
Jeg er visst kommet på feil klode!
Her er så underlig …
(Obstfelder 2001)
I look at the white sky.
I look at the grey-blue clouds.
I look at the blood-red sun.
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So this is the Earth.
So this is the home of the planets.
A raindrop!
I look at the tall houses,
I look at the thousand windows,
I look at the distant church spire.
So this is the Earth.
So this is the home of mankind.
The grey-blue clouds gather. The sun disappears.
I look at the well-dressed gentlemen,
I look at the smiling ladies,
I look at the stooping horses.
The grey-blue clouds become so heavy.
I look, I look …
I must have come to the wrong planet
Everything is so strange …
(translation by Nils Gilje)
In the poem the familiar world is present – the sky, clouds, houses, a 
church, gentlemen, ladies, horses – but at the same time is strangely 
unfamiliar. Something has moved in between mankind and the worldly 
things, between the poet and his worldly compatriots. Everything is 
strange. All the well-known phenomena seem to have lost their meaning 
and what is going on has become questionable. This leads to a feeling of 
estrangement. Is the observer a stranger in the world he inhabits – or 
does he know it too well? Can this really be the world of mankind? At 
the end the poet seems to be trapped in the mood of the uncanny, or 
what Heidegger calls ‘Unheimlichkeit als solcher’. The poet feels that 
he is not at home in this ‘home of mankind’, where everything has 
become strange.
There are some striking similarities between Obstfelder and the 
German poet Rainer Maria Rilke, both of whom seem to experience 
the same complexity of moods. In Rilke’s poem ‘Die grosse Nacht’ the 
poet is in a city that appears strange and unfamiliar, watching it from 
the window and observing it at a distance:
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Noch war die neue
Stadt wie verwehrt, und die unüberredete Landschaft
finsterte hin, als wäre ich nicht. Nicht gaben die nächsten
Dinge sich Müh, mir verständlich zu sein. An der Laterne
Drängte die Gassen auf: ich sah, dass sie fremd war.
(Rilke 1975)
The new city still was as if denied me, and the unpersuaded land-
scape darkened as if I was not. The nearest things did not bother 
to make themselves known to me. The street crowded itself up to 
the lamppost: I saw it was strange.
(translation by Nils Gilje)
In such a mood the world is disclosed in a certain way. Moods seem to have 
the function of opening up the world to us, and different moods disclose 
the world in different ways. In this sense, moods are our pre-theoretical 
access to the world. However, it is also a well-known fact, at least in some 
forms of existentialist philosophy, that some moods have a more privileged 
status than others. In the works of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, anxiety 
has such a privileged ontological position. But perhaps we should also 
regard the feelings of alienation and estrangement, as in Obstfelder and 
Rilke, as important existential moods that should not be transformed 
into ontological structures.
I have already indicated that anxiety differs from fear in that the object 
of anxiety is ‘nothing’ or ‘nothingness’. In this sense, anxiety is not just 
understood as a mood among other moods, such as pleasure and sadness, 
but is also said to be an ontological characteristic of mankind, rooted in 
his or her very existence. I do not find this argument very convincing, 
though. It is not quite clear why anxiety should be ranked in this way. The 
same could probably be said about despair, boredom, estrangement – or 
more cheery moods like happiness and the feelings of pleasure and joy. It 
is exactly at this point that Spinoza becomes relevant for our discussion.
Spinoza and the ‘affective turn’
There is little of Spinoza in Heidegger’s oeuvre. Heidegger seems to 
have accepted the argument of post-Kantian German idealism that 
Spinoza could not think of the Absolute as subjectivity (cf. Heidegger 
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[1936] 1986: 57 ff., 124; Heidegger 1957). Heidegger developed a dialogue 
with the Greeks, Duns Scotus, Meister Eckhart, Kant, Hegel, Schelling 
and Nietzsche, but not with Spinoza. In Being and Time Spinoza is not 
mentioned at all. This is strange, because there are interesting points of 
overlap between Being and Time and Spinoza’s Ethics. One promising 
theme is Heidegger’s interpretation of Befindlichkeit and moods (Stim­
mungen) and Spinoza’s analysis of the emotions (affectiones). Kierkegaard 
does not seem to have shown much interest in Spinoza either. His claim 
that Spinoza’s substance is only a metaphysical expression of Christian 
providence is not very convincing (Kierkegaard 1980: 199).2
Even though Heidegger and Spinoza develop similar claims about 
thinking, understanding and moods, there is also an obvious distance 
between them. This comes out clearly in their reflections on death. For 
Heidegger, death is a permanent and yet undetermined ‘possibility of 
no-longer-being-able-to-be-there’ (1996: 232). Death is intimately mine. 
No one else can die my death. At the same time, death is something that I 
would like to put into parentheses, or ignore. For me, anticipating death, 
or ‘running ahead into death’, defines the possibility of the absence of 
all possibilities. For Heidegger, this is the most challenging way of being 
attuned: ‘Being-toward death is essentially Angst’. What is it that char-
acterises authentic existence projected being-toward-death? Anticipating 
death, which for Heidegger has nothing to do with the ‘cowardly fear’ of 
death, discloses the finitude of existence and makes us free in relation 
to it (ibid. 245). In this sense, Heidegger talks about the possibility to be 
ourselves ‘in passionate anxious freedom toward death which is free of 
the illusions of the they’ (ibid. 245; emphasis in the original). Anticipating 
death can even free us from the tyranny of das Man and open the gate 
to an authentic life. In Spinoza there is nothing of this heroic realism 
towards death. In fact, Spinoza is extremely critical of those moods that 
have had a privileged status in many existentialist traditions: ‘A free man 
thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not 
of death but of life’ (IVp67).3 According to Spinoza, a free person is not 
led by anxiety and fear. Rather he/she strives to act, live and preserve 
her/his being. Therefore a free man does not focus on death, but – as 
Spinoza claims – ‘his wisdom is a meditation of life’ (ibid.). For Spinoza 
anxiety can never lead to an authentic life. Authentic existence is rather 
correlated with joy and happiness. This seems to be an understanding of 
being-in-the-world that is far removed from Kierkegaard and Heidegger. 
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However, this first impression reveals some very interesting affinities 
between these thinkers.
According to Spinoza, all forms of understanding and knowledge are 
expressed in affective structures (see Renz 2012). Spinoza seems to claim 
that feeling and thinking, or feeling and cognition, are two aspects of 
the same psychological process (cf. 2a3, IIp48–49). Even true knowledge 
is something that is felt, not only something that is known (cf. Vp23). As 
we have seen, Heidegger develops a similar thesis by arguing that our 
understanding is always already ‘attuned’ in certain ways:
Mood has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole 
and first makes possible directing oneself toward something … The 
moodedness of attunement constitutes existentially the openness 
to world of Da-sein. (Heidegger 1996: 129)
In both Spinoza and Heidegger we are confronted with the elimination 
of the idea of an original unbodily and ‘pure’ theoretical attitude to the 
world. This explains why the purest theōria does not abandon all moods:
Even when we look theoretically at what is merely objectively 
present, it does not show itself in its pure outward appearance 
unless this theōria lets it come toward us in a tranquil staying. 
(Heidegger 1996: 130)
For Spinoza, there is close correspondence between the emotions of 
the body and the ideas of the soul. Human consciousness can never be 
analysed independently of the body and its emotion. Our relation to the 
world is always already constituted by bodily emotions or affects.
The reason why Spinoza has such an important place in the ‘affective 
turn’ is due to his philosophy of emotion and power. Gilles Deleuze has 
correctly pointed out that Spinoza engenders all the passions, in detail, 
on the basis of two fundamental affects: joy as an increase in the power 
of acting and sadness as a decrease or diminution of the power of acting 
(cf. Deleuze 1981). According to this analysis, Spinoza leaves the philo-
sophy of the mind and concentrates on the philosophy of the body. Seen 
from Spinoza’s point of view, we still do not know what a body is cap-
able of. We talk about the soul and the mind, but we have no idea what 
a body can do. Here Spinoza goes in a materialistic direction compared 
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to Heidegger and Kierkegaard, where at least Dasein (Heidegger) or the 
individual being (Kierkegaard) gets a body.
Power is a key term in Spinoza’s philosophy of bodily emotion. When-
ever power of some kind increases or decreases, there are emotions. 
When there is an increase in power, there is active emotion. This claim 
can also be turned around: when there is active emotion, there is an 
increase in power. According to Spinoza, increase in power is also an 
increase in freedom. Only active emotions will increase our power and 
freedom; passive emotions will decrease our power and diminish our 
freedom (cf. IIIp6–9). What kind of emotions will increase our power and 
freedom? What kind of emotions will decrease our power and freedom? 
The starting points for answering these questions are joy and sadness.
In the Ethics, especially in parts 3 and 4, Spinoza analyses many emotions 
on the basis of the two fundamental affects of joy (laetitia) and sadness 
(tristitia). An increase in power, freedom and autonomy has everything to 
do with joy. Joy cannot be separated from authenticity. In IVp41, Spinoza 
defines joy as the emotion, whereby the body’s power of activity is increased 
or helped. Thus, it is not only the body that profits from joy. According to 
Spinoza, an increase in the body’s power to act also implies an increase in 
our ability to think (cf. IIIp11). Joy makes us better thinkers and improves 
our minds. Here, active emotions have a lot to do with intellectual activity.
Why is joy so important for Spinoza? Most of the positive claims in his 
philosophy of emotion are based on joy: when we are in joy, we increase 
in power. Increasing in power implies being joyful. When we experience 
joy, we become freer, at least in some respects, and become more active. 
When we feel joy we also experience an increase in self-realisation and 
authenticity (being oneself). So, for Spinoza, it is not primarily anxiety 
that discloses the world to us – it is joy.
Not all forms of joy have positive effects, however. Love and desire, 
for example, may be excessive and take control of our actions. In such 
contexts Spinoza uses the term titillatio, which is perhaps best translated 
as intense stimulation or extreme excitement. When our bodies are taken 
over by titillatio we tend to become the slaves of our own passions. In 
part 4 of the Ethics Spinoza analyses some of these possibilities:
For the emotions, whereby we are daily assailed, are generally 
referred to some part of the body which is affected more than 
the rest; hence the emotions are generally excessive, and so fix 
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the mind in the contemplation of one object, that it is unable to 
think of others. (IVp44)
Emotions can thus become obstinately fixed. This is the case when we 
are completely absorbed in an object (or a subject). It is not difficult to 
imagine what Spinoza has in mind here. His favourite example is ‘those 
persons who are inflamed with love, and who dream all night and all day 
about nothing but their mistress, or some woman’ (IVp44). According to 
Spinoza, we should therefore differentiate between cheerfulness (hilari­
tas) and extreme excitement. When joy affects all parts of the mind and 
body equally, increasing our total power, Spinoza normally talks about 
joy as cheerfulness. Cheerfulness somehow permeates the whole person.
Spinoza’s Ethics can be read as an attempt to show us how to educate 
our emotions and desires. We have to learn that a strong emotion may 
impede the development of different aspects of mind and body, especially 
when it is concentrated in one or a few bodily parts (and corresponding 
ideas). Titillatio comes in many forms. One effect of extreme excitement 
might be a partial or limited increase in power and freedom, although 
it could also result in a dramatic decrease in power and freedom. Very 
strong stimulations of the body may block an increase in power and 
freedom, or reduce it. An example of this is sexual addiction, or an 
un usually strong obsession with sex, which can reduce a person’s possi-
bility of self-realisation. In fact, any extreme excitement that is initially 
pleasurable may turn us into slaves. If titillatio renders the body ‘incap-
able of being affected in a variety of other ways’ (IVp43), we will soon 
lose our freedom and autonomy.
The power and freedom of mankind can also be reduced in other 
ways. Some of Spinoza’s most interesting reflections on human affec-
tions focus on sadness (tristitia). Generally speaking, sadness is a state 
of decreasing power and freedom. When discussing sadness, Spinoza 
distinguishes between melancholy (melancholia) and pain (dolor). This 
trio corresponds more or less with joy, cheerfulness and extreme excite-
ment. Melancholy can be said to be the polar opposite of cheerfulness. 
Melancholy diminishes or hinders the power of activity in our bodies, 
and therefore also hinders the power of thought and understanding in 
our minds. This mood implies an overall decrease in activity (cf. Næss 
1975: 103). Like cheerfulness, melancholy affects all parts of the body (cf. 
IIIp11). We can be taken over by melancholy. It is a mood that completely 
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colours our perceptions of the world and ourselves. Spinoza has a lot to 
say about the emotions that we encounter in poets such as Rilke and 
Obstfelder, but insists that melancholy is a state in which we lose power 
and freedom in every relation. Extreme forms of melancholy come close 
to madness.
Pain corresponds to extreme excitement or stimulation and normally 
implies a decrease in power in at least one relation and a partial loss of 
freedom. Being in pain also implies a partial decrease in understanding. 
Pain is clearly intertwined with thinking and understanding.
It is not possible here to go into Spinoza’s complex analysis of mixed 
emotions. The pain that is experienced during a pleasurable or highly 
rewarding undertaking, such as climbing a mountain or working on an 
article late at night, does not normally lead to a decrease in power and 
freedom, largely due to the joyful nature of the undertaking. If titillatio, 
or excessive stimulation, is an obstacle to freedom and self-realisation, 
in certain joyful situations dolor could be a positive stimulation.
From these comments on the ‘affective turn’ in Spinoza we can easily 
understand why he could not give any primacy to the existential mood 
of anxiety. Even though anxiety, like dolor, could help us to understand 
some important aspects of the human condition, Spinoza would probably 
say that anxiety is a mood that at least partially diminishes our body’s 
power to act and decreases our freedom and autonomy. But Spinoza 
would also agree with Heidegger that thinking and knowledge produc-
tion cannot be separated from the emotions of our body. We always feel 
our understanding of something.
Back to basic moods
Let us suppose that anxiety has an important philosophical function. 
Kierkegaard’s claims that anxiety discloses our experience of ‘nothing-
ness’, and Heidegger does the same: ‘Die Angst offenbart das Nichts’ – 
anxiety reveals nothingness. Why, then, is this presentation of anxiety 
and nothingness so important for thinkers such as Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger? It might be because anxiety shakes the human being in all 
his/her familiar relations. According to Heidegger, in everyday life the 
human being is ontologically ‘fallen’, lives an inauthentic life and has das 
Man as its hero. In our daily lives most of us take part in what Heideg-
ger calls the ‘real dictatorship of the “they”’ – with its ‘news papers’ and 
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‘public transport’. Of course, everything that is ‘public’ (öffentlich) – such 
as political parties and trade unions – is an expression of das Man. Most 
of the time I take part in the ‘great mass’, where ‘every Other is like the 
next’. However, most importantly, das Man conceals my finitude and 
what it really means to be a finite being-in-the-world (see Heidegger 1956: 
167–180). Here I will not discuss Heidegger’s elitist and rather problem-
atic criticism of modernity, but will instead focus on his understanding 
of the role of moods.
For both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, anxiety and the experience of 
‘nothingness’ are necessary in order to bring humans out of their every-
day lives and attain a more authentic level of existence. Anxiety serves 
to shake us up and bring us back to ourselves. Understood in this way, 
anxiety has an extremely positive function, and is not something that 
should be avoided at all cost. It is rather an expression of what is human 
about human nature. Anxiety is like some sort of dizziness that creates a 
distance between people and everything they are involved in. However, 
in this state of lack of control, mankind’s existence, possibilities and 
freedom are revealed. When humans are thrown back on themselves, 
they will finally discover their real existential freedom. Seen from this 
perspective, which is shared by both Jaspers and Heidegger, anxiety has 
nothing to do with weakness. Weakness shows itself when we flee from 
anxiety and move back to the security of trivial and inauthentic everyday 
life – to the life of das Man. Withstanding anxiety implies extreme effort.
Other basic moods (Stimmungen) have a similar function in the 
philoso phy of existence. They all call mankind to authenticity, but do 
not have the same privileged position as anxiety. I will not go into an 
analysis of moods such as boredom (Langweile), melancholia (Schwermut) 
and despair (Verzweifelung), but will simply make a few comments about 
them. With regard to boredom, we need to distinguish between super-
ficial boredom, for example when reading a boring book or listening to a 
boring lecture, and a deeper and more ‘eigentliche Langweile’ (Heidegger), 
which can be totally overpowering, where nothing seems to be important 
and all action seems meaningless. I am bored by everything, including 
myself and nothing in the world matters. Heidegger calls this a feeling of 
‘strange indifference’ (merkwürdige Gleichgültikeit). It is probably easier 
to flee from boredom than anxiety. Heidegger once said – in 1929/1930 
– that boredom was the primary mood of the times (Heidegger 2004). 
But as we know, in 1933 the basic mood was quite different.
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Heavy-mindedness and melancholia seem to have been important 
moods in Kierkegaard’s life. Melancholia (tungsind) was his ‘faithful 
mistress’. According to Kierkegaard, melancholia is similar in many ways 
to anxiety. If you ask a melancholic what makes him or her so gloomy, 
then he/she will answer: I don’t know, I can’t say. Heavy-mindedness is 
akin to being melancholic and is a person’s way of being in the world 
(for a good analysis of KierkegaardCs view of melancholy, see Verstrynge 
2008: 143–159). There also seems to be a close relationship between bore-
dom and melancholia; melancholia is sometimes understood to be an 
extreme form of boredom. Kierkegaard also accepted the old idea that 
melancholia was a severe sin, in that it breaks down our ability to decide 
and to act as free human beings.
Let us leave the moods for a moment and turn to how existential-
ist philosophy understands ‘existence’, or the basic human condition. 
According to Kierkegaard, there is no progress and no cumulative learn-
ing at the existential level. At this level, every generation has to start 
from scratch. What is really human can never be learned from previous 
generations. The question of heritage is therefore reformulated within 
existentialism: it becomes a question of ‘repetition’, which is also the 
title of one of Kierkegaard’s books from 1843: Repetition (Gentagelsen). 
It is an important argument, too, in Being and Time: ‘The repetition is 
the explicit handing over’ (Heidegger 1996: 352, translation modified by 
Nils Gilje). This idea was already very popular in Lutheran Protestant-
ism and is clearly expressed in Luther’s claim that ‘the old Adam should 
become sober by daily remorse and repentance and daily be reborn as a 
new man’ (quoted from Bollnow 1949: 104). It is important to stress that 
it is only at an existential level that something like ‘repetition’ is found, 
which Kierkegaard also pointed out in Repetition. In normal life we are 
involved in transformation and progress. Repetition understood from 
an existential point of view does not exclude reforms and transforma-
tions of society. However, existential repetition cannot make sense of 
such changes.
In our everyday language we talk about high and low moods, superficial 
and deep moods, and being ‘attuned’ in a certain way. This expression 
comes close to the German Stimmungslage (or the Norwegian stem­
ningsleie). When I am in a certain mood or attuned in a certain way, the 
world appears to me affectively. I am tuned like a musical instrument. 
When I am attuned in a different way, it appears differently. Moods are 
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therefore basic ways of relating to the world. They also have an epis-
temic function. Moods make certain experiences possible and exclude 
others. They determine from the outset how the world appears to us as 
individuals. Even our observations are coloured by moods, sometimes 
in lights colours, sometimes in dark colours. Our experience of the 
world is therefore emotionally coloured, as ‘rosy’ or ‘gloomy.’ This is how 
moods open the world for us. Not even the so-called theoretical attitude 
is free from moods, but is based on very specific ones. Moods are thus 
always involved in the discovery of the world: ‘Every understanding has 
its mood. Every attunement understands’ (Heidegger 1996: 309). While 
there is surely more to discovery than attunement and moods, basic 
affects seem to play an important role in scientific activity.
At this point there is also an important difference between Heidegger 
and his most famous pupil Hans-Georg Gadamer. In Truth and Method 
Gadamer develops a much more cognitive interpretation of how the world 
is disclosed to us. Seen from Gadamer’s point of view, preunderstanding 
and prejudice are the most important preconditions for understanding. 
But both preunderstanding and prejudice are basically forms of propo-
sitional knowledge. Moods are not propositions. And Heidegger’s idea 
of the primacy of practical knowledge or know-how (the German terms 
being Vorhabe and Vorsicht) can in my opinion not be reduced to prop-
ositional knowledge.
I have tried to establish a distinction between moods (Stimmungen) 
and emotions (Gefühle), even though this distinction is not very well 
supported by our everyday language, at least not in Norwegian and 
probably not in English either. I still think that there is a difference 
between experiencing joy when an old friend unexpectedly turns up 
and being attuned in a certain way. A mood is more like a state that for 
shorter or longer periods ‘takes hold of me’. In the 1970s Jack Scott had 
a hit called ‘What in the world’s come over you’. A mood is something 
that comes over me, without necessarily being intentionally directed 
towards an object. There might be a close relation between the general 
feeling of well-being or happiness, and the joy of seeing an old friend, 
but it still seems to be a good idea to draw a distinction between mood 
and intentional emotion.
Mood and emotion are related in complex ways. In Sergio Leone’s 
spaghetti western ‘Per un pugno di dollari’ you never see the nameless 
and lonely rider, played by Clint Eastwood, smile or laugh. The antihero 
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is obviously tuned in a certain way. He is characterised by his gloomy 
moods. But mood does not reduce the emotions to superficial epiphenom-
ena. Even though Heidegger placed moods at a deeper ontological level 
than emotions (Gefühle), moods can be turned on by strong emotions. 
The loss of a dear friend or a family member could mean being in a sad 
mood for a very long time. In Henrik Ibsen’s epic poem Terje Vigen, he 
tells the story of a Norwegian fisherman and sailor who during the British 
blockade in the Napoleonic wars set out in his rowing boat to buy wheat 
in Denmark. On his way home he was captured by an English captain 
and put in prison for five years. When he eventually returned to Norway 
he found that his wife and child had starved to death. The loss of his 
wife and daughter transformed Terje emotionally. In his mourning he 
became completely overwhelmed by melancholia and sadness, and also 
by hate and revenge. In such a mood certain emotional expressions are 
unthinkable, for example laughter and joy. Only after having saved the 
wife and daughter of the English captain who was responsible for his 
loss could Terje Vigen be attuned in a new way:
Ærbødig løftet han barnet ned,
og kyssed dets hender mildt.
Han ånded, som løst fra et fængsels hvelv;
hans stemme lød rolig og jevn:
‘Nu er Terje Vigen igjen sig selv.
Indtil nu gik mit blod som en stenet elv;
for jeg måtte – jeg måtte ha’e hævn.’
Respectfully he sat the child on its feet,
and kissed its hands gently.
He was breathing as though released from a prison cell,
his voice sounded calm and even:
‘Now Terje Vigen is himself again
Like a rocky stream flowed my blood then;
for I had – I had to take revenge’.
(translation by Nils Gilje)
Despite my emphasis on the difference between emotions and moods, 
there are clearly intriguing interactions between the two, and in many 
cases it can be difficult to determine which is which. A mood is not a 
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completely subjective experience either, because subject and object and 
the self and the world are interrelated. This point is clearly expressed 
by Heidegger in Being and Time: The mood is neither ‘subjective’ nor 
‘objective’, but arises as a way of being-in-the-world in the world itself.
Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Heidegger give anxiety a certain priority 
over other moods. Even though anxiety is an important mood, I think 
that moods in the plural open up the basic structures of our being in the 
world. Unfortunately, Kierkegaard and Heidegger tend to focus on anx-
iety and despair in their analyses of the human being. In paragraph 40 of 
Being and Time it is clear that anxiety is the primary and paradigmatic 
mood in the analysis of Dasein. The problem with this approach is that 
other moods tend to be reduced to deficient or superficial moods. In my 
opinion, Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety is brilliant, but he tends to end 
up with a one-dimensional Dasein. This is because it is based mostly on 
one mood – anxiety.
It is easy to understand why anxiety has been given such a privileged 
place in existential philosophy. Anxiety is the mood that confronts us with 
Nichts. What we are confronted with in Nothingness is life itself, or what 
Heidegger called ‘das In-der-Welt-sein selbst’. According to Kierke gaard, 
anxiety presents to us the possibility of freedom. Heidegger’s argument 
is similar: Without the original manifestation of nothingness, there is 
no self-being and no freedom.
An interesting approach to such claims that does not start from 
anxiety can be found in the works of the Italian Renaissance philosopher 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. In On the Dignity of Man (1486), Pico 
presents his personal version of the myth of creation. In Pico’s version, 
God is a Platonist and uses the rich resources in the realm of ideas in 
the creation of the world. According to this view, the sun, the moon and 
the stars have a fixed essence or nature and behave in accordance with 
ideas about the sun, moon and stars. The same is the case with animals, 
trees, plants etc. The lion behaves in accordance with ideas about lions, 
the sheep in accordance with ideas about sheep and so on. No created 
being can change its nature. However, on the sixth day, when God created 
Adam, all the ideas and resources had been used up. So when God made 
Adam he had to conclude that all creatures had a fixed and eternal 
essence except for Adam, who was created without a permanent nature 
and had freedom to become a wild beast or a beautiful angel. According 
to Pico, this is how man is distinguished from all other beings. He also 
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maintained that freedom is the dignity of man (Pico 1965). We know 
that Kierkegaard was aware of Pico, as was Heidegger (probably from 
his reading of Schelling’s treatise on the freedom of man).
I would like to add a few words about Pico to explain the relevance 
of his myth. Pico is a kind of paradoxical anti-essentialist. What is the 
essence of men and women? It is to be without a predetermined essence. 
Our existence precedes our essence. We recognise this as Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
argument in Existentialism is Humanism. Sartre has only secularised 
Pico’s analysis. Seen from Pico’s point of view, every human being is 
placed in Adam’s position; he is either free or condemned to freedom, 
as Sartre would say, and has to pick his way between the beasts and the 
angels. At an existential level there is in fact nothing new, no progress, 
no learning process. This idea, as we have seen, was taken over by Kierke-
gaard and Heidegger, both of whom focused on exactly the same points: 
Gentagelse and Wiederholung.
Conclusion
In my opinion, anxiety is a very fragile foundation for a phenomen-
ology of moods and emotions. Let me first reiterate the sound point 
Heidegger’s position, namely that I am always in some kind of mood. 
I am distracted, indifferent, anxious, bored or whatever. Therefore, 
mankind’s primary form of disclosure is affective, and this affective 
disclosure reveals humans as confronted with their own existence. When 
mankind is attuned in a mood, she/he sees possibilities – for instance 
of an authentic existence.
Most of the time we live our lives in what Plato called the realm of 
doxa, and what Heidegger refers to as everyday life. Being-in-the-world 
is always being together with others in that world (Mitsein). Heidegger 
calls the everyday form of this being together das Man. Being determined 
by das Man is inauthentic, because it means that man lives according 
to the conventions and customs of the everyday world. In Being and 
Time – except for the discussion in paragraph 74 on taking part in the 
fate of the Volk – there does not seem to be any authentic form of being 
together. With this exception, being together is understood negatively 
as das Man. Authentic existence is only possible when man confronts 
anxiety and death. In some sense, then, authentic existence in Heidegger 
takes the form of self-sufficiency.
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Is it perhaps time to rehabilitate inauthentic existence? What is really 
wrong with small talk? What is wrong with a jolly good party? Why is 
it inauthentic to see Liverpool play football, read newspapers, or watch 
television? (For some interesting comments on this, see Critchley 2007: 
21–50). If Heidegger had been more open to positive moods, or to Spinoza’s 
phenomenological descriptions of joy, his criticism of modern daily 
life would probably have been different. There is an elitist bias in both 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and much less so in Spinoza (see Negri 
1991). Whatever Heidegger thought of the modern world, he was surely 
not fond of the ‘real dictatorship of the “they”’. But this did not protect 
him from the real dictatorship of Hitler. Heidegger’s phenomenological 
analysis of attunement and moods is nonetheless an important source 
of inspiration for both present-day philosophy and more empirically 
oriented social and cultural research.
In this chapter I have tried to spell out some of the philosophical ideas 
involved in the recent ‘affective’ and existentialist turn in ethnology and 
social science, focusing primarily on Kierkegaard, Spinoza and Heidegger. 
One important claim has been that moods and emotions disclose our 
world in different ways. Thus moods and emotions also have important 
epistemic functions.
Notes
1 Generally speaking, moods can be understood as collective phenomena and should not be 
reduced to more individual or psychological affects or emotions. We are affected by moods 
that somehow come upon us from the ‘outside’. On the other hand, moods should not be 
‘objectified’ (hypostasis). Moods are nothing if they are not experienced by human beings.
2 The reference is to Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers.
3 Spinoza is quoted using the standard system of reference to the Ethics. The edition used is 
Ethics (translated from Latin by R.H.M. Elwes), New York: Dover Publications, 1955. For 
example, IVp67 refers to part IV proposition 67.
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Chapter 3 raises questions about the challenges of combining developments 
in contemporary social and cultural theory with empirical ethnographic 
research. The author critically examines the advantages and disadvantages of 
adopting recent theories of affect in connection to his research in present-day 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. How does a feature film relating to the aftermath 
of the 1990s war elicit different intensities among various audiences? How 
can ethnographers write about such intensities? What possibilities does the 
‘affective turn’ offer to ethnographers, and what does it put out of reach? The 
author makes a case for ethnographic investigations that aim for analysis that 
goes beyond evocation through hermeneutics, conceptualisation, and crit-
ical argument. Evoking certain forms of affect without making the ‘affective 
turn’, he concludes that the ethnographic study of affect may be at its best 
when it also historicises their specific forms, tries to detect patterns in their 
operation, and conceptualises them in dialogue with other scholarly work.
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chapter 3
Ethnography and the Choices 
Posed by the ‘Affective Turn’
Stef Jansen
Affect is at the centre of exciting attempts to renew ethnography.1 This 
essay aims to disentangle the implications of some central program-
matic components of affect theory for ethnographers and to crystallise 
key choices embedded in calls for an ‘affective turn’. It asks: what does 
the ‘affective turn’ lead us towards, and what does it lead us away from?
The tension, the tension…
Obrana i zaštita (A stranger), a 2013 film directed by Bobo Jelčić, deals 
with a day in the life of an elderly couple, Milena and Slavko, in contem-
porary Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH). When a family friend 
Đulaga dies, Milena matter-of-factly prepares for them to attend his 
funeral. Their friend Milan could give them a ride. Slavko is not sure 
they should go. He is preoccupied with what seems to be something 
else entirely: he is waiting for a call from a certain Dragan. Later, in a 
conversation in the photocopier room of a public institution, we find 
out that his attempts to get hold of Dragan and his dilemma about the 
funeral are intimately related. Agitated, Slavko tells a friend that Dragan 
has promised him to take care of something but has not called since. 
Should he contact Dragan himself? Or would that be counterproductive? 
‘Do you know … what tortures me most?’, Slavko asks, ‘I’m afraid some-
one said something to him about me … something against me.’ A man 
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called Srećko, he adds, recently said: ‘Slavko, you’re more on their side 
than on our side’. The scene is abruptly cut. Obrana i zaštita never spells 
out Slavko’s predicament. Yet, as we shall see, to an audience familiar 
with contemporary Mostar – and only to them – the link between his 
dilemma about Đulaga’s funeral, his issue with Dragan and something 
referred to as ‘sides’ is now clear.
Having bought a bottle of whiskey from a black market trader, Slavko 
asks for a meeting with Dragan at another public institution. A range 
of details, including the contrasting bodily demeanour of Slavko and 
the secretary, embed the scene in the political-economic dynamics of 
contemporary BiH. Slavko eventually establishes that Dragan is in a 
hotel for lunch but his subsequent search there is unsuccessful too. In 
fact, we never meet Dragan, but he hovers over the story as a person of 
influence – probably a politician. We know he has a potential hold over 
Slavko. And Slavko, rightly or wrongly (we’ll never know), connects this 
with the issue of ‘sides’.
His dilemma regarding Đulaga’s funeral lasts. Milan visits to cancel 
his offer for a lift because his wife is ill. He apologises profusely and 
offers to drive them a little later. The conversation turns ugly – Slavko’s 
behaviour verges on the rude. He exclaims he doesn’t know if they’ll 
go at all. Viewers are again left in doubt. Is Milan’s unavailability 
genuine or is he reluctant to drive them? Is this a problem for Slavko 
or a welcome way out? Milena suggests they go by foot. Slavko still 
hovers: ‘Listen… In this situation in which I find myself now, I don’t 
know whether it would be smart to go to the funeral. While Dragan 
is taking care of this, you understand?’ In a highly gendered set-up, 
Milena quiet ly persists, continuously invoking moral duty and recip-
rocity: ‘They came first when my old man died, they are like family to 
me’. While Milena prepares a salad, a tormented Slavko steps of the 
balcony. The screen goes dark.
In the next scene Slavko and Milena make their way to Đulaga’s house. 
Slavko insists they take backstreets and paths, lamenting that Dragan 
has not contacted him. He has forgotten his mobile phone in the flat. 
Throughout the gathering in Đulaga’s house and at the cemetery, Slavko 
acts very ill at ease. Afterwards, Đulaga’s daughter Zehra offers them a 
lift. A tense altercation follows – mirroring the earlier conversation with 
Milan. Eventually Zehra drives them to their flat. Yet on the way, she 
breaks down in tears, stops the car and gets out. Milena tries to console 
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her. Slavko buys water for her from a kiosk and, crossing the street, is 
hit by a truck. The screen goes dark again.
Upon returning to their flat, Slavko sees Dragan has still not called. 
Exasperated, Slavko repeats his suspicions about Srećko, who, like Dragan, 
does not make an appearance in the film. After a lengthy silent refusal, 
Milena now criticises Slavko for moral failure. His initial reluctance to 
attend the funeral, as well as his ‘sitting on needles’ at Đulaga’s house, she 
tells him, is due to his fear that Dragan would find out about his attend-
ing. Slavko puts up a vehement but unconvincing defence, blaming his 
‘situation’. In response to Milena’s moral arguments, he too emphasises 
his closeness to Đulaga’s family. In unexpectedly rude terms she tells him 
she is fed up. Slavko sweeps up the tablecloth and scatters the contents 
on the floor. He goes to the bathroom and collapses. The neighbours are 
called and he soon recovers.
Throughout the film, it is clear that Slavko’s ‘situation’ draws on a 
more encompassing ‘situation’ in contemporary Mostar. Obrana i zaštita 
offers only a few hints of such historicisation. Twice, radio and TV voices 
in the background obliquely refer to a ‘divided city’, to ‘insecurity’, to 
‘the recent past’ and to the ‘national division of the city created in the 
1990s’. A few enunciations by the protagonists themselves also gesture 
towards a ‘situation’. For example, on the way back from the funeral, 
Milena breaks the silence in Zehra’s car, sighing:
Everything has somehow changed [long silence] I don’t know … 
There are no people anymore … There’s no life here anymore … 
Whoever can do so, it’s best they escape.
There is no reaction to this. Slavko mostly simply laments his fate. ‘I 
don’t know who I am, or where I am’, he exclaims. When he hints at the 
more encompassing ‘situation’, he never completes his sentences. This 
is particularly striking in a scene when he awaits his son Krešo, visiting 
from Croatia, at the bus stop and steers him into a park. A long, almost 
frantic monologue follows.
Krešo, I came to pick you up just to tell you a few things on our 
own. The situation is difficult. Difficult, by god. Everything’s fin-
ished, but this is not it. It’s still not known here what could be. 
Nothing is known. Everything here is in some tension. One thing 
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is said and another thing is done. I don’t see a solution. Not at 
all. Not me, nobody does. Everything is fine between people but 
it only requires … for it to explode. There you go, that is why I 
don’t like you to come too often. Well … Zehra asked about you. I 
don’t know. I wouldn’t meddle in that. Sit down with her for a bit. 
She’s alone. Her husband is an idiot, she’s not with him anymore. 
I’d ask you that you be … What do I know, maybe it’s nothing, 
but fuck it, you understand what I’m saying. On the other hand, 
Zehra’s alright. Normal. Correct. She drove us home after the 
funeral. Kind. She hugged and kissed me. She’s beautiful, I can 
tell you. But, well, there you go, you see about it. I think it’s not for 
you. Now, I don’t know what you, with her, did you do anything. 
I won’t meddle. But I think, well, there you go, I told you what, 
you see about it. I’m more or less fine. Sometimes urinary tracts, 
sometimes my kidney, and then that lumbago when this weather 
changes, Well all that’s normal. The rest is okay. Years, you know, 
so it’s ever more difficult when a man every day …, well, it’ll be 
clear to you when you reach my age. There’s no more, it’s not … 
No no! Ah yes, well, my stool gives me trouble, big trouble. I went 
to the doctor’s, he said don’t worry. If it’s not every day, he says, 
it’s normal, at your age. But somehow I’m not at peace with that 
so they gave me aloe vera to drink. And, you know, it helps. Every 
morning I drink a glass on an empty stomach. But fuck it, then 
I need the loo straight away …
Krešo, who smoked and looked away throughout, now sharply turns to 
his father: ‘Right, old man, are you aware that every time I come here 
you tell me the same things?’ Slavko, surprised, tries to establish some 
intimacy but his son angrily pushes him away, telling him in exactly 
the same crude terms as his mother Milena that he’s fed up with him.
Later they have the black market trader (Krešo’s friend), Milan and 
his partner over for a meal in their flat. Alcohol flows. We don’t follow 
any one of the crosscutting conversations. The camera mainly focuses on 
Slavko, who hardly participates. He self-consciously puts his arm around 
his son’s shoulders. The phone rings. Milena answers. It’s Dragan. He is 
available now. Slavko immediately returns to the public institution and 
in a long silent scene he sits in the waiting room, holding his bottle of 
whiskey in a plastic bag. The film ends.
ethnography and the choices posed by the ‘affective turn’
59
Affect theory – the autonomy of affect
Obrana i zaštita blew me away. To me it brilliantly renders some key 
dimensions of contemporary life in BiH. I watched it in Sarajevo with 
friends who felt the same. Its great quality, to us, lay in the way it brought 
across a particular atmosphere. In our conversations the term we used 
most commonly to describe this atmosphere was napetost, i.e. a con-
tinuous tension. Not much happens in Obrana i zaštita. The scenario is 
sparse. Dialogue is limited. A few heated conversations are as spectacular 
as it gets. There is no plot, no surprise. There is no sequence of actions 
by the protagonists that increases or decreases the tension. It is simply 
there, palpable in every scene. Almost unbearable at times. Although the 
above conversations do provide some entries into it, to us it was above all 
the photography, the sound and the central performances by two well-
known actors that made this work. Shaky, handheld close-up camerawork 
often approaches the protagonists from indirect angles, which makes for 
claustrophobic viewing. Clearly, in this essay, much of this is lost. All 
in all, no explanations of the tension are identified – Slavko’s concrete 
‘situation’ and the ‘situation’ in Mostar are never specified – but we all 
agreed the film powerfully evoked them.
Coincidently, at the time of our conversations about Obrana i zaštita, 
I was reading some writings in the field of  ‘affect theory’. While it is 
hard to find definitions of ‘affect’ in such work (and harder still to find 
one that is shared across different writings), all authors seem to agree 
that affect is about ‘intensity’. For some it is intensity (Massumi 1995: 88), 
whereas for others it is ‘a nonconscious experience of intensity’ (Shouse 
2005, my emphasis). Some speak of ‘affect’ and others of ‘affects’. The 
most common reference is to Spinoza, who wrote of ‘the capacity to 
affect and be affected’. Yet rather than identifying specific ‘affects’ – as 
Spinoza does in his references to hate, envy, anger, etc. (Navaro-Yashin 
2012: 26) – in this recent work affect appears as an unspecified ‘some-
thing’, proclaimed to be very important. ‘Affect’, we are told, is not 
feeling or emotion. Instead, it is ‘pre-personal’ (Shouse 2005). It is 
‘asocial, but not presocial’ (Massumi 1995: 91). Crucially, according to 
these theorists, affect cannot be signified: it is resistant to language and 
remains in excess to it (Blackman and Venn 2010: 9; Massumi 1995: 96; 
Seigworth and Gregg 2010: 1–2; Shouse 2005). Affect, it is said, can only 
be experienced and evoked.
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Reading such work, it struck me that its register closely dovetailed 
with my Sarajevo conversations about Obrana i zaštita. As we saw, we 
felt it was permeated by and brilliantly brought across a continuous 
tension – an intensity – relying much less on signification than on evo-
cation. Intrigued, I delved deeper into affect theory. I found that, broadly 
speaking, two key sources of inspiration are experimental neuro sciences 
and Spinozian–Deleuzian philosophy. Yet despite its central place in 
some of the work they cite, many authors who embrace affect theory do 
not refer to the first at all.2 Leaving brain processes aside, much affect 
theory is written in a programmatic fashion, converging around two 
postulates: (a) affect should be a key matter of concern because it is of 
crucial importance in the world, and (b) affect theory provides the only 
or the best framework to produce the new forms of research, writing 
and politics that this requires. In both cases there is an insistence on 
departure from existing work: a call for an ‘affective turn’ (Clough and 
Halley 2007).
The call for an ‘affective turn’ emerged within broader posthumanist 
developments in knowledge production. Affect theory shares many affin-
ities with actor-network theory, which rejects the ‘sociology of the social’ 
(its own term) in favour of a greater focus on non-human actants, such 
as objects, with whom humans are said to be always-already entangled 
in a ‘flat’ social (Latour 2005). Affect theory also strongly resonates with 
anthropological work that rejects an ‘epistemological’ approach (its own 
term) in favour of an ‘ontological’ one (e.g. Henare et al. 2007). We thus 
see a convergence of three self-proclaimed ‘turns’ – the turn to objects, 
the ontological turn and the affective turn.
In this scholarly landscape, affect theory turns away from some-
thing labelled with many terms, such as language, reason, cognition, 
meaning, signification, discourse, positions, identities, structures, sub-
jectivity or representation. Instead, since affect is ‘irreducibly bodily 
and autonomic’ (Massumi 2002: 28), ‘always prior to and/or outside 
consciousness’ (Shouse 2005), a focus on affect as a matter of concern is 
said to draw attention to immanence, to bodies, to their attunement to 
each other and to objects, which are considered to function prior to all 
of the above. With regard to affect theory as a framework with which to 
approach this matter of concern, we find a call for turning away from 
‘paranoid theory’ (Sedgwick 2003), ‘critical thinking’ (Massumi 2002), 
‘studies of representation’ (Thrift 2004) or ‘representational thinking and 
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evaluative critique’ (Stewart 2007). Readers are mostly left to join in the 
dots themselves. In my reading, this usually implies poststructuralist 
cultural studies, performativity theory and/or psychoanalysis. Yet it has 
more encompassing ramifications.
To grasp these ramifications for anthropology, it is important to note 
that affect theorists seek to overcome what they consider deficiencies of 
two related approaches that have long been central to this discipline. 
Firstly, the ‘affective turn’ looks beyond social constructivism. Here social 
constructivist approaches are identified with hermeneutic attempts to 
analyse meaning (as we saw, sometimes glossed as e.g., ‘representation’ 
or ‘signification’). While problematic,3 for reasons of argument I will 
adopt Stewart’s term ‘representational thinking’ to refer to this. Secondly, 
affect theorists find fault with ‘critical’ approaches. By this they seem to 
mean efforts to detect patterns that are not immediately visible (some-
times ‘structures’) in order to gain insight and, potentially, to inform 
action. This is related to generalisation. Think for example of attempts 
to identify historical patterns of class, gender or other inequalities that 
are understood to also function on a scale beyond the immediate setting 
under study. The ‘affective turn’ and its sister ‘turns’ emphasise the limits 
of such efforts to engage in ‘evaluative critique’.
How then should scholars go about implementing this ‘affective turn’? 
What should they turn to? Affect theorists call for a different sensitivity, 
different modes of attention, different ways of being attuned to what 
happens around us, ‘different forms of knowing that disclose the tangle 
of connections that exert a pull on us and that can be felt’ (Blackman 
and Venn 2010: 11). I did not find methodological guidelines. Instead, 
there is a promise, which exists in diverging incarnations (see Seigworth 
and Gregg 2010: 5–9). At one end, the promise remains largely implicit 
and is exemplified in a shift of emphasis or a broadening to incorporate 
hitherto understudied domains of experience (e.g. Berlant 2001). At 
the other end, there is an explicit dismissal of any ‘enlightening’ aspir-
ations of hermeneutical and/or critical scholarship (e.g. Massumi 2002). 
What allows us to detect a call for an ‘affective turn’ in these diverging 
writings is the exhortation to consider a new matter of concern (affect) 
and a new way to study it (affect theory). Whether authorised by neuro-
scientific experiments or not, affect is invariably postulated as worth 
increased attention. And since it is said to be resistant to signification, 
analysing it in terms of ‘representational thinking’ is considered limited 
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at best and futile at worst. Moreover, notwithstanding its aspirations, it 
is argued, ‘evaluative critique’ inevitably ends up placing what it records 
in pre-existing frames and thereby closing off emergent ‘potential’. It is 
therefore believed to be politically ineffective at best and detrimental at 
worst. Instead we are called upon to refuse any ‘capture and closure on 
the plane of signification’ (Massumi 2002: 263; see also 1995: 96).
In its more strident versions, affect theory takes a vanguard position. A 
detailed dissection of the writings of Massumi and Sedgwick, two of the 
most-cited affect theorists, shows how they ‘emphasize the unexpected, 
the singular, or indeed the quirky, over the generally applicable, where 
the latter becomes associated with the pessimism of social determin-
ist perspectives, and the former with the hope of freedom from social 
constraint’ (Hemmings 2005: 550; see also Irni 2013). At this, the sharp-
est end, affect theory stages a call for a farewell to the old ‘representa-
tional’, ‘critical’ ways, which are presented as limited, boring, flat, cold, 
determinist, generalising, oppressive, arrogant and elitist. Such existing 
approaches are said to instil pessimism because they inevitably ‘close 
off’ their matters of concern. Making the ‘affective turn’, it is promised, 
allows one to be part of a new way that is more encompassing, exciting, 
multidimensional, warm, open-ended, attuned to singularities, liberat-
ing, humble and democratic. It offers optimism because it is oriented at 
‘opening up’. While not all affect theorists position themselves in such 
terms, a common denominator remains: an emphasis on the limits of 
current scholarship – portrayed as hopelessly caught in attempts to 
hermeneutically trace meanings (‘representational thinking’) and to 
critically bring to light patterns (‘evaluative critique’) – and a call to go 
beyond it. We have a serious challenge here.
Anthropology meets the ‘affective turn’
How can we investigate affective dimensions of life ethnographically? 
How can we produce texts that successfully render them in anthropo-
logically interesting ways? These questions have been at the heart of my 
academic endeavours for years, although I wasn’t familiar with affect 
theory. Upon reading such writings, it seemed to me that ‘affect’ – or at 
least a term derived from that root – allowed me to grasp not just the 
appeal of Obrana i zaštita to my Sarajevo friends and myself, but also a 
larger concern. For years now, when people ask me why I prefer to spend 
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so much time in the Balkans, I have been telling them – grappling for 
words – that this is because of a certain ‘intensity’ I experience in life in 
this part of the world. Unwittingly, then, I have been using the register of 
affect theory and my (largely unarticulated) sense has long been that this 
‘intensity’ is indeed ‘prepersonal’ and that it cannot be fully grasped in 
signification. It also became a core concern in my anthropological work 
in which I try to grapple with ‘intensities’ of lives in the post-Yugoslav 
states, time and again seeking to provide insight into dimensions of a 
certain ‘shared historical sense’ (Berlant 2001: 3). For example, I have 
investigated the pressure to identify ethnonationally; nostalgia for a past 
future; people’s sense of home after displacement; the unease of crossing 
borders; the everyday geopolitics of people’s sense of entrapment. Much 
of this came together in a recent book on yearnings for ‘normal lives’ 
amongst people in a Sarajevo apartment complex, focusing on their sense 
of abandonment and spatiotemporal entrapment (Jansen 2015).
A question that emerges for me is then: if I consider issues that could be 
grouped under the label of ‘affect’ to be at the centre of my research, should 
I therefore take the ‘affective turn’? Would my specifically anthropo logical 
interest in issues of affect be best served by the programmatic orienta-
tions promoted by affect theory? In what follows I try to disentangle some 
key choices anthropologists face when considering such an ‘affective 
turn’. What are the parameters at stake – implicitly or explicitly – when 
weighing the promise offered by affect theorists?
In the spirit of scholarly debate, I address these questions in dialogue 
with the work of Kathleen Stewart, a contributor to this volume and a 
participant at the workshop that preceded it. With her ground-breaking 
book Ordinary Affects (2007) Stewart established herself as the best-
known anthropological proponent of the ‘affective turn’. Written as an 
experiment to devise a new anthropological mode of writing, Ordinary 
Affects consists of a short programmatic introduction followed by a series 
of descriptions of ‘scenes’ in the US in different places and at different 
times. These are interspersed with other sections (see below).
Let us first look closely at how Stewart herself positions her work. 
What are ordinary affects? Stewart’s many redescriptions function mainly 
through metaphor or illustration. For example, ordinary affects are ‘public 
feelings that begin and end in broad circulation, but they’re also the stuff 
that seemingly intimate lives are made of ’ (Stewart 2007: 2); they are ‘an 
animate circuit that conducts force and maps connections, routes, and 
sensitive objects
64
disjunctures’ (ibid. 3); they are ‘the scene of an encounter we can barely 
get our eyes around, a cluster of non-coherent attachments and impacts’ 
(Stewart in Fannin et al. 2010: 929).
How then can anthropologists ethnographically study ordinary affects 
and write about them? Stewart has called her book
an experiment in ethnography. It is ethnography as a form of 
haptically mapping what’s happening. A vague and inarticulate 
analytical work … Here, ethnography is a sustained, sensory 
practice of attending to the material and affective emergence of 
things that come together as shared sensibilities or fall apart, per-
haps leaving traces or dormant trajectories. It is an attunement to 
potential modes of existence resonating in immanent events and in 
the lived rhythms and refrains (that is forms, genres, habits) that 
circulate, accrue, underscore attachments and detachments, and 
form modes of inhabitation. (Stewart in Fannin et al. 2010: 930)
As a reader I mainly encountered the innovative impulse of Ordinary 
Affects as a new way of writing. This is also how Stewart herself positions 
the book. Aiming to develop an experimental ‘form of address’ (Stewart 
2007: 4), she has said she wants
to incite new forms of writing and reading, new approaches to 
analytic objects, and new forms of attention and attachment to 
the intensities and sensibilities now taking place in the various 
situations of the ordinary. (Stewart in Fannin 2010: 928)
Experimentation, speculation and attunement to ‘potential’ are prom-
ulgated as key aims. Stewart says: ‘Something throws itself together in 
a moment as an event and a sensation: a something both animated and 
inhabitable’ (Stewart 2007: 1). As is common in affect theory (e.g. Mas-
sumi 1995: 96), she frequently reaches for words that start with ‘some-’ 
and remain unqualified, thus purposefully maintaining indeterminacy. 
Her book, she says,
tries to slow the quick jump to representational thinking and 
evaluative critique long enough to find ways of approaching the 
complex and uncertain objects that fascinate because they literally 
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hit us or exert a pull on us. My effort is not to finally ‘know’ them 
– to collect them into a good enough story of what’s going on – but 
to fashion some form of address that is adequate to their form. 
To find something to say about ordinary affects by performing 
some of the intensity and texture that makes them habitable and 
animate. (Stewart 2007: 5)
‘Slowing the quick jump’ could suggest that ‘representational thinking 
and evaluative critique’ are not rejected but postponed. I am left unsure 
whether Stewart finds this worth pursuing or not. Yet readers familiar 
with contemporary social theory are given some clarification on her 
position. And this too is in line with most writing in affect theory: the 
author tells us what her aim is not. So, the ‘somewhere’ she writes from is
Not the kind of somewhere that is easily reducible to subject pos-
itions or to the effects of underlying structures but one dispersed 
across social and cultural fields and gathered into singularities 
and resonant forces. (Stewart in Fannin et al. 2010: 928)
Stewart is not committed, she says, ‘to the demystification and uncovered 
truths that support a well-known picture of the world’ (Stewart 2007: 
1). She continues:
the terms neoliberalism, advanced capitalism, and globalization 
that index this emergent present, and the five or seven or ten 
characteristics used to summarize and define it in shorthand, 
do not in themselves begin to describe the situation we find our-
selves in. The notion of a totalized system, of which everything 
is always already somehow a part, is not helpful (to say the least) 
in the effort to approach a weighted and reeling present. This is 
not to say that the forces these systems try to name are not real 
and literally pressing. On the contrary, I am trying to bring them 
into view as a scene of immanent force, rather than leave them 
looking like dead effects imposed on an innocent world. (Ibid. 1)
With Ordinary Affects, then, Stewart aims to develop an ethnographic 
mode of address that avoids unwelcome forms of closure that she associ-
ates with representational thinking and evaluative critique – reduction, 
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demystification, totalisation. She does not reference which approaches 
manifest those problems. But since the author positions herself as an 
anthropologist and her book as ethnography, I assume that this por-
trayal is meant to include at least some anthropologists and their ethno-
graphic writings. Perhaps it remains unspecified because she believes 
such problems are so widespread in anthropology as to obviate the need 
for specification?
In any case, in this essay I try to disentangle the challenge posed 
here to ethnographers. Given the variety of uses of the terminology of 
‘affect’, I must state upfront that this essay is not a review of a body of 
ethnographic studies that take issues of affect as their matter of con-
cern. Most of them, namely, share with affect theorists an interest in 
affective dimensions of life, yet they do not make the ‘affective turn’. 
Many both evoke affect and seek to analyse it in hermeneutical and 
critical ways that are not radically different from how they proceed 
with other matters (see e.g. Muehlebach and Shoshan 2012; Millar 
2014; Navaro-Yashin 2012). I will not dwell on this common ground 
between affect theory and such anthropological studies of questions 
of affect. Instead, this essay focuses on the call for an ‘affective turn’. I 
attempt to formulate as precisely as possible some key choices it entails 
for ethnographers. I do this in direct dialogue with Ordinary Affects 
because I consider it the strongest book-length work by an anthropol-
ogist to embrace the ‘affective turn’. While she does not mention this 
‘turn’, Kathleen Stewart, in my reading, has devised the most consist-
ently followed-through experiment to develop an ethnographic form 
of address that eschews both (social constructivist) hermeneutics and 
critique. Steadfast in its attempts to be true to the implications of the 
‘affective turn’, her book therefore allows identification of breaking 
points where affect theory’s specificities can be seen at work in their 
clearest form.
When ethnographically writing about issues of affect, which possibili-
ties does the ‘affective turn’ offer and which ones does it put out of reach? 
I will organise my reflections in three central (interdependent) either/or 
choices.4 The first choice concerns the reach of evocation we aspire to: 
who do we evoke for? The second one revolves around aspirations we 
may have beyond evocation. The third choice concerns the grounds on 
which we are prepared to be held accountable as authors.
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Three key choices for anthropologists 
interested in questions of affect
Do we aspire to evocation across boundaries of familiarity?
For anthropologists, a first choice regarding the ‘affective turn’ concerns 
evocation itself. It revolves around questions of audiences, familiarity 
and historicisation. Who do we evoke for?
To crystallise this, let us first return to Obrana i zaštita. If this film 
evoked a certain form of affect so well for my Sarajevo circles, how would 
it fare for other audiences? A friend of mine fought to earn it a special 
mention as a jury member at a foreign film festival. She failed. ‘They 
didn’t get it’, she said. The success with which we felt the film brought 
across an intensity to us relied on our own hermeneutic work of framing, 
based on pre-existing knowledge of certain meanings and patterns. We 
framed the tension in the film through historicisation. We knew Mostar 
was violently ‘unmixed’ during the 1992–1995 war, largely along ethno-
national lines. From the outset, through names that we could identify in 
ethnonational terms, we assumed that Đulaga and Zehra live in the east 
of Mostar and Slavko, Milena, Srećko, Dragan and Milan in the west. 
An awareness of possible exceptions did not remove this assumption: 
we knew about Mostar’s patterns of segregation; its ‘sides’. We knew 
some of Mostar’s streets and their location. We suspected right away 
that Slavko’s dilemma about attending the funeral was related to the 
city’s ethnonational division. And note that it is not that he, a man with 
a Croatian name living in West Mostar,5 is nervous about attending a 
funeral of a man with a Bosniak name in East Mostar per se. Clearly, as 
Srećko’s accusation implies, Slavko spends much time on the ‘other side’. 
His main worry is what Dragan – on his ‘own’ side – will think of that 
and how this will impact on his life. That too we ‘got’.6
While Obrana i zaštita could have explained all this, to us, its evoca-
tion of tension was all the more successful because nothing was spelled 
out. These meaning(ful practice)s and patterns do not need to be spe-
cified outside the cinema in BiH either. They usually aren’t. Hence, while 
pre-existing knowledge was crucial to the film’s appeal to us, much of 
its particular power relied on resonance. To different degrees, we were 
familiar with dealings with ethnonational issues in roundabout ways; 
but also with the difficulty to find solid ground for moral personhood 
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in this historical conjuncture in BiH; with living in waiting; with the 
importance of some ‘Dragan’, to be ‘chased’ with a bottle of whiskey; 
with the difficulty to assess the genuineness of stated intentions, wor-
ries and excuses. We were not estranged by Slavko’s despair at his own 
doubts; by his demeanour in the secretary’s office; by his switching back 
and forth between unfinished sentences about the ‘situation’ and about 
his health; by Krešo’s exasperation with his father’s anxiety; by Milena’s 
insistence on moral duty and reciprocity, her silent disapproval and her 
eventual outburst – embedded in the couple’s gendered interactions. Even 
the furniture in their flat is familiar to us. I suspect that most viewers 
in or from BiH, and perhaps others in or from the post-Yugoslav states, 
will, perhaps regretfully, find it resonates with dynamics they know or 
imagine in some household around them. Through this resonance, Obrana 
i zaštita evokes familiar affects from a familiar world. I think it does so 
brilliantly, partly because it offers so little historicisation. For viewers 
who already have the tools to hermeneutically frame this, this works.
Anthropological writings embracing the ‘affective turn’ invest heav-
ily in evocation and reviews show that the reception of Ordinary Affects 
too relies to a large degree on familiarity (e.g. Highmore 2010; Pelkmans 
2013). The ‘scenes’ that make up much of the book are short descriptive 
pieces that reverberate. I was struck by the beauty of much of the writing. 
Given Stewart’s focus on particular US worlds, this resonated to me with 
work by some of my favourite artists: Tom Waits, say, or Lorrie Moore, 
or Raymond Carver. As in their work, and as in Obrana i zaštita, I felt 
some ‘scenes’ were affectively very powerful. Yet, as we saw, the evoca-
tion of affect in Obrana i zaštita would not work, even for people in BiH, 
without playing on people’s names or without any reference to Mostar’s 
‘sides’. Significantly, to explain its affective power to a broader audience 
in this essay I had to spell out some meanings and patterns that remain 
unspoken in the film.7 In contrast, the ‘affective turn’ calls on us to ‘per-
form’ affect and to refrain from hermeneutic attempts to historicise it: 
the autonomy of affect, its theorists say, places it beyond interpretation. 
Instead of aiming for such ‘closure’, we should retain singularities at all 
times. Ordinary Affects does indeed refrain from such ‘representational 
thinking’. It evokes-in-singularity. It seems that the ‘scenes’ in Stewart’s 
book do for some readers what Obrana i zaštita does for some viewers: 
they evoke ‘intensities’. In some cases this worked for me too, brilliantly 
so. In other ‘scenes’ it didn’t, possibly because I lack familiarity with 
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the various US worlds Stewart is travelling through. Having taken the 
‘affective turn’, the author did not give me a hand through historicisa-
tion. As a result, some ‘scenes’ simply slid off me, not ‘attuning’ me to 
anything. And some filled me with unease when, rather than allowing 
attunement, the reading experience felt closer to voyeurism (see Breen 
2009: 94). Stewart’s empathy is obvious throughout the book, yet a refusal 
to historicise risks such reader responses.
Much anthropological work on affect takes an alternative route. Most 
explicitly, in her work on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2012), 
Navaro-Yashin aims to capitalise on the strengths of affect theory without 
embracing the ‘turn’ it promotes. She calls for reconciliation, exploring 
dynamics of affect and of subjectivity, of human and of non-human 
agency, and valuing evocation and signification. Navaro-Yashin iden tifies 
and names certain forms of affect, qualifying them and embedding them 
in configurations that she knows are unfamiliar to many of her readers. 
Her evocations often work through emic terms in the Turkish language, 
which she explains. Indeed, she emphasises the need to historicise forms 
of affect, framing them hermeneutically in constellations of meanings 
specific to the setting.
I suggest that the choice anthropologists face here is whether in our 
ethnographic writing we aspire to evoke certain forms of affect across 
boundaries of familiarity, or not.8 If we do aspire to this, historicisation 
is crucial for that evocation to work. I think Obrana i zaštita draws part 
of its great evocative power for audiences in BiH from the decision to 
provide only minimal historicisation. The price paid for that choice is 
that this evocation falters for other audiences. Inspired by affect theory, 
anthropologists can make the same choice and may proportionally gain 
in evocative power. Or they can try to introduce audiences to unfamiliar 
worlds from the perspective of people who inhabit them – and thereby 
defamiliarise familiar ones. Making the ‘affective turn’ means choosing 
to let go of the most important tools we have to fulfil this aspiration.
Do we aspire to go beyond evocation?
A second choice that comes with considering the ‘affective turn’ concerns 
the refusal of ‘closure’ associated with hermeneutical and/or critical 
analysis. Affect theory, as we saw, warns that affect can only be expe-
rienced and evoked. Stewart has said that ‘ordinary affects can only be 
approached awkwardly, described around, repeated as a refrain, scored 
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over and underscored’ (Stewart in Fannin et al. 2010: 929). We may then 
ask: is there any value in attempts to trace the embeddings of certain 
forms of affect, to interpret them, to conceptualise them, to build coher-
ent arguments about them?
Affect theory does sometimes gesture beyond evocation. In fact, 
Stewart’s experiment includes an attempt to reconfigure conceptualisa-
tion itself:
Ordinary Affects tries to produce a different kind of concept. Not 
one that can be cut out of scenes and situations to be laid on the 
table for academic debate but one that builds by attaching itself 
to the living out of what is singular and proliferative in a scene 
or moment, to what is accrued, sloughed off, realized, imagined, 
enjoyed, hated, brought to bear or just born in a compositional 
present. (Stewart in Fannin et al. 2010: 930–931)
Also, in her introduction, Stewart explains that her book performs ‘some 
intensity and texture’ of ordinary affects by mapping ‘connections between 
a series of singularities’ (Stewart 2007: 5). Perhaps we can read this second 
part as going beyond evocation. In this light it is notable that the ‘scenes’ 
in the book are interspersed with short sections of a different type, diffi-
cult to render other than by citation. For example, a part of the section 
under the heading ‘The politics of the ordinary’ says:
Ideologies happen. Power snaps into place. Structures grow 
entrenched. Identities take place. Ways of knowing become habit-
ual at the drop of a hat. But it’s ordinary affects that give things 
the quality of a something to inhabit and animate. Politics starts 
in the animated inhabitation of things, not way downstream in 
the various dreamboats and horror shows that get moving. Step 
one in thinking about the force of things is the open question 
of what counts as an event, a movement, an impact, a reason to 
react. (Ibid. 15–16)
The style of these sections remains tentative, speculative. Yet in add-
ition to evocation, we encounter propositions here. These are themselves 
purposively vague and inconclusive. If Ordinary Affects ‘is written as an 
assemblage of disparate scenes that pull the course of the book into a 
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tangle of trajectories, connections and disjunctures’ (ibid. 5), Stewart’s 
‘mapping’ does not spell out how connections, trajectories and disjunc-
tures are formed in particular social configurations. No ‘patterns’ are 
identified in ordinary affects and their operation beyond the singularity 
of any scene. The ‘tangle’ is not mapped out in an explicit, coherent man-
ner that I can recognise as mapping. In fact, not one particular affect is 
named in the book. As in other work written in line with the ‘affective 
turn’, what I can recognise as a form of conceptualisation here does itself 
occur through evocation, particularly through gestures to particular 
unnamed but identifiable scholarly traditions, as flagged by terms such 
as ‘forces’, ‘event’, ‘intensities’, ‘trajectories’, ‘circuits’, ‘flows’, ‘potential’, 
etc. Like Slavko, in his monologue in Obrana i zaštita, Stewart avoids 
closure. In the process, unanalysable per se or unanalysed by choice, 
affect remains a ‘something’.
Again, other anthropological work takes a different route. Navaro- 
Yashin’s study (2012) explicitly names particular forms of affect (e.g. 
‘melancholia’, ‘abjection’, ‘spatial confinement’), historicises them and 
maps them and their resonance, particularly with regard to the politics 
of sovereignty in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (e.g. practices 
of bordering, administration, mapping, documentation etc.), refracted 
against global state-making dynamics. Like many other ethnographic 
studies,9 in addition to hermeneutic framing, which renders evocation 
effective for readers unfamiliar with the setting, Navaro-Yashin thus 
seeks to uncover patterns in the operation of forms of affect. She con-
ceptualises this in generalising terms through the systematic tracing 
of singular forms of affect and their resonance. In my own writings on 
post-Yugoslav lives I too seek to identify widely resonant patterns in the 
work of certain forms of affect and to map them, for example, in postwar, 
post-cold war developments. And let me not shy away from it: this can 
have a somewhat disenchanting effect. Trying to analyse how certain 
forms of affect operate is a bit like explaining a joke. Yet much as I like 
a good joke, a key anthropological objective for me is to try and under-
stand the work of certain forms of affect in their historical conjuncture. 
As an ethnographer I partly try to do this on the basis of how people 
themselves try to make sense of it. All this, of course, is incompatible 
with a turn away from ‘signification’. Yet, like Navaro-Yashin, I found 
that the people I work with themselves historicise affect and that there is 
much ‘signification’ going on in relation to the forms of affect we study. 
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If affect theory emphasises affect’s ‘autonomy’, we may thus ask if, for 
anthropologists, it could not be of interest ‘precisely to the extent that it 
is not ‘autonomous’ (Hemmings 2005: 565, my emphasis).
In the final section of Ordinary Affects, entitled ‘Beginnings’, Stewart 
writes that her book:
doesn’t mean to come to a finish. It wants to spread out into too 
many possible scenes with too many real links between them. It 
leaves me – my experiment – with a sense of force and texture 
and the sure knowledge that every scene I can spy has tendrils 
stretching into things I can barely, or not quite, imagine. But I 
already knew that. (Stewart 2007: 128)
I am not sure if I understand this correctly, but as a reader I think I too 
can spy many of these tendrils. And this is a testament to the remark-
able success of Stewart’s experiment. In contrast, my own fraught, far 
less original attempts to write anthropologically about affect – mostly 
without calling it that – have indeed struggled with a frustrating slide 
towards totalising closure of the kind that Stewart seems to warn us 
against in her introduction. But a question then emerges: what price are 
we prepared to pay for such success?
Is our only protection against ‘asserting a flat and finished truth’ 
(Stewart 2007: 5) a refusal to even try to develop analytical approaches 
that go beyond evocation through hermeneutics, conceptualisation 
and critical argument? Must, as affect theorists imply, such attempts 
inevitably assume determination by certain ‘underlying structures’ 
and necessarily fetishise particular terms (e.g. neoliberalism)? Can we 
not explore to what extent such ‘structures’ – or whatever we call them 
– may have explanatory value and to what extent particular terms can 
be of use? These are things we do not know yet when we start our inves-
tigations and I think many anthropologists invest much work in such 
explorations, precisely because ethnography allows us to ‘slow the quick 
jump’ to hasty answers. Should such questions be discarded or are they 
worth asking? If worth asking, I suggest, this allows us to formulate a 
second key choice regarding calls on anthropologists for an ‘affective 
turn’. Quite regardless of the question whether a rhetorical commitment 
to ‘openness’ actually does avoid closure,10 we may ask: is it our main 
aspiration to maintain the principle of open-ness (to singularities, lines 
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of flight, becoming, indeterminacy, potential and so on) against the 
closures of others? Or do we attempt to move towards (self-consciously 
hesitant, modest, tentative) closures ourselves through careful analysis 
and argument beyond evocation?
On which grounds are we prepared to be held accountable?
A third choice following the call for an ‘affective turn’, firmly embedded 
in the previous two, concerns authorial accountability. As we have seen, 
affect theory often entails a self-conscious abstention from any truth 
claims underpinned by recognisable argumentation. This is implicitly 
or explicitly presented as an emancipatory move. Such an aesthetic and 
ethic of abstention has important implications for the positioning of the 
author. Stewart states she does ‘not write as a trusted guide carefully 
laying out the lines between theoretical categories and the real world’ 
(ibid. 5). This positioning is one of the grounds on which Ordinary Affects 
has been praised for ‘join[ing] other recent attempts to render cultural 
life in more fragmentary, less arrogant ways’ (Fannin et al. 2010: 923) 
and falls in line with a general self-presentation by affect theorists as a 
humble alternative to the pretence of enlightening omniscience detected 
in ‘representational thinking and evaluative critique’.
How exactly is this positioning of humility constructed? We saw that 
Stewart rejects providing concepts ‘cut out of scenes and situations to 
be laid on the table for academic debate’. I suggest this entails a much 
further-going pre-emptive neutralisation of any debate. The proposi-
tions in the sections that intersperse the ‘scenes’ in Ordinary Affects are 
submerged in unqualified ontological statements and non-committal 
speculations. One reviewer has called this an ‘authorial shrugging of the 
shoulders’ (Jackson 2008: 273). Stewart thus effectively renders irrelevant 
in advance any engagement in terms of (dis)agreement or refinement. 
Readers-colleagues, i.e. academics, cannot talk back to the book on the 
basis of its contents or on the basis of insights external to it. Nor can those 
readers who appear on its pages as its subjects. While posited against 
closure, in this way the authorial voice of the affect theorist is actually 
made unassailable. Whether intended or not, such an approach shelters 
an author from any critical reasoned argument, academic or otherwise. 
One cannot agree or disagree with a ‘refrain’. One can sing along with 
it or not, and as for appraisal, only aesthetic criteria can be applied. The 
reactions to Ordinary Affects, often glowing, are indicative in this respect: 
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they praise it for being touching, beautiful, powerful, deep and elegant. 
As we saw, for some readers this may resonate more, and for others less. 
As in Obrana i zaštita.
I, for one, would be delighted if someone said that my anthropological 
writing achieves similar effects to a great feature film. Or rather, if some-
one said that it also did that. Here we are dealing with modes of expres-
sion and their institutional conditions of existence. Because in leading 
us away from ‘representational thinking and evaluative critique’, much 
work inscribed in the ‘affective turn’ also leads us towards something else. 
And that something else is not entirely new: it strongly resonates with 
established styles in artistic production. Faced with a call for an ‘affective 
turn’, I suggest ethnographers must consider what kind of authorship 
they aspire to. Is it a different kind of authorship from that of novelists or 
feature film-makers? In practice, it certainly involves different forms of 
accountability. Of course, such differences are not internal to our work 
itself, but a product of the historical development of scholarship and of 
art, their institutional frameworks, publishing venues, audiences, rewards, 
pressures, and so on. Arguments can be and have been made against 
this division of labour. Yet in the current configuration of academic and 
artistic production, these differences do exist and I suspect that very few 
anthropologists can afford to ignore them. For most of us, the criteria 
by which our work will be appraised differ from those that artists will 
encounter. Anthropologists can decide to evoke certain forms of affect. 
Many do so, without making the ‘affective turn’: they also decide to his-
toricise specific forms of affect, to detect patterns in their operation and 
to conceptualise them in referenced dialogue with other scholarly work. 
Of course, like novelists and feature film-makers they necessarily do this 
in a stylised, selective manner. They ‘edit’ their products.
Yet should they aspire to exactly the same goals? Is your list of favour-
ite anthropology books or course reading pack assembled on the same 
grounds as that of your favourite novels, songs or feature films? Should 
it be? Is a commission to allocate doctoral research funding in anthro-
pology governed by the same criteria as those of a film festival jury? 
Should it be? Or should anthropologists, in contrast, be vulnerable to 
critique based on reasoned argumentation? If so, this means we must write 
in ways that allow our readers, including the people we write about, to 
talk back to our work on the basis of evidence or experience, or in terms 
of the coherence of our arguments. Going beyond evocation, trying to 
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earn some trust as ‘guides’ means readers can hold us accountable. In the 
terms of anthropological knowledge production as an institutionalised 
field today, the call for an ‘affective turn’ presents a choice between an 
authorial self-positioning that is vulnerable through such aspirations 
and one that is unassailable because it abstains from them.
To end, a reminder. The key decisions for anthropologists when consid-
ering the ‘affective turn’ are not decisions about whether we believe the 
work of affect is important or not; whether we study it or not; whether 
we evoke it or not; whether we place it centrally in our writing or not. 
Writing as someone whose answer to all these questions is a hearty ‘yes’, 
in this essay I have tried to crystallise three choices concerning the ques-
tion of how etnography can best contribute to this.
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Notes
1 Reflecting my primary academic biotope, I shall refer to ‘anthropology’ and ‘anthro pologists’ 
throughout. Yet my argument does not focus on disciplinary tradition but on the specificities 
of the ethnographic study of affect. I therefore believe that colleagues who (also) self-identify 
as ethnologists may find that it resonates with their concerns too.
2 And those who do, do so at a price. Massumi (2002) and Sedgwick (2003) have been criticised 
for decontextualising the disputed results of a specific set of neuroscientific experiments, 
transferring them into the humanities and seeking to render them authoritative through 
repetitive citation (e.g. Hemmings 2005; Leys 2011; Papoulias and Callard 2010).
3 For a critical discussion of the use of the term ‘representation’ in affect theory, see Leys 2011: 
458–459, n43.
4 Elsewhere (Jansen 2013) I have addressed a fourth choice, concerning how we render the 
communicative moment of our ethnographic methodology in our writing about affect and 
non-human entities.
5 Or rather: ‘Slavko’ is not a name anyone in BiH will categorise as Bosniak.
6 For an ethnographic study of border-crossing in Mostar that may help readers to ‘get it’ 
too, see Palmberger 2013.
7 Perhaps we can detect a certain hierarchy of places in anthropology here too, whereby they 
are considered to be in need of different degrees of framing. Would Duke University Press, 
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the home of much affect theory work, publish a book by an anthropologist on BiH that 
would refrain from a minimum of historicisation? Should they?
8 These boundaries should not be a priori equated with boundaries of ‘national culture’.
9 An interesting branch consists of ethnographic studies of forms of affect (without necessarily 
calling them so) in relation to the politics of sovereignty. See e.g. on borders, Demetriou 
2007; Löfgren 1999; Povrzanović Frykman 2001; Reeves 2011.
10 For reasons of space I will leave the political positionings of affect theorists aside here, 
although this is where many of them predominantly pitch their commitment to ‘openness’. 
This tends to be concentrated in the omnipresent word ‘potential’ (unqualified).
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During the 1992–95 war, the vast majority of people in Bosnia and Herze-
govina relied on international humanitarian assistance for survival. Material 
goods sent as humanitarian aid were crucial to the civilians trapped in Sara-
jevo under siege. Chapter 4 presents what some of the residents remember 
and how they talk about it two decades later. The analysis pursues how the 
act of narration of a particular person–object interaction activates corpo-
real memories and establishes affective links – resonances in the body and 
mind – between then (when the experience was acquired) and now (when 
one narrates it), between what the research participants talked about (their 
humanitarian aid-related experiences), and how they talked about it (affects 
that were revived in the course of narration). The vivid descriptions of sensual 
experiences concerning humanitarian aid – the tastes and smells of food and 
feel of clothing items received from distant donors – witness to the lingering 
sensual effects those experiences still have today.
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chapter 4
Sensitive Objects of 
Humanitarian Aid
Corporeal Memories and Affective Continuities
Maja Povrzanović Frykman
In his book Lifeworlds, Michael Jackson (2013) quotes a woman who sur-
vived Ravensbrück: ‘the presence of bread today never erases the memory 
of the absence of bread in the past’ (ibid. 272). The people quoted in this 
chapter also talk about the absence of bread and their manifold experi-
ences of receiving humanitarian aid during the siege of Sarajevo in the 
1990s. Their accounts, retold some twenty years later, confirm that these 
experiences have not been forgotten. On the contrary, they contain vivid 
and often gripping descriptions of sensual memories of humanitarian 
aid – of tastes and smells of food, of clothing items received from distant 
donors, and of the lingering affective power these things still have today.
My empirical focus is Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina – a country that due to the war in the 1990s attracted one of the 
largest humanitarian operations of that decade involving many of the 
significant international humanitarian organisations (Forman and Pat-
rick 2000). The so-called ‘air bridge’ to Sarajevo was closed after 13,000 
flights transporting 167,677 tonnes of humanitarian aid from twenty 
countries (Hronologija 2012). This aid sustained the life of civilians who 
stayed behind in Sarajevo during a siege that lasted for over three and a 
half years (Maček 2009).
During the war, 90 per cent of the population relied on international 
humanitarian assistance for their survival. However, countless articles on 
war and postwar aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina predominantly promote 
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the perspective of the so-called ‘donor side’ (see e.g. Forman and Patrick 
2000). In contrast, this chapter focuses on the ‘recipient side’, with an 
interest in the micro level of individual experience in the local context 
of Sarajevo during the war years.
In a pilot study undertaken in collaboration with the Sarajevo Centre 
for Refugee and IDP Studies, fifteen people were interviewed between 
November 2013 and April 2014: nine women and six men of varying ages 
and different educational backgrounds who lived in Sarajevo during the 
1990s war.1 Five interviews were conducted with people now aged 30–36 
but who during the war were children approaching their teens. Two 
research participants were in their mid-forties, three in their mid-fifties, 
three in their mid-sixties, one was 72 and another 92 years of age. One 
had completed primary school only, nine had completed secondary 
school education, three had graduated from university and two had a 
PhD degree.
The interviews were explorative. The question relating to what the 
interviewees remembered about receiving humanitarian aid in the 1990s 
was open and enabled them to raise any issue they found relevant. The 
transcribed material encompasses 180 pages of text that is exception-
ally rich and facilitates several angles of analysis. The local perceptions 
of the effects of humanitarian aid, conceptualised as a specific realm 
of global interconnectedness, have been discussed in a paper framing 
humanitarian aid as an aspect of global moral and political order that 
affected local sociocultural orders (Povrzanović Frykman 2016). Another 
paper (Povrzanović Frykman 2015) addresses the finding that the same 
kinds of aid are sometimes framed as charity and at others times as 
help, which suggests that their social meanings are ultimately defined 
by the (im)possibility of reciprocity. This chapter sets out to explain why 
some objects in the collected narratives emerge as sensitive objects, and 
to show how war memories are preserved and communicated through 
affective relations to such objects.
Material circumstances
An in-depth description and analysis of life in wartime Sarajevo is pro-
vided by Ivana Maček (2009) in her book Sarajevo Under Siege: Anthro­
pology in Wartime. This book is an essential read for anyone wanting 
to understand the context of experiences focused on in this chapter. 
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As an eyewitness, she captures many of the paradoxes of civilian life 
in wartime and the peculiar tension that existed between destruction 
and creativity. Offering an account of individual experiences of war, 
she discusses the norms of behaviour and the perceptions of reality that 
were continuously defined and redefined as people tackled life in cold 
apartments and survived on meagre and basic foodstuffs, never knowing 
when running water or electricity would be available again and being 
at the mercy of the forces attacking Sarajevo. The Sarajevo Survival 
Guide (1993) – a sarcastic imitation of a Michelin city guide produced 
during the war – offers abundant examples of life in a town under siege. 
Appreciated gifts include a bottle of clean water, a candle, a bar of soap, 
shampoo, a clove or two of garlic or an onion. At the time when the 
monthly salary of those still working was between 10 and 30 DM (ibid. 
68), 1 cubic metre of wood cost 200 DM (German Marks) with 50 DM 
added for home delivery. A kilo of garlic cost 120 DM and a litre of oil 
40 DM. 40 DM was also the cost of a kilo of beans, a children’s bicycle 
or a humanitarian aid ration pack (ibid. 45).
The woman I interviewed described their material circumstances by 
stressing the resourcefulness of Sarajevans living under siege. Reflecting 
on the events some twenty years later, she consistently used the present 
tense to describe them:
We are incredibly adaptable, I think, more than animals. Really, 
there is no electricity, there is no water, there is no food – so what? 
You don’t see anything, of course, it gets dark at five o’clock and 
you are collecting that oil used for frying, and you make a wick 
from some rope to make a lamp. Then you remember to take the 
battery out of the car that had been totally destroyed, and connect 
it to a small lamp – I mean, the one from the battery – and then 
you are really happy, you have light in the house, yeah! So, it is a 
very strange experience.
She also recalled the lasting effects of some of the bodily sensations 
related to the war:
I remember I was freezing in 1992, because when the winter came 
it was terribly cold. I tell you – the windows – they don’t exist [they 
were all broken by the shelling]. Terribly, terribly cold. I mean, 
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since then I have not been able to stand two things – I cannot 
stand the cold, definitely, not even today, not for a second. And 
the other thing is that I can’t stand dim lighting. There can’t be 
a romantic light in the house, it has to be at least 100 watts! Even 
today, it is strange, when, say, the radiators stop working; some-
thing happens, something needs repairing, and the temperature 
starts falling – I freeze at the very same moment, even if the radi-
ators are still warm. But when I hear that they are not working, 
or someone says, that repairs will be needed … It’s the same with 
water. If there is no water, you freak out. You run to the shop to 
buy water that same second; you think about buying a jerrycan 
with 5 litres of distilled water, because it can be used for washing. 
It is not a problem, it is not a problem, don’t panic, everything 
is OK! So, I think – I know – this is some kind of reflex-fear, a 
trauma that, in a way, triggers it, not only in my case, no, no, it is 
really the same for everyone who was here. Absolutely, you still 
react to such things today.
From an individual perspective, the claim that ‘everyone’ living in Sara-
jevo under siege reacted in the same way to a change in their material 
circumstances has to be thoroughly corroborated.2 It can also be treated 
as a narrative device to describe the magnitude of the negative experi-
ence.3 However, this woman’s descriptions of being unable to stand the 
cold – ‘definitely, not even today, not for a second’, and her ‘freaking out’ 
at the lack of running water are genuinely related to personal experi-
ence. Moreover, they show that the wartime difficulties are still deeply 
engrained in her body.
Corporeal memories
Although an individual’s remembering occurs in socially inscribed set-
tings and frameworks, a discussion about how subsequent experiences 
and public discourses of war may have influenced individual memories 
and how they are narrated is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here, the 
point of reflection concerns the tendency of memory studies to priori-
tise ‘the cerebral, the representational, and the cultural’, which results 
in ‘our thinking on memory often remaining fixated on a point outside 
the body’ (Burton 2011: 9).
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The narrative quoted above is a conscious articulation of a personal 
experience and is presented as something that was shared by others who 
experienced the siege of Sarajevo. It is thereby placed in a wider framework 
of narrating war from a victim perspective – a framework that is likely 
to be influenced by the many representations of the 1990s war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina that this woman has been exposed to over the last two 
decades. It could have been influenced by her own retelling of the same 
story (with a good-to-be-told structure) to other people before repeat-
ing it to me. However, this does not necessarily mean that her past and 
present bodily feelings are only constructed as a useful narrative device, 
or that she only remembers the war non-discursively through her terror 
of freezing, darkness and thirst, or the rush of panic triggered by what 
Kathleen Stewart (2007) describes as fragments of sensory experience. 
The above quote is actually an apt illustration of what Stewart sees as 
the sudden awareness of the ‘edge of the ordinary’ that is triggered by 
things resisting routine use.
According to Blackman and Venn (2010: 7), bodies are ‘thoroughly 
entangled processes, and importantly defined by their capacities to affect 
and be affected’. As any engagement with material culture is always em -
bodied,4 the issue in question is therefore ‘how people remember through 
the body and the intercorporeality of person and object’ (De Nardi 2014: 
447). As shown by Maria Tumarkin (2013), an individual’s remembering 
may engage person–object interactions that constitute a bodily remem-
bering; bodies can be ‘inhabited and structured’ by an ‘active immanence 
of the past’ (ibid. 315). Tumarkin reminds us that ‘much is being missed 
when we think about the intrapersonal forms of remembering and trans-
mission either in exclusively declarative and representational terms or as 
profoundly overshadowed by trauma’ (ibid. 312) and suggests that we ‘do 
not buy into the opposition’ between representation and affect (ibid. 318). 
While mnemonic processes operate ‘on various levels not fully reducible 
to cognition’, their products are ‘exceeding representational form rather 
than being completely outside or beyond it’ (ibid. 313).
Tumarkin’s work shows that memories can be transmitted discur-
sively as well as affectively, and that this can be done separately or at the 
same time (ibid. 315). This also applies to the narratives analysed here. 
Documented in the audio recording and described by the interviewer 
who also transcribed the interviews are the tears shed, the deep sighs, the 
facial expressions and gestures accompanying the statements of disgust or 
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happy excitement; all of which escape representation through language. 
They are neither outside nor beyond it, but rather an integral part of the 
intentional communicative effort that, by evoking corporeal memories, 
also solicits bodily (re)actions in the course of narration.
Even if said in the context of a formal interview, turned into a text, 
translated into another language or cut out of a wider narrative context, 
the fragments of narratives quoted here still witness to the intensity of 
people’s experiences, which in some cases still feel very real due to the 
act of narration.
Yet another attempt to explain the engagement of body in remem-
bering is of relevance here. In proposing an understanding of chronic 
pain as a form of corporeal (body, somatic) memory, Tess Burton (2011: 
7) adopts Edward Casey’s phenomenological stance, which is that cor-
poreal memory is not something we merely ‘have’, but ‘something that 
we are; that constitutes us as we exist humanly in the world’ (Casey 1987: 
163). In other words, the body ‘remembers its own activity’ (ibid. 147) and 
body memory ‘includes its own past by an intimate osmotic intertwining 
with it’ (ibid. 178; see Burton 2011: 27).5 Or, as Blackman and Venn (2010: 
9) formulate it, an enfleshing and embodying affect is ‘a particular kind 
of process-in-practice’.
Widening Burton’s considerations to other kinds of corporeal mem-
ories, the analysis attempted here sets aside the question of which bodily 
experiences were shared by many or most people in Sarajevo under siege, 
and how they might be included in the institutionalised representations 
of the victims’ suffering (thereby affecting the narratives analysed here). 
Instead, my analysis pursues how the act of narration of a particular 
person–object interaction activates corporeal memories and establishes 
affective links – resonances in body and mind (Seigworth and Gregg 2010) 
– between then (when the experience was acquired) and now (when one 
narrates about it), between what the research participants talked about 
(their humanitarian aid-related experiences) and how they did it (affects 
that were revived in the course of narration some twenty years later).
Affect and narration
For Brian Massumi (1995: 86), affect is ‘intensity’ – ‘a state of suspense, 
potentially of disruption’. He associates it with ‘nonlinear processes: res-
onation and feedback which momentarily suspend the linear progress of 
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the narrative present from past to future’ (ibid.). As will be shown below, 
this ‘resonation’ – which I call affective flashbacks – can be discerned in 
the narrative material.
Massumi’s claim that affect (or intensity) is ‘qualifiable as an emotional 
state’ (ibid.) is relevant here. He defines emotion as ‘the socio-linguistic 
fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward 
defined as personal’ (ibid. 88); as a culturally shaped ‘insertion of intensity 
into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativ-
izable action–reaction circuits’ (ibid.). Even though affect is not entirely 
‘containable in knowledge’, Massumi sees it is ‘analyzable in effect, as 
effect’ (ibid. 107, n. 2). It is thus possible to pursue affect in the narrative 
material presented here.
If naming/defining affect enables a culturally appropriate emotional 
reaction (see Cichosz 2014: 56), the ambiguous ‘openings’ – the moments 
of grappling with words, along with the changes of voice and facial 
expressions – make it possible to understand the occurrence of what I 
call affective surplus in these narrratives.
Sarah Ahmed, on the other hand, takes clearly circumscribed emo-
tions as the starting point when analysing affects, since ‘naming emotions 
involves different orientations towards the objects they construct’ (Ahmed 
2004a: 14). Yael Navaro-Yashin (2009) is also interested in the emotions 
engendered amongst Turkish Cypriots inhabiting the seized Greek dwell-
ings, the affects generated by the assumed objects and the broader postwar 
environment itself. Stef Jansen (Chapter 3 in this volume) explains how 
Navaro-Yashin employs affect theory without embracing the ‘turn’ away 
from what has been called ‘representational thinking’. She explores affect 
and subjectivity, human and non-human agency and values both evoca-
tion and signification. A similar exploration is attempted in this chapter.
This chapter also frames affect hermeneutically in constellations of 
meanings specific to the setting in which it arises. I maintain that focusing 
on the affective layers of the narratives discussed here – in discursively 
presented reminiscence, but also in non-discursive aspects of narration 
– helps to explain why some objects of humanitarian aid emerge as sen-
sitive. However, such an explanation needs to recognise the intertwining 
– discernable in the narratives – of emotions as understandings of affects 
that are firmly embedded in a particular socio-historical context, and 




In Sarajevo under siege, meanings were destabilised and emotions as 
cultural devices were inadequate for grasping the realities of threat, lack 
and destruction. Talking about it in terms of fear and sadness does not 
seem to be adequate, because recalling these emotions does not capture 
the affective quality of the situation some of my research participants 
call ‘absurd’ and the people Maček (2009) met in Sarajevo talked about 
as ‘surreal’.
The presence of tense smiles and strained laughter is striking in this 
material.6 I see it as a way of dealing with the perceived absurdity of the 
experiences narrated, with the ambiguous quality of a situation of siege. 
On the one hand, a retrospective description of life under siege often 
produces surprise and disbelief. On the other hand, by framing it as a 
set of funny events or recollections to be laughed at, the narrator occu-
pies a distanced, empowered position. Being able to laugh at oneself is a 
sign of strength. There is an abundant documentation of war humour, 
notably in Sarajevo (Kapić et al. 2006; Maček 2009; Sarajevo Survival 
Guide 1993; Sheftel 2012). Humour makes sense of absurdity by denying 
the straightjacket of an imposed, troublesome reality. It constitutes a 
platform that stabilises one’s existentially elated position, from which 
the conditions of siege and destruction are observed and laughed at. 
However, as one middle-aged woman said:
Now, more often than not, war experiences are turned into anec-
dotes or jokes. But there is a big difference between then [and 
now]. We now use anecdotes to talk about it … we have a different 
feeling now than we had then.7
In their introduction to the special issue of the journal Body & Society, 
Lisa Blackman and Couze Venn (2010) note that ‘affect is invoked to 
gesture towards something that perhaps escapes or remains in excess 
of the practices of the “speaking subject”’ (ibid. 9). These authors warn 
against an ‘exclusion of processes which might be characterized as less 
visible to the particular technologies of observation, seeing and listening 
that characterize the humanities, and particularly the reliance of many 
of our qualitative methodologies on language and sight’ (ibid.). This is 
connected to the critique of ‘representational thinking’ (Stewart 2007; 
Thrift 2008; see also Jansen, Chapter 3 in this volume), which assumes 
that the discursive representation of a research object is sufficient (Black-
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man and Venn 2010: 9). Referring to Stewart (2007), Blackman and Venn 
compare ‘representational thinking’ to ‘a particular academic and ana-
lytic training in attention, which excludes other ways of ‘noticing’ and 
attending within our research endeavours’ (Blackman and Venn 2010: 9).
Relying on interviews, the interpretations offered in this chapter are 
‘based on the practices of the “speaking subject”’ (ibid. 18). Here, the 
researcher’s knowledge about how people feel remains tentative and the 
representation in a text ‘closes off’ potentially different meanings. How-
ever, it is both possible and necessary to engage the registers of affect by 
examining people’s visceral and affective responses to an interview. This 
entails paying special attention to ‘feelings that are incongruous when 
examined alongside the content of an interviewee’s account’, or that 
direct the interviewer to ‘what is left unsaid but that is communicated 
through other forms of bodily knowing’ (ibid.). Both affect and emotion 
are ‘immediately embodied’ (Massumi 1995: 85).
Affective continuity
When recounting their experiences of receiving humanitarian aid, several 
interviewees expressed ambivalence and frustration: tears and laughter 
sometimes accompanied one and the same narration. They were grateful 
for the help received and recognised this as crucial to their surviving the 
siege. But a highly emotional tension between the feelings of gratitude 
and humiliation was obvious (see Povrzanović Frykman 2016). Some 
interviewees struggled with notions such as pride, personal integrity and 
human integrity, yet used the word ‘humiliation’ without hesitation and 
in a straightforward manner. To paraphrase Seigworth and Gregg (2010: 
8), they refer to an ‘ethico-aesthetic space’ that is opened up by affective 
encounters with humanitarian aid.
A psychologist who worked through the war but was still in dire 
need of aid is a case in point. She recalled the time when her husband 
fainted after not having eaten for days in order to save food for their 
two small daughters. She recollected a situation when her five-year old 
daughter telephoned her at work to ask whether she could cut herself 
another slice of bread:
It was horrifying for a mother to have a child call in order to ask 
– mummy, may I cut one more slice of bread? That was terrible, 
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because she knew that if she ate it today there wouldn’t be any-
thing for tomorrow [tears]. And that was a child five years old, it 
is terrible to be in such a situation, but, as much as that humani-
tarian aid was humiliating, it was valuable. I did understand the 
value of it. On the other hand, it has had its … well, effects, in the 
feeling of integrity, some human, basic, pride. It does not have to 
be pride, but somehow a feeling [sigh] that you are helpless, that 
you can’t do anything.
Here, the statement ‘it was horrifying’ represents a complex emotion of 
fear and horror. Describing it in such strong terms communicates the 
overwhelming negativity of the situation. Moreover, by saying that ‘it 
was horrifying for a mother’, the narrator calls on a culturally embed-
ded understanding that she assumes is also shared by the interviewer, 
namely that mothers want to protect and provide for their children. This 
makes it even clearer why not being able to feed them is represented as 
‘horrifying’. The reflections on feelings of humiliation, integrity, pride 
and helplessness indicate past emotional work and give a succinct insight 
into the ambivalence experienced by this recipient of humanitarian aid. 
But what about her sighs and the tears shed in the course of the interview 
some twenty years later? Although an evaluative and emotional import is 
standard for any autobiographical narrative, an affective surplus seems 
to be contained in the emotionally charged situations described here. 
This is especially obvious in the continuation of this woman’s narrative, 
even though unlike the previous exerpt it presents a more general picture 
and does not relate to a particular event:
I still remember those queues in the winter; we would stand outside 
and wait in those queues. I often discussed this with my husband, 
for him too standing in those queues was humiliating – that some-
one would see us waiting for food [sigh]. Because we were people 
who earned our living [laughter] it was very humiliating. I didn’t 
want to go, because it was really terrible that someone should see 
me receiving aid. And I remember those queues where people sat, 
and, of course, we had to sign, and [I remember] the bags that 
we then carried, that meant life to us [said with emphasis] and 
[sigh] they really were very significant, they were welcome. I am 
not saying that they were not important [uttered excitedly]! Yes, 
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they were, and we would probably not have survived without that, 
but the humiliating feeling that someone is giving you the basic 
things you need for living, even now when I tell you about it I have 
that … that feeling, I have difficulty breathing [laughter, then a 
sigh], because it’s all coming back, the memory of it comes back, 
of what that period was like … we were happy to receive things, 
without them we wouldn’t live!
The interviewer (see note 1) noted that the woman’s narration was speedy 
and uncharacteristic of her usual way of speaking. Talking about difficult 
memories seemed to make her agitated. Her narration involved laughter, 
tears, sighs and heavy breathing, all of which suggest an affective flashback 
resulting in bodily (somatic) reactions that were beyond the narrator’s 
control. The act of narration thus created an affective continuity between 
what was said and how it was told, between the past lived experience and 
the present experience of talking about it. I insist on the importance of 
paying attention to (the effects of) corporeal memories – their sensory 
and affective dimensions – because this is where the explanation of 
affective continuities over a long period of time lies.
‘Continuity’ here refers to the intensity of affect and not to its qual-
ity. If the experience had only been stored in the body, the same affects 
would have been relived. But the experiences narrated here have been 
psychologically processed, which means that the quality of the affects 
may have changed.8 Laughter, tears and sighs belong to the now – the 
narrating moment. At the same time, they suggest that the intensity of 
the experiences is retained. The statements quoted above about feeling 
humiliated during the war are cognitive statements, whereas the tears shed 
in the interview stem from the sadness and frustration emerging now of 
the revived intensity of the experiences then. I therefore argue that a two-
decade-long exposure to a variety of representations of the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 1990s does not taint or falsify the kind of affective 
continuity that emerges at the personal level in the recorded narratives.9
At the same time, intertwined with the dominant narrative topic of 
humiliation is the materiality of basic things (the food depended on), 
bags (in which these things were carried home) and queues (connecting 
the war-imposed lines of bodies in the street and the personal – bodily 
– experience of suffering the cold while waiting). Other interviewees 
also tended to focus on the sensual qualities of particular objects of 
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humanitarian aid (negative but also positive, as will be shown below). 
As explained above, the senses involved in person–object interactions 
constitute a bodily remembering. It is these interactions’ affective charge 
that makes the objects appear sensitive, even in narrations that occur a 
long time after the war.
Sensitive objects
Sarah De Nardi (2014), in her research on Second World War veteran 
storytelling as ‘feeling’, pays attention to things relating to memories. 
Her work highlights the importance of mementos (such as a scrapbook 
or a dead brother’s scarf) for embodying the narrator’s memory, rather 
than simply being memory aids that facilitate storytelling. De Nardi’s 
interviews with members of the Italian and British Second World War 
resistance activists suggest that their experience was grounded ‘in the 
body and the world, and is shared through storytelling that is also per-
force grounded in the body’ (ibid. 443). This researcher shows that the 
‘worlds of feelings’ of veterans are established through their interac-
tions with mementos used in storytelling, and that these objects are not 
just sites of memory or relics but also ‘sites of feeling’.10 Consequently, 
engagement with mementos is ‘a route to understanding and expressing 
the ways in which persons, memories and objects are interconnected 
an mutually constitutive’ (ibid. 461).
The people quoted in this chapter did not use and did not need to 
use any physical mementos in the course of the interviews. Instead, they 
engaged with their corporeal memories while reviving fragments of 
sensory experience. The person–object interactions constituting these 
memories seem to have had a lasting and easily revived affective impact.
Brian Massumi (1995: 96) defines affect as synaesthetic, which implies 
‘a participation of the senses in each other’. Ben Highmore points out 
that senses and affect ‘bleed into each other’, that every flavour has 
an emotional resonance (sweetness, sourness, bitterness) and that the 
bio-cultural arena of disgust ‘simultaneously invokes a form of sensual 
perception, and affective register of shame and disdain, as well as bod-
ily recoil’ (Highmore 2010: 120). Highmore asks, ‘When emotions are 
described by flavors, … are these simply metaphorical conventions? Or 
does the emotional condition of bitterness for instance release the same 
gastric response as the ingestion of bitter flavours? How do we make our 
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way from one modality to another?’ (ibid.). He notes that it is hard to 
imagine even trying to untangle the physical experience of touch, feel 
and movement or passionate intensities such as love or bitterness in order 
to subsume them ‘to discrete categories in terms of their physicality or 
their ideational existence’ (ibid.). Indeed, it is a matter of interpretation 
as to whether a particular word uttered in an interview denotes a revived 
affect or is used as part of a by now locally well-established ‘emotion-
ally correct’ way of representing the experience of innocent victim and 
deserving recipient of aid. We can only guess why an interviewee shed 
a tear while talking into the voice recorder two decades after the war. 
It is, after all, not certain that she would know herself if asked about it, 
since tears reflect an affective, open-ended state.
However, it is certain that the narrative material discussed here 
offers several examples of how ‘to have your attention being gripped 
by the goodness or badness of your circumstances, … is to be gripped 
by what matters to you, by something you care about, and – crucially 
– in a way that essentially involves and appreciation of that mattering’ 
(Helm 2009: 253; emphasis in the original). This pertains to significant 
others, close social relations and things. Descriptions of tastes and 
smells of food and clothing received as humanitarian aid are abundant. 
These are mostly the objects that are in direct touch with bodies or are 
incorporated by being eaten, such as lentils remembered as disgust-
ing and rice rejected as repulsive (‘I need it, but would not touch it! I 
can’t, I couldn’t eat one spoonful, not even if I was dying of hunger!’), 
or heaps of smelly old clothes at the Red Cross to ‘dig in’ in order to 
find useful clothing:
I still have memories of stinking clothes at the Red Cross … Well, 
that part, of the clothes that were arriving – with the best inten-
tion of those people who were giving away second-hand clothes 
– for me, that smell, I still seem to have it in my nose [she laughs 
tensely]. The mountains of clothes that I rummaged through in 
order to find something suitable for my children … it was very 
humiliating.
As in the quote in the previous section, the experience recounted here is 
perceived as negative and framed as humiliating. We cannot tell whether 
the woman ‘really’ felt humiliated when searching for clothes at the Red 
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Cross in Sarajevo during the 1990s war, or whether this framing – cap-
tured some twenty years later – ‘convinces’ Sarajevans that they were 
humiliated, or whether they were actually very pleased to have access to 
anything that was scarce. However, such considerations do not question 
the authenticity of this woman’s experience of the unpleasant smell that 
still activates an olfactory memory in her body. The fact that she laughs 
tensely while talking about it suggests her ambiguity towards this revived 
experience, i.e. she would like to laugh it away but cannot truly do so 
because it is (also) her corporeal memory.
A pensioner recollected how he ate mouldy bread:
I remember the hunger, when there was nothing but mouldy 
bread, we ate that, so that the little [good] bread we got could be 
given to the children. I ate those mouldy crusts [stressed by being 
uttered very slowly] and I lied to the children that that it was live 
penicillin and that I liked it.
Here, the affective flashback makes the man talk more slowly, as if men-
tioning the mouldy crusts makes him retaste them. Another person said:
We got a big can of smelly fish. I haven’t been able to eat fish since 
then; the smell of fish makes me vomit.
The statement ‘the smell of fish makes me vomit’ establishes a direct 
affective continuity between the past and the present. By not adding 
‘still’ to the statement, the narrator seems to recognise and admit the 
permanent nature of the memory. Borrowing Tumarkin’s formulation 
(2013: 315), here we can see how the body is ‘inhabited and structured’ 
by an ‘active immanence of the past’.
Sensitive symbols
There is a clear tension in the material between acceptance out of necessity, 
the repulsive objects narrated about and the attempt to distance oneself 
from the former experience. It seems that disgust is not only communi-
cated due to corporeal memories revived in the interview situation, but 
also to establish that one has not sunk so low in war as to stop caring 
about the smell and taste of food.11
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An object gathering layers of humiliation in the interconnected experi-
ence of hunger, necessity and charity is canned minced meat called ICAR. 
As summarised by one of the interviewees:
The famous ICAR, of course, no one could avoid it. It was eaten 
because it was necessary, but there were a lot of stories told about 
ICAR. It was like dog food, they sent us food for animals. People 
talked a lot about it, but everyone had to eat it, you had to because 
there wasn’t anything else, no meat or anything else … so, that’s 
how it was.
Referred to at length by most interviewees, ICAR features among the most 
important objects in the virtual war museum (Sarajevski ratni predmeti 
2010) and has iconic status. It has been analysed in scholarly articles 
(Sheftel 2012), presented in the Bosnian media (Bošnjaci.net 2007) and at 
tourist information sites (Sarajevo 2012) and discussed at length in web 
forum groups (Forum Klix.ba 2013). The popular consensus in Sarajevo 
and beyond is that ICAR symbolises the relation between international 
political actors and people living in Sarajevo in the 1990s – a relation of 
uneven power that has to be shielded by cynicism and black humour. It is 
a symbol of Sarajevans’ position as the generic other in relation to those 
sending them survival rations – as an indiscriminate mass of desperate 
people it dire need of any kind of food (see Povrzanović Frykman 2016).
ICAR is generally remembered as disgusting, as something that even 
cats and dogs refused to eat but that Sarajevans had to. ‘A monument 
to the international community’ (by Nebojša Šerić Šoba – a Sarajevan 
visual artist now living in New York) signed by ‘the grateful citizens of 
Sarajevo’ (see Bošnjaci.net 2007) was erected in an attempt to resolve this 
ambivalence and frame the experience. The object represented is a can 
of ICAR. This ‘monument’ can be regarded as a cynical materialisation 
framing a difficult experience to gain visibility.12
It is uncertain whether or how much the narratives analysed here are 
affected by the iconic status of ICAR. However, when it is evoked in the 
interviews it seems to produce a ‘kick in the stomach’. With few excep-
tions, people talked at length about their hatred of ICAR, even if they 
admitted to eagerly consuming it because they were not in a position to 
reject it (the taste could be improved if one was lucky enough to have 
access to onions or spices).
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Some kind of minced meat, in some smelly salty sauce, I mean, 
with no tomato … It was just minced meat, I mean, I don’t know 
what it was, but some kind of sauce with meat, salty, with some 
spices, possibly … the spices were hardly noticeable, but they 
disguised the taste of the meat.
The woman quoted above joked about her cat’s reaction to ICAR (and 
in doing so used the present tense):
Those are the most disgusting cans! You share the can with the 
animal, because it also has to eat something. And the cat sniffs 
at the can and then looks at you as if to say are you nuts? I’m not 
going to eat this!
Another interviewee framed her experience differently, in spite of having 
talked about a dog whose hair started to drop out after eating ICAR:
I can tell you, ICAR was to us … getting ICAR was a feast! Because, 
even if it was the most common thing [a common part of human-
itarian aid], it wasn’t certain that we would get it.
In a web forum entitled ‘Has the riddle of ICAR ever been solved?’ 
(Forum Klix.ba. 2013) the participants try (in 2011–13) to find out who 
produced ICAR and what exactly it contained. The humorous entries are 
numerous and black humour is prevalent. A straightforward connection 
is made by some participants between the bad quality of food received 
as humanitarian aid (ICAR being iconic in that sense as well) and the 
present-day perceived magnitude of cancer-related deaths in Sarajevo 
(an established folk belief on this matter seems to feed into the general 
victimisation stance), whereas some forum participants remind the others 
that ‘in spite of everything it was super food’ (ibid.).
For the discussion in focus here, it is relevant to mention that the 
person saying this describes how he found an unopened can two years 
after the war and tried it ‘in order to remember the taste – and the taste 
was disgusting. However, at that moment (during the war) it was superb’ 
(ibid.). Another participant in the forum presents himself as a chubby 
teenager in war who devoured ICAR in great quantities. As none of the 
neighbours would eat it, they gave their rations to him.
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In the interviews, the affective connection between then and now can 
be discerned through its effect on the body. That effect can be negative – a 
certain smell makes the person vomit – or positive. The material contains 
plenty of descriptions of excitement and joy caused by the encounters 
with items of aid. The following story about a tomato blurs the borders 
between its symbolic and pragmatic value, but neverthelsss depicts it as 
a sensitive object. It is a story about a tomato grown on the balcony and 
solemnly shared by three neighbours who ate their respective parts of 
the tomato with a knife and fork.
Aunt T., myself and granny shared [emphasised] a tomato that we 
had grown [emphasised] in a flowerpot. It was like a small ball and 
was pink, it wasn’t even ripe. We put it on a big plate [expressed 
very slowly] and then we took small plates [expressed very slowly] 
and cut it into three pieces [expressed very slowly], and each of us 
put a piece on our plates, picked up a fork and a knife and cut that 
tomato piece by piece. Can you imagine that? … We enjoyed this 
small [expressed very slowly] tomato [laughter]. The three of us! 
It was a special pleasure. I don’t think I have ever eaten a better 
tomato in my life [laughter]!
The potential symbolic value of this tomato is strengthened by the anchor-
ing of the narrated memory in sensual experience. At the same time, 
a positive corporeal memory is interlaced with the happy memory of 
solidarity and togetherness that was reconfirmed by the material prac-
tice of sharing ‘a meal’. Yet, at the same time, the way the three women 
consumed the tomato re-established them as civilised people (eating 
with a knife and fork) and thereby symbolised their pre-war normality.
A matter of generation
As shown above, the objects that emerge as sensitive in the narratives told 
by people who lived through the siege of Sarajevo are not ‘sites of mourning’ 
(De Nardi 2014: 446). Here, they are analysed as ‘sites of rev isited experi-
ence’ involving ordinary things that acquired extraordinary importance 
in the context of war. Their importance stems from the fact that they were 
scarce and difficult to obtain, although the framing of how they were expe-
rienced is not only negative. The material suggests the importance of the 
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age of the interviewees during war, in that it seems to be the main reason 
for the difference in the affective charging of their narrations.
People who were adults at the time of the war mostly talk about their 
experiences in terms of difficulties and humiliation, whereas those who 
were children in the 1990s tend to talk about the excitement and joy of 
getting sweets, toys, or a pair of secondhand jeans that were ‘just per-
fect’ and so dear that it was ‘impossible’ to throw them away after the 
war. Children take the world around them – its materiality – as it is, as 
it unfolds for them through their senses.13 When asked about humani-
tarian aid, most of the younger research participants talked animatedly 
about the moments of pleasure experienced when receiving precious 
titbits from humanitarian ration packs. One of them added:
You know, perhaps I talk a bit differently about it now … You 
see, when you are older, then perhaps you talk differently, but we 
[those of us who were children] talk about it all as joy, and the 
tidbits that made us happy.
What were known as Vietnamese cookies have a similar status to ICAR in the 
local narratives. A woman whose children were very young in the war said:
I remember those cookies sent by UNICEF that were some 50 years 
old … they were very dry and white, we tried to do something 
with them, make cakes out of them combined with something 
else. That was terrible too. I saw how old they were, I saw how 
terrible they were, but I simply had no choice but to give them to 
the children to eat, because I didn’t have anything else. If I had 
I would certainly not have made them eat them, and that also 
makes me angry, because I had the feeling that they just wanted 
to get rid of them … I had the feeling that the people sending us 
that help, humanitarian, were in fact manipulating us because 
they sent us something that they would never eat themselves.
However, the same cookies were a favourite of a younger man, who said:
There was this famous ICAR that is often mentioned, but I actually 
remember the ration packs – aaaand [prolonged] those cookies, 
American, some 40–50 years old [emphasised], in metal tins, and 
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which we [children] ate, ate, ate, because they were so sweet [smile] 
and we were pleased when they were available [emphasised]. They 
were sweet, and we children liked those sweets, and they were 
eaten [said very slowly].
His most cherished wartime objects were the ration packs (originally 
made for the American military):
Those ration packs that contained several things were something 
special, they contained, as one says, both the salty and the sweet. 
Some sweets, small bars of chocolate [said very slowly], those dishes 
[said very slowly] that were there! Those ration packs remained 
for me … because they were packed in a special manner, in some 
plastic [said very slowly], foil [said very slowly], then in some, I 
don’t know, material that was probably heat-resistant and water-
proof. So I remember that a lot.
Another young man cherished the second-hand shoes from the human-
itarian aid. Although they were too small for him (and thus hurt), he 
loved them because they enabled him to play football with the neigh-
bouring boys. Also, the following example shows how the unpleasant 
bodily experience of a material object is acknowledged, but its function 
perceived as more important. It illustrates how the memory of bad smell 
is pertinent, yet it is not the reason for framing the experience as negative 
(the mix of tenses reflects the original):
My parents would go a couple of times, and bring … not really 
clothes, but they brought some kind of plaids [said very slowly]. 
We called them horse blankets [said with emphasis]. They were 
red [said very slowly] and they were quite coarse.
Why ‘horse’ blankets?
Well, I don’t know, they were so … like, they were so coarse [said 
very slowly] and so ugly [said very slowly]. Well, you couldn’t – if 
you used them to cover yourself – you simply couldn’t breathe, 
they were smelly [said with emphasis], and therefore people called 
them ‘horse blankets’, because in the past plaids like this were 




So, folk would say – we have now reached the point where we have 
to use what was used for horses. But it was war – cover yourself 
with whatever … There was no heating, there was nothing to 
heat with, no central heating, of course, or anything we have 
today – cover yourself with that! So I remember a lot of such 
plaids coming in, and since they were big [said very slowly] they 
were warm but also very smelly, and in the war it was not pos-
sible to wash them because there were no detergents or electricity 
for the washing-machine to work… So they would make from it 
… I remember from our neighbourhood, they [women] would 
make some kind of overall for us [children] that we would wear 
in the winter. Some people had sewing machines in the home, 
and they used this plaid and cut it a bit, here, there, and made … 
like … for the winter.
Like an overall?
Yes, like an overall. We would then – I mean, it is normal for a 
child to go the very moment there is a ceasefire – run out, roll in 
the snow, we were just playing, getting rid of energy. And we were 
warm [emphasised], but oh that smell [emphasised, smiling]. So, 
I remember those horse blankets, as we called them, very well.
For the younger interviewees the war experience was not a break with 
the everyday that made them aware of material losses and changes in 
their environment, or a challenge to their identity and dignity. It was 
the world they knew, the only world they had first-hand experience of. 
Twenty years later, the young people’s stories about humanitarian aid 
revived the excitement felt at the ‘aid arriving!’ and the commotion in 
the long queues. Their memories of parcels are happy memories, because 
they remember the joy of getting a brand new dress or a new notebook 
that was the prettiest they had ever seen. Their sensual recollections 
focused on, e.g. ‘ration pack no. 7’, which ranked high in their version 
of the practice of collecting things and trading the collectables.
Most importantly, it contained a bar of chocolate. As noted above, 
the taste of chocolate is remembered by young people for its delicious-
ness – for its very materiality and not as a memento of the normality of 
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chocolate consumption lost due to the war. While the bar of chocolate 
helped children to establish the world as they knew it – and themselves 
as individuals who liked chocolate – through their palates, the same 
bar of chocolate served to effectively remind the adults that the world 
as they knew it was no more. The realisation of a moment of pleasure, 
formerly a regular part of everyday life, becoming something exceptional 
and evoking the all-encompassing nature of loss made the adults, as 
one of them said, aware of ‘how much you are in fact abandoned, how 
insignificant you are’.
Conclusion
Taking the examples of past experiences of receiving humanitarian aid, 
this chapter shows how person–object interactions activate the bodily 
remembering that involves affective relations to particular objects.
This chapter contributes to ‘enfleshing and embodying affect as a 
particular kind of process-in-practice’ (Blackman and Venn 2010: 9). 
It shows that in the narratives about past war experiences, the objects 
in direct touch with the body and those sustaining the preservation of 
bodies are given a central place. In line with De Nardi’s claim (2014: 458) 
that the memory of the body is inseparable from the living (present-day) 
memory of a past war, the analysis shows that senses engaged then retain 
a lingering affective dimension that is communicated in the narration 
now, and at the same time affects the person in the act of narration.
The analysis of my examples offers a general explanation of the expe-
riences illustrated by the introductory statement that the memory of ‘the 
absence of bread in the past’ – the deep, overwhelming hunger of those 
who were starving – is not erased by ‘the presence of bread today’. Such 
experiences are not erased – and sometimes cannot be erased – because 
they constitute corporeal memories. Such memories in turn reveal how 
deeply people are entangled with a surrounding material world.
The analysis further shows that the objects that people single out as 
important are sensitive due to their ambiguous nature, i.e. due to people’s 
ambiguous attitudes towards them. Some objects were necessary but at 
the same time foul-tasting or smelly. Others brought about sensations 
of pleasure, but were scarce. Either way, the senses involved in engage-
ment with those objects constitute corporeal memories that ‘resonate’, 
even two decades later, in meetings with particular smells and tastes, or 
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due to sudden ruptures in the expected material circumstances (heath, 
light, running water).
However, these corporeal memories also appear to be reactivated by 
the very act of narration. This suggests that the affective power of past 
experiences remains gathered in some of the objects of humanitarian 
aid, i.e. in the memories of them. These memories are both positive 
and negative. However, for the people who were adults at the time of 
the war, particular objects of humanitarian aid also emerge as sensitive 
because they are so basic and part of a normal existence in the sense of 
‘normality as people know it’ (Nordstrom 2004). At the same time, the 
objects were highly desired regardless of their repulsive traits. In the 
post festum narrative effort of sense-making, they become the nods of 
realisation of the fragility of any kind of taken for granted materiality 
in which ‘normal’ social and emotional reactions are supposedly safely 
embedded (see Povrzanović Frykman 2002).
It is noted (in line with Tumarkin 2013) that person–object inter-
actions constitute a bodily remembering, that mnemonic processes also 
operate at levels that cannot be fully reduced to cognition, and that the 
products of these processes exceed representational forms rather than 
being completely outside or beyond them. This chapter shows that in 
addition to the what – the words that qualify the experiences and the 
ways they are rationally (and morally) framed in the narrative act of 
sense-making – the how also needs to be observed – the physical and 
physiological dimensions of the act of narration.
Tears were shed during several of the interviews. However, perhaps 
most importantly, the tense laughter and smiles of disbelief offer glimpses 
of the lingering ambivalence stemming from the revived memories 
of deprivation and pleasure alike. They highlight – for the narrators 
themselves as well as for the researcher – the affective power, retained 
as corporeal memories, of the utterly precarious situation of the siege. 
They also confirm openness as a core character of affect: the objects of 
humanitarian aid remain sensitive precisely because the (older) narrators 
could not (always) decide how they felt about them. Twenty years after 
the war they were not quite sure how to ‘fix in words’ their experiences 
of humanitarian aid, whether they should feel grateful or angry, happy 
about surviving or humiliated. Regardless, the act of narration creates an 
affective continuity between what is said and how it is told, and between 
the past experience and the current act of narration.
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Notes
1 Thirteen interviews (one with a married couple) were conducted in Sarajevo by the psy-
chologist Dr Nina Bosankić, who acted as research assistant. She is assistant professor at 
the International University of Sarajevo and senior researcher affiliated to the Centre for 
Refugee and IDP Studies in Sarajevo. A native of Sarajevo, she was in her teens during the 
war. The people she interviewed were not her close relations, but her own or her relatives’ 
acquaintances. She had not talked about the matters discussed here with the fourteen 
interviewees before, but they could all presume her familiarity with the subject matter. I 
interviewed the fifteenth participant by Skype, also in Bosnian, the native language of all 
the interviewees. The translations of the interview excerpts are mine.
2 Observe also the term ‘trauma’ in this quote. The discussion of how this term is and can be 
used is beyond the scope of this chapter.
3 Ivana Maček (in her comments on this text) observed that the narrative device ‘and everyone 
would tell you so’ was often used when people in Sarajevo said something that was politically/
publicly ambiguous. By using the narrative device of magnitude, the woman I interviewed 
may have wanted to make sure that I (an outsider who did not share her experiences of the 
seige) did not regard her reactions as strange, but like those of ‘everyone else’.
4 In line with how it is used by Thomas J. Csordas (1990), embodiment refers to the body as 
the main means of interacting with the world. For Csordas, ‘the body is not an object to be 
studied in relation to culture, but is to be considered as the subject of culture, or in other 
words as the existential ground of culture’ (ibid. 5). His approach is developed from the 
perspective of psychological anthropology and ‘leans strongly in the direction of phenomen-
ology’ (ibid.).
5 Burton (2011: 8) sees chronic pain as the antithesis of the commemorative, embodied ritu-
alisation described by Paul Connerton (1989) as essential for the maintenance of social 
memories and for defining collective identities. ‘Instead, chronic pain is marked by an 
almost complete absence of communal performance or formal significance within the life 
of a community. Its meaning is located within the four corners of the (modern) individu al, 
symbolically banal, corporeally profane and devoid of meaning, for everybody except the 
sufferer, and sometimes even for the sufferer as well’ (Burton 2011: 8). See also Linda Green’s 
description (1994) of illness among Guatemalan Maya as the only unpoliticised way of 
remembering political violence and pain/loss.
6 This was also well documented in my former research on war experiences; see Povrzanović 
Frykman 2002 and 2008.
7 Ivana Maček (in her comments on this text) observed that the quality of the affect is changed 
in the narrative – for the purpose of distancing and thus also integrating an otherwise too 
psychologically disturbing experience. Other ways of coping with disturbing experiences 
include forgetting them, or ignoring them as much as possible – not talking about them.
8 When commenting on this text Ivana Maček observed that people in Sarajevo were happy 
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when they received their humanitarian aid packages but felt ashamed at having to queue 
for them. However, at the time they did not laugh or feel suffocated.
9 The connections between personal and collective experiences and their subsequent rep-
resentations are not pursued here, but would benefit from Fischer and van Kleef ’s work 
(2010), where the social dimension of emotions is seen as fundamental. The analysis of 
such connections would further benefit from Richard and Rudnyckyj’s emphasis (2009) 
on the relationality inherent in affect – its transactional and intersubjective character that 
forges new subjectivities and new collectivities. Richard and Rudnyckyj’s notion of affec-
tive collectivities might also be useful in interpreting solidarity in war. The same applies 
to Sara Ahmed’s discussion (2004b) of affective economies. Stories cherishing solidarity 
are prominent in the interviews and the related affective collectivities can be discerneed 
on different scales (see Povrzanović Frykman 2015).
10 De Nardi therefore concludes that memory is not just retrieval from or of the past, but has 
a regenerating aspect that is ‘encapsulated’ in mementos as the veterans’ ‘best tool to reach 
out with their stories and emotions in order to establish a meaningful connection with 
the contemporary world – to feel that what they did matters’ (ibid. 460; emphasis in the 
original). My examples reveal what mattered to people living under siege, but also open up 
the question of how the experience of being dependent on humanitarian aid mattered, and 
might still matter, with regard to people’s emotions and attitudes in the context of postwar 
socio-political developments (see Povrzanović Frykman 2016).
11 In his research on Sarajevans’ postwar yearnings for ‘normal lives’, Stef Jansen (2013) shows 
that this dynamic is central to everyday war memories in Sarajevo more generally.
12 In a PR statement issued by the Centre for Contemporary Art in Sarajevo, the institution 
that authorised the placement of this sculpture in a public space, the part about Sarajevans 
‘still today remembering these cans with disgust’ is followed by a reminder of the arms 
embargo imposed in the 1990s by the international community. The point made is that 
instead of allowing them to fight back and defend themselves, the international community 
was ‘feeding the endangered population with the long out-of-date canned meat’ (Bošnjaci.
net 2007).
13 See Frykman, Chapter 7 in this volume, on how an affective relation to the environment is 
analysed in terms of worlding.
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Josip Broz Tito was the personification of the Yugoslav state for 35 years. Starting 
from specific scenes where objects referring to him are visible in contempo-
rary Croatia, the authors of Chapter 5 give examples from the post-Yugoslav 
affective zones: a portrait of the leader appears as a gift and ruins a birthday 
party; his name is found spelled out in roses in a public park; small busts and 
bric-a-brac are sold at flea-markets. In different ways they all invoke what the 
authors of this chapter call ‘Titoaffect’. This is a state composed of a mix of 
affects such as indignation, repugnance, and shock that lead to emotional 
states of introspection and remembrance of days gone by. They demonstrate 
that in spite of Tito constantly being denounced in the political realm, his 




Tracing Objects and Memories of 
Socialism in Postsocialist Croatia
Nevena Škrbić Alempijević & Sanja Potkonjak
In this chapter we focus on the residual materiality of socialism and 
its ambivalent status in Croatia today. We observe that relicts from the 
socialist period have the power to affect people and produce affective 
stirrings in the social realm by, for example, arousing emotions or mak-
ing people act or remember episodes that have been silenced. Objects 
that have a particularly strong effect are those bearing the image of the 
ex-Yugoslav president, Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980). Our study of this 
topic began in 2004 with the project ‘Political Places in Change’, which 
focused on unofficial contemporary celebrations of Tito’s birthday in 
his birthplace (cf. Hjemdahl and Škrbić Alempijević 2006). During our 
research we noted that for the majority of actors – including research-
ers – artefacts bearing Tito’s image, name or reference to him triggered 
a strong emotionally charged reaction. This ranged from the holding 
of one’s breath to a desire to express one’s opinion; reactions that we 
in this essay refer to as the Titoaffect. A wide variety of objects bearing 
Tito’s image or name have emerged in various contexts, many of which 
are mentioned in Mitja Velikonja’s book Titostalgia – A study of Nostal­
gia for Josip Broz (2008). Sculptures, paintings, drawings, photographs, 
postcards, banknotes, books, textbooks, newspapers, comics, badges, 
plaques, decorative plates, gramophone records, tapestries, gobelins, 




When analysing the affective dynamics of the material remnants of 
socialism we do not only observe the objects themselves, but also people 
in actual social contexts, i.e. their emotional, bodily and intellectual 
involvement, their sensory perceptions and the narrative expressions and 
social practices triggered by the presence of Tito in their everyday lives. 
In this sense we follow Sara Ahmed, who states that: ‘to experience an 
object as being affective or sensational is to be directed not only toward 
an object, but to“whatever” is around that object, which includes what is 
behind the object, the conditions of its arrival’ (Ahmed 2010: 33). In other 
words, we need to look at what the symbolic power of objects reflecting 
Tito’s personality cult was like in the past and how it affects people now. 
How do these objects trigger people into action and trigger experiences 
before they even begin to deliberate on the meanings inscribed in them? 
We also analyse how people circulate these objects today: what they do 
with them, what they say about them and how they experience them in 
the afterlife of socialism.
We use the notion of the afterlife of socialism to situate the tempo-
ral layer of our research. When we look at the flow of objects over time 
and the simultaneous changes in social memory, we are able to follow 
their ‘cultural afterlife’ (Rigney 2004: 383) and understand how they 
reflect people’s perceptions of socialism and postsocialism. The afterlife 
of socialism is an interpretative horizon – an analytical playground in 
which we see the potentiality of socialism to resonate beyond its his-
torical existence. We approach the afterlife of socialism as a dimension 
that influences present-day social practices and creates new affective 
worlds. In that sense, our aim is to produce a record of attunement and 
disattunement to the socialist legacy. Here we point to ‘rifts’ in affective 
responses and practices that stand out against the contemporary hori-
zon of values. Given Ahmed’s claim (2010) that objects are dependent 
on sociability and the cultural and political environment in which they 
affect people, the Titoaffect that is set in motion by Tito artefacts can 
only be studied in the full understanding of post-Yugoslav memory shifts 
and political turns.
In addressing the Titoaffect we build on recent research on post- 
socialism and memory in post-Yugoslav countries. The number of studies 
of socialism from the postsocialist perspective has increased in recent 
years. Some researchers, such as Dunja Rihtman Auguštin (2000), ana-
lyse changes in everyday practices caused by changes in the political 
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system, discuss interventions in the urban toponymy and follow the 
fate of socialist monuments in postsocialist times. Others deal with the 
politics of memory in Croatian socialist culture, or examine textbooks 
and popular culture as vectors of memory (Čale Feldman and Prica 2006; 
Jambrešić Kirin 2004; Žanić 2002). Several studies focus more closely 
on the imaginary, on places and practices directly related to Tito (Škrbić 
Alempijević and Hjemdahl 2006; Velikonja 2008). However, because of 
a lack of consensus about his role in Croatian history, Tito remains a 
problematic topic in Croatian academic circles.1 Our aim is to address 
this uneasiness by using the Titoaffect concept. There are certain points 
of contact between this concept and the previously discussed Tito stalgia, 
which also raises the question of how and for what purpose Tito is still 
present more than thirty years after his death. In comparison to the 
concept of Titostalgia, related to the sunny side of memory (Velikonja 
2008), Titoaffect encompasses a whole span of differently charged reac-
tions to Tito objects.
‘Tito’s bodies in word and image’ (Brkljačić 2003) were omnipresent 
in all the spheres of political and everyday life in the former Yugoslavia. 
From the 1950s until the end of the 1980s the figure of Tito served as the 
core of political mythology and a personification of the country itself 
(ibid. 99). That was one of the reasons why Tito ‘in word and image’ 
vanished from public sites in the 1990s, after the break-up of Yugosla-
via and during the Croatian War of Independence. Negative connota-
tions have been attached to Tito’s figure, such as the political system 
he represented being both backwards and harmful to Croats, and that 
‘Tito’s Army’, which is what the Yugoslav People’s Army was frequently 
called, turned against the Croatian people. Memory shift, or a sharp cut 
in the politics of memory, was both an element and a symptom of the 
nation-building process. The historic imaginary of the Croatian state 
has been constructed anew. Some collective memories have been delib-
erately ‘forgotten’, especially those connected to the Second World War 
and life under socialism and Tito, and subdued by the discourse of the 
suffering of Croats in the aftermath of the war and ‘in the chains’ of the 
former Yugoslavia (Jambrešić Kirin 2004: 140). Other episodes, motifs 
and figures have been placed in the front line, such as those referring to 
the historical periods preceding socialism, and especially those which 
in popular discourse have the status of ‘eras of Croatian independence’, 
in which the Croats established some sort of autonomous political for-
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mation, as in medieval times (see Biti and Blagaić 2009; Potkonjak et 
al. 2006; Škrbić Alempijević 2012: 185–202). In those periods Tito mon-
uments and other artefacts created in his image went underground and 
disappeared from public sight. Tito objects were stored in galleries and 
basements, forgotten in the landscape or reserved for the private sphere. 
In other cases they were violently destroyed, altered, thrown away or 
blown up with explosives. On the other hand, Tito’s name can still be 
heard or stumbled across in the public sphere. For instance, one of the 
central squares in Zagreb, where the National Theatre stands, still bears 
the name of Marshall Tito, notwithstanding numerous protests and 
initiatives to choose a more politically correct name. In contemporary 
Croatia, even in the mainstream political discourse, there is no consensus 
on Tito’s role in Croatian history, and both present and past usages of his 
name reflect this. Sometimes he is called a communist villain, a butcher 
of Croats, an anti-Croat, a Yugoslav dictator. Here Tito is an ugly word, 
but at the same time is a means of creating and mobilising cohesion in 
right-wing political circles. This also applied in the presidential campaign 
in 2014, in which one of the candidates was criticised by her own party, 
the Croatian Democratic Union, for failing to refer to Tito as a crimi-
nal in her public speeches (Lovrić 2014). In other cases, Tito is defined 
as a supreme leader of antifascism and a fighter for freedom. For some 
people he is primarily ‘a very cool guy’, both good and bad, and a truly 
impressive historical figure. For others, the appearance of his figure is 
kitsch, due to the overflowing sentimentality it implies.
In the examples of how objects can become more than remnants, 
relicts and dead artefacts upon which to gaze, we show how they trig-
ger wonder and memories and foster affective engagement. Given the 
materiality that constitutes them and the political symbolism inscribed 
in them, such objects are ‘affective before they are encountered’ (Ahmed 
2010: 40). In other words, there is an anticipation, potential and inten-
sity about them that ‘compels a response’ (Stewart 2007: 14). In order to 
address the response to the ‘potential stored in ordinary things’ (ibid. 
23) we elaborate on three affective realms of the Titoaffect. They do not 
exhaust all the possible realms, or function as affects that are ‘emerging 
discharged by … objects’ (Navaro-Yashin 2009: 1). Rather, they are acci-
dental, snatched and partial images of what constitutes the post-Yugoslav 
affective zone. There we find three predominant affects: one is indigna-
tion, shock and repugnance; the other is introspective silence; and the 
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third is drive to share memories of individual pasts in a reflexive and 
positively connoted manner.
To illustrate the range of Titoaffects we present three scenes, or con-
texts, in which we intentionally or accidentally encountered Tito objects. 
The first two scenes evoke a personal rapport with Tito artefacts, which 
are narrated as stories and encapsulated in the third person. Pseudo-
nyms are used for the stories’ principal characters. This translation to a 
third person narrative has also enabled us to observe the stories from a 
different perspective. In addition to reconciling our own personal reflex-
ions this process helped make us more attuned to the narratives of our 
interlocutors. By becoming other people’s stories, our own stories began 
to resonate with the Titoaffect we wanted to convey.
Helena’s story – Tito at the birthday party
It was a mild winter’s night in 2006. A friend of Helena’s husband from 
high-school days was celebrating his 35th birthday in the indoor space 
of what had previously been the neighbourhood’s public gathering point 
in the western part of Zagreb’s outskirts. As soon as Helena received the 
invitation she knew that it was going to be a wild, drunken night. The 
birthday boy had a reputation for throwing the craziest parties wherever 
he was and regardless of the company he kept. He was a funny, noisy, 
sociable person who laughed at everyone and himself. Also, he was an 
official at the Civil Court and a supporter of the right-wing Croatian 
Democratic Union, with a rich family history of engagement with that 
political party at the highest governmental level.
Helena and her husband went to the party with another couple, the 
man being the birthday boy closest high-school friend. They took a bottle 
of wine with them from Helena’s home island, knowing that it would be 
well received. Once at the party they placed it on the long table, which 
was already groaning with drinks and snacks.
The large room was packed with people: the host’s colleagues from 
work, his neighbours, members of the mountaineering club and old mates 
from his home town. They were dancing, drinking, smoking, laughing, 
shouting and trying to hear what was being said over the loud rock-and-
roll music vibrating from the hi-fi. The birthday boy was in charge. The 
venue was dark, sweaty and pulsating.
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Around midnight Helena became aware of some commotion at the 
door and moved towards it, expecting some kind of birthday surprise. 
A few of the man’s colleagues were manoeuvring a big, flat rectangular 
object through the doorway. Helena took a closer look. What she saw 
was a familiar black-and-white picture of Tito in his presidential pose, in 
a black suit, his serious face photographed in half-profile. This familiar 
picture, along with images depicting Tito as the Marshall, a chief com-
mander of the Yugoslav People’s Army, and in the company of cheerful 
pioneers, had previously hung in offices, schools and other institutions all 
over former Yugoslavia. It had a thick, dark, heavy frame. It was cover ed 
in dust, but otherwise was in a perfect shape.
‘We thought it would be more authentic if we left the dust on it’, 
explained the initiator of this unusual birthday performance. It was not 
the finding of the object – an extraordinary birthday gift – that was the 
bottom line of his quest through remnants of a forgotten past. The main 
motivation was to do something with the object, stir up the sweating 
crowd, change the usual course of the party and make a difference. Helena 
asked where he had found it. ‘In some basement’, he responded. Helena 
had the impression that he did not want to reveal whose basement it was. 
The gift-giver asked for some kind of confirmation of the greatness of his 
idea. Some of the participants saw it as a good joke, an original provo-
cation. But the high-school friend in Helena’s company was furious. He 
couldn’t believe that he was seeing Tito again, ‘after we finally got rid of 
all of it’; it meaning all sorts of things – Tito, socialism, the war. A chair 
was placed at the edge of the dance floor. Everyone gathered around the 
chair in a half-circle. The music stopped and the lights were dimmed. 
The host was invited to approach the chair. Then the treasure hunter 
entered with the birthday gift, its subject hidden from view. ‘For your 
birthday present we decided to give you something that you can decorate 
the walls of your office with’, he said. With a ta-dah gesture he turned 
the picture towards his expectant audience. Everything froze. For several 
long seconds there was a deathly silence. Some eyes were fixed on Tito, 
and some on their host, awaiting his reaction. A few of the participants 
giggled nervously, or made a silly remark about the size and subject of 
the picture. Most of the sentences were incomplete: ‘I remember we had 
one of those in our…’ But these attempts did not hide the fact that the 
birthday boy did not like his present at all. His face showed disappoint-
ment and distaste. He mumbled something about hanging the picture 
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Figure 5.1. The official image that used to be displayed in public buildings. Photo: 
Željko Livnjak, September 2015. Used with permission.
in his office and then turned, slowly, to face the table laden with drinks. 
The partygoers followed suit and the picture was ignored. Nobody talked 
about Tito, or at least if they did it was drowned by the music, and it 
was a while before people’s party spirits were again raised. But after a 
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while people ‘forgot’ about the awkward situation and began to dance 
and shout as before. The chair with Tito perched on it was dragged into 
the nearest corner out of the way. In the morning it was still there. The 
birthday gift had been forgotten.
Sara’s story – Tito’s name is written in the park
Sara and her husband moved into a residential block in Zagreb’s city 
centre in the middle of 2000. They purchased a flat on the 9th floor with 
a panoramic view over the old town. In time they learned that the build-
ing held a secret more striking than the view. Sara did not remember 
who noticed the lettering in the park first – the name of Tito in yellow 
rose bushes – but once her attention was drawn to it, she started to chase 
‘the Tito ghost’. She even learned from the neighbours that ‘they live in 
an old commie street’.
Sara approached her immediate neighbour first; a woman in her fifties 
who turned out to be a poet. The poet told her, in hushed voice, that she 
should not disturb the memory of Tito. Sara was amazed. If you start 
‘chasing the story’ – the poet told her – someone may alert the author-
ities and then the lettering will be removed, ‘someone might dig it out’. 
The poet was distressed at Sara’s curiosity, so Sara dropped the subject. 
She did not want to tarnish the treasure the poet’s family held dear. The 
poet’s words resonated strangely: ‘There is no more socialism. What is 
left is social inequality’. The poet was bitter: ‘They promised us a better 
future. It looks as though they secured a better present for themselves’. 
Sara understood that the poet did not want her to do anything – but just 
let Tito be. Sara should simply keep quiet. It was as though the keeping 
of the Tito lettering a secret was their private prank on the society. In 
Sara’s building, silenced rebellion went hand in hand with silenced pride. 
After all, as one of neighbours announced, ‘they themselves planted the 
rose bushes after Tito’s death’.
Talking to another neighbour, a woman in her seventies, in a lazy 
Sunday conversation helped Sara to find out more about the history of 
the building: ‘I shouldn’t be talking to you about that. I don’t dare. I am 
not sure if you know that a multinational group of people lived here 
before. They were a colourful group’. The elderly woman was a retired 
literature professor, an intellectual, tactful and not very happy about 
being labelled a ‘military widow’. At the same time as pointing to the fact 
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that many different nationalities once lived in the building, she warned 
Sara that some people were still ‘under the impression of war’ and that 
‘everything changed in the 90s’. What changed was not just how neigh-
bours looked at one another when they learned the importance of being 
a Croat, a Serb or a Muslim. More than anything else, the world they 
knew changed. They were trapped and had to refashion themselves, and 
be careful about what they said in public. The elderly woman said: ‘A 
few days ago I was standing there facing the lettering – the rose bushes 
haven’t started to bloom yet. I wonder each year whether they will still 
be there in the spring. Shaped in Tito’s name!’ She thought that it was 
‘peculiar’ that even during the war (in the 1990s) she never saw the bushes 
looking unkempt. She had expected someone to come in the night and 
pull everything out, to ‘clean away’ the ‘annoying memory’.
‘Do you think that the gardeners who look after the public gardens 
know what they are trimming and pruning?’ Sara asked the elderly 
neighbour. ‘Yes’, was the answer. ‘What about the corner shop employ-
ees who sneak out for a smoke and sit on the wall and turn their backs 
to Tito – do they know?’ ‘They all know’, said the elderly woman. It was 
their small and silent victory; the spirit of rebellion was there.
Figure 5.2. Tito’s geoglyph in the city park. Photo: Hrvoje Kalafatić, September 
2015. Used with permission.
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Sara was amused at the thought of Tito’s ghost. Her first impression 
was that other people also regarded the lettering as comical. But no 
matter who Sara talked to she met the same reaction – awkwardness 
and silence. Some praised the silence for preventing harm being done 
‘to Tito’, some did not want to get involved, while others cherished the 
silence, even though they felt threatened by it.
How well does Tito sell?
‘Where can we find Tito?’ That was our starting question when we dis-
cussed, at the beginning of 2014, which public contexts to approach in order 
to trace Tito objects and the affects they create. Strolling and shopping 
in Zagreb’s open-air markets seemed like a reasonable option. After all, 
at one time selling Tito was a profitable business. In our search for Tito 
we decided to visit two such markets: Hrelić, the biggest flea-market on 
the outskirts of Zagreb, and Britanac, branded as an open-air antiques 
fair in the city centre. What unites these two markets is the way the past, 
including the socialist past, is transformed into a commodity. However, 
they also differ in many ways – in the goods sold, in their esteemed eco-
nomic value, in the way trading objects function and in the types of vend-
ors and buyers they attract. But they are still interconnected. ‘Merchants 
selling at Britanac go to Hrelić early in the morning and pick up anything 
of value, including Tito statues’, explained one of the vendors at Hrelić.
Situated next to the city’s drop-off depot – a rubbish dump mark-
ing the southern entrance to Zagreb and blocking the view of the city’s 
skyline for motorists, Hrelić is the Mecca for petty trade. There you can 
buy anything from used cars to cheap low quality clothing produced in 
China, second-hand and well-worn clothes, once fashionable now vin-
tage accessories, spare parts for household appliances, books, old jour-
nals and all kinds of memorabilia. Anything that can be sold, traded or 
exchanged and that might tickle someone’s imagination or meet one’s 
needs has a price at Hrelić. ‘How much do you ask for Tito? Does he sell 
well?’ We asked our questions every time we saw anything resembling 
Tito displayed there. We saw several busts, a book about Tito’s life, paper 
money from the socialist period and a lot of badges. Those are ‘Tito’s 
badges and those with the red star sell the best’, we were told. The first 
Tito objects passed from hand to hand because they had to be touched 
by the person buying them to see if they felt right. It took us a few hours 
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to pick our way through the neat lines of piled goods on the ground. Our 
search for Tito had limited success. The traces of him at Hrelić were few 
and far between. We commented how odd it was that he was gone. ‘The 
thing sells better at Britanac’, a vendor explained, commenting that he 
kept Tito busts and other valuable items at home, in his garage, because 
they were too pricy for Hrelić. He only took them to the market if they 
had been ordered in advance. However, from time to time, Tito and the 
ideological industry that had made him ever-present surfaced in differ-
ent ways. At the very end of our Hrelić tour we found Tito at his very 
best. ‘I see you are interested…’ was the vendor’s cheerful response as 
he turned to us. ‘He [Tito] knew how to deal with kids. He was a leader!’ 
He seemed to have to explain this in order to sell the picture. But there 
was no mystique surrounding Tito’s name at Hrelić. One sells things, 
Tito objects included, because someone wants to buy them. There were 
no witty comments about Tito and no special sentimentality around 
him – as we had heard on other occasions. There was just a glimpse of 
happiness – that faded the moment we declined an offer to ‘buy Tito’ 
for 50 kunas.




Britanac was a different story. Tourists and celebrities, people in their 
Sunday best carrying their groceries home moved slowly past the neatly 
arranged stands. We could hear the buzz of the town centre – trams 
passing by, car horns blending with the morning chatter over coffee in 
street cafés. Under red market umbrellas, vendors displayed statues, 
paintings, books, antique furniture, old uniforms, traditional irons and 
coffee grinders. On several occasions we stumbled across Tito: the bust 
in his image, monographs and banknotes bearing his picture and name, 
photographs, postcards and stamps, Tito badges and key holders, an 
elementary textbook from the forties teaching children their first letters 
of alphabet – I, O, T – and how to write their first word: TITO. We took 
photographs of the objects and commented on them to the vendors. Our 
interest in Tito objects triggered reactions from merchants and from 
passers-by. ‘The girls are interested in Tito’, said one vendor to another 
and they both smiled at us, obviously amused. An elderly lady with a 
dog on a leash asked the vendor how much Tito cost when she saw us 
fingering a small metal bust of the former leader. ‘70 kunas, Madam’, 
was the reply. ‘Do you have any better ones than that?’ As soon as she 
had said this, she added: ‘Although the best one of all is gone’. We met a 
distinguished professor from our faculty. He caught us browsing through 
a book entitled Tito and the Diaspora. ‘The author had to formulate his 
work like that’, he said to justify the writer putting Tito and the diaspora 
together. ‘He had to connect the emigrants with the system because in 
those days being a member of diaspora meant being Ustasha.’ Our interest 
in Tito objects resonated like a wave in the social space around us. The 
objects and their trading offered an opportunity to state one’s opinion, 
to excuse someone else’s writings and to evoke personal memories. They 
became the focal point of interaction.
Tito’s coming out
Nowadays, objects bearing Tito’s image or name appear when you least 
expect them, as both a means and a hindrance to social interaction. 
They propel markets, inspire artistic and social interventions and create 
various kinds of affects. People act differently in such an encounter: 
they draw back from the object that reminds them of the forgotten past 
(as in the case of the unsuccessful birthday present), are drawn into a 
conspirational silence protecting a secret rose bush lettering or share 
the titoaffect
119
knowledge and memories when faced with Tito imagery, as shown in 
the open-air markets in Zagreb. Uprooted from their thriving historical 
environment, Tito artefacts are diverted from their previously expected, 
albeit heterogeneous, meanings and collective support. However, their 
potential to produce suspense and create an immediate and object-related 
affective cohesion and interaction around themselves makes every Tito 
object an extraordinary artefact that provokes people into expressing 
their feelings of appreciation or utter irritation and disgust.
The groups we met around the Tito objects were not made up of like-
minded individuals or supported the same, or indeed any, ideology. They 
were not clearly bound up in time and space. They did not recognise 
sharp distinctions. They were sometimes private and at other times not, 
for example the residents of the ‘old commie street’ guarding the secret 
of the Tito lettering. Groups like this can also appear in public spaces 
and in public contexts, although do not necessarily give an impression of 
collectiveness. We noticed this when searching for Tito objects in Zagreb’s 
open-air markets, where the people who participated in the actions 
and dialogues provoked by their presence expressed quite different and 
Figure 5.4. Selling Tito at Britanac in Zagreb. Photo: Sanja Potkonjak, February 2014.
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sometimes even opposing opinions and sentiments. These groups were 
temporarily joined together in affective practices triggered by the ‘prox-
imity’ of the Tito object, in relation to it, or in attachment or detachment. 
They were simply circumstantial, dependant on the reappearance of the 
Tito object. Provoked by the sudden recognition of a Tito artefact, their 
emotions peaked and vanished. This was what was witnessed when Tito 
appeared suddenly and unexpectedly at the birthday party.
If we return to the aim of this essay, to the affective power of an object, 
we need to ponder on the affects and relational nature of the material 
existence of the Tito object. In our study we have tried to discern how 
an object like this buzzes, vibrates and prompts affects. We saw how 
it provoked and served as a stimulus to express something that would 
otherwise have remained concealed. Nowadays, these objects seem to 
utter something unexpected, despite having been ordinary, common and 
almost typical parts of a popular culture in socialist times. This is also 
the case for those objects that, at the moment of their production, did not 
serve any practical purpose. The same can be said about the institutional 
use of Tito pictures, which were meant to turn a public space into an 
arena in which the power of the state was seen and felt. However, those 
objects became so omnipresent and expected that they became part of the 
everyday scenography. Back then, in the heyday of Tito objects, they may 
not have been recognised as profound ethnographic treats. What would 
be noticed at that time was their absence rather than their appearance. 
Nowadays, their absence is taken for granted. When they do reappear, 
they trigger unaccounted affective practices and unexpected ethno-
graphic situations. In our study, the Tito objects we encountered made 
people turn their backs and move on as though nothing had happened; 
they created an embarrassing silence, made invisible things visible as in 
the ethnography of the unwanted birthday present, made neighbours 
reconsider the rose bush manifestation of Tito’s name and made buyers 
and bystanders engage in brief interactions and share experiences and 
historical lessons on Tito and socialism, as in the Hrelić and Britanac 
markets.
What makes these objects unexpected and extraordinary in the present 
is the fact that they have changed from being obligatory in socialism to 
being unwelcome and stigmatised in the dominant politics of remember-
ing in postsocialism. For a while many Tito objects went underground 
and were suspended from the public sphere. When they re-emerged 
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they echoed the uneasiness of that process. In the present their everyday 
usages are marked with ambiguity and ambivalence. It seems to us that 
the Titoaffect largely relies on the interplay of the objects’ ordinariness 
and extraordinariness, and their simultaneous familiarity and estrange-
ment. Such stirrings in the social space can hardly be verbalised, but are 
nonetheless widely felt, experienced and acted upon.
Ahmed describes affects as a challenge to how we think of emotions 
that encapsulate our being in the world. The affective turn ‘[is] bringing 
forth ghosted bodies and the traumatized remains of erased histories’ 
(Ticineto Clough 2007: 3). It allows us to research affects that creates 
some sort of span between the present encounter with the objects and 
the past they evoke, even if that past functions as a temporal stratum 
that is intentionally forgotten in the present moment. By recognising 
the power of a Titoaffect to shape, i.e. to disturb and inspire reactions, 
we approach its manifestations as graspable affective accounts. In our 
use of the idea of Tito objects we have pointed to their capacity to weave 
a meaningful affective web for the generations experiencing and shar-
ing Tito’s charisma. We have also acknowledged its transgenerational 
translation into a sign that provokes pain, discomfort and disturbance.
Ahmed (2010) calls the impression that is attached to objects their 
‘affective value’. When explaining the social life of objects she holds that 
there are a wide range of experiences, sensations and relations to the 
affective value of the particular object. The fact that Tito artefacts stimu-
late political and personal affects ranging from adoration to abhorrence 
shows Tito’s affective power over people. They are indicators of societal 
battles, encounters with a changing world and help people to reflect on 
a meaningful existence. They all come to us as Titoaffect-at-work.
Our decision to confront the powerful memory of Tito and the Tito-
affect emerged from something deeply disturbing within us. It emanated 
from a society we were not only observing but living in, and that is 
reflected in the stories told here. It also struck us that at some point our 
ethnography could not grasp the emotion of the underlying narratives, 
the mockery and contempt, we were confronted with.
With these stories we have tried to point to the existence of differ-
ent affective communities and their relationship with the socialist past 
(ibid. 37). These communities also differ in how they relate to Tito’s her-
itage. Some still celebrate the images and memories of Tito’s cult, while 
others do not. They follow what could be called a Croatian emancipatory 
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national cult, based on dissociation from Tito’s ideology and indignation 
at his enduring cult. But the vast majority of people we encountered did 
not act according to this binary distinction. Their narratives, reactions 
and practices situate them in a heterogeneous and multilayered zone of 
Titoaffect. Some of these communities seem to be more private, while 
others are more public. However, they coexist, produce affects and link a 
relationship to the past with one created for present needs. What brings 
them together in the zone of Titoaffect is that they are affected in mul-
tiple ways by the same objects.
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What makes the suitcase such a sensitive object? It is a container in which 
emotionalities and materialities are entangled – packed or unpacked in some-
times surprising ways. The suitcase is a container into which not only objects 
are stuffed, but also emotions and dreams. It can be many things: a distillation 
of the future, an icon of mobility, a last resort, a threatening or comforting 
object. A very personal bond might also evolve – ‘me and my suitcase’. The 
emotional charges change with the kinds of journeys undertaken, a longed-







A woman rushes upstairs past her guests at a funeral reception in her 
elegant, upper-class home in Milan. Emma, played by Tilda Swinton, 
just can’t take this life any longer; she needs to get out of the claustro-
phobic setting she married into … now! Her housekeeper runs after her, 
understanding completely what is going on. Together they throw open 
wardrobe doors and begin to pack a travel bag. This is the final scene of 
the film I Am Love from 2010; tears are streaming, and clothes are being 
torn from their hangers.
It is a classic scene. The heroine has had enough and can’t wait to 
leave. For the film’s audience, it is clear that it is not the suitcase that 
is important, but the need to pack for a new life. The mixed feelings of 
anger, sorrow and anxiety for the future must be given a tangible form: 
clothes are ripped from shelves, stuff thrown into a bag. Without a packed 
suitcase, there is no final break-up. Body, objects and affects are working 
intensely together here. Yet, when Emma walks out of the house a few 
minutes later, she is not carrying a suitcase. It has already done its job.
My next Hollywood suitcase has a major part in the film The Acci­
dental Tourist from 1988. The film features a travel writer, played by 
William Hurt, who specialises in writing books for business travellers 
who want to avoid the foreignness and anxieties of travel and remain 
untouched by the exotic, eating in McDonalds whenever possible and 
wearing practical grey suits that do not show any stains. The film begins 
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with the writer neatly packing a small suitcase and preaching about the 
necessities of packing light. This favourite carry-on case of his follows 
him throughout the film. When he moves in with a new woman, it 
remains unpacked next to the bed as a silent but menacing threat (‘are 
you thinking of leaving me?’). When, in the end, he opts for a new life 
with her, he drops his beloved suitcase in a Paris alley before grabbing a 
taxi to the airport, leaving it behind him, filled as it is with his old life.
It is not surprising that suitcases are popular co-actors in media 
narratives, from novels to movies, songs and advertisements. These two 
Hollywood examples illustrate how suitcases can do many things besides 
carrying belongings. The suitcase is not only a container for stuff, but 
also for affects, dreams, anxieties and ideals. It can be many things: a 
distillation of the future, an icon of mobility, a last resort, a threatening 
or comforting object, a defence against a hostile world. It is an object into 
which affects and materialities are crammed and intertwined in interesting 
ways. I will use several perspectives to explore such processes. The first 
is Doreen Massey’s evocative concept, throwntogetherness (2005). What 
kinds of objects and feelings are thrown together in the limited space 
of the suitcase? How do surprising mixes, intimacies and provocations 
emerge out of the confrontations of toothbrushes, clean underwear, 
pocket books, souvenirs and bottles of pills, together with an entire array 
of mixed feelings? The suitcase is also a throwntogetherness of the past, 
the present and the future, as the two examples in the films illustrate. In 
the case of Emma, packing a suitcase is a powerful statement of breaking 
up, a threat materialised into action: putting power behind the words, 
‘I am actually leaving you’. In The Accidental Tourist, the suitcase car-
ries other emotional charges. It is a fortress against an uncomfortable 
feeling of being abroad, a reassuring object, but also a threat of future 
action that is mirrored in numerous hit songs about a packed suitcase 
ominously waiting in the hallway or under the bed.
The concept of throwntogetherness focuses on the ways in which 
diverse elements come to cohabit in a setting or a situation, often as 
unexpected neighbours – but in order to understand how these confron-
tations work, a few other theoretical tools are helpful. In her book Vibrant 
Matter, Jane Bennett analyses the agency and affective power of things, 
from a small collection of rubbish to a nationwide electricity grid, using 
Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage as an example of a ‘confederate agency’ 
(Bennett 2011). Another helpful approach can be found in the concept 
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of entanglement (see Ingold 2007 and Hodder 2012), the ways in which 
humans and things as well as sets of things become codependant. These 
three concepts approach questions of affect as potentially energising or 
intensifying in the everyday life of things, but by linking feelings and 
materiality there is also a far better chance of contextualising affect and 
not seeing it as free-floating energy. As the editors point out in the first 
chapter of this volume, the boundaries between affect and emotion are 
fluid. The suitcase is a good example of this fluidity and interweaving, 
which I analyse using mundane but broader concept of ‘feeling’, although 
at the end of the chapter I return to the question of affect and emotion.
My wider theoretical inspiration comes mainly from non-representa-
tional theory (Anderson and Harrison 2010; Vannini 2015), a tradition 
combining several theoretical and ethnographic perspectives that should 
rather be termed ‘more than representational theory’. It focuses less on 
codes, representations and discourses and more on everyday practices 
and skills, as well as sensibilities and affect (drawing on theories of 
materiality, performance and affect). In many ways, it is grounded in 
a phenomenological interest in commencing the analysis with the how 
rather than the why of social action. This interest does not, of course, 
exclude symbolic and semiotic aspects of material objects; the boundaries 
between the non- or pre-representational and the representational are 
constantly blurred. As I aim to show, the life of the suitcase illustrates 
ways in which the material and symbolic are constantly interwoven – a 
special form of entanglement.
The strength of non-representational theory lies in its constant experi-
mentation with methods to capture the dimensions of actions which 
are hard to verbalise. This is often done through a bricolage approach, 
inviting dialogues with art, popular culture and fiction. The result is a 
strong interweaving of theory and methodological experimentation, in 
an attempt to find new ways of doing ethnography, and often learning 
from approaches outside academia, such as from artists who experiment 
with destabilising or provoking everyday life, for example (see the dis-
cussion in Thrift 2008).
I will use such a bricolage approach, mixing history, popular cul-
ture, field observations, art and fiction. I have, for example, found it 
fruitful to combine fieldwork with watching films, because this genre 
often opens up insights into the impact of artefacts and affects. Films 
can compress or stretch out time and space; they can distort, enlarge 
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or miniaturise themes, and make materialities stand out as important 
props or trendsetters.
The same goes for other forms of fiction. In the opening poem of her 
collection Vagga liten vagabond Eva-Stina Byggmästar (2010) imagines 
the home of a woman with wanderlust: the living room full of illumi-
nated world globes, and suitcases everywhere. Are the suitcases packed 
and ready to go, or are they invitingly empty? They convey the mood 
that Scandinavians and Germans call ‘travel fever’ (resfeber, Reisefieber), 
that mixed feeling of anxiety and excitement, nervous anticipation and a 
longing for elsewhere (Löfgren 2015). To pack a suitcase is, in a sense, to 
start from zero; it is an empty vessel ready to be filled to the brim. Yet, 
at the same time, packing is an intensely cultural process, a competence 
people learn. The empty case is already full of pre-understandings and 
conventions. What to bring, and what not? And how to pack it? This is 
where material and technological potentials are entangled with travel 
logistics, with social and economic resources, and with hierarchies, 
feelings, cultural ideals and conventions.
To explore these entanglements, a historical perspective is helpful 
(which, by the way, is too often lacking in both non-representational 
and affect theory). Historical contrasts are needed to destabilise the 
taken-for-grantedness of the present. This goes especially for what Michel 
Foucault has called ‘objects without a history’, which led him to develop 
his genealogical approach (Foucault 1977). It is not a question of searching 
for origins but of looking at the open and messy situations in which new 
elements take shape, as for example in learning to pack for a journey in 
an age of mass travel.
When a new technology or practice emerges, it is often the focus of 
much experimentation and debate, and there is a high degree of visibility 
that later fades away. As new forms of travel such as rail and air opened 
up, there were bewildered but enthusiastic discussions about how to 
handle these forms of transit. How did one learn to be a rail or an air 
traveller, and what skills had to be developed? The historical perspective 
is also important to understand what James Gibson (1986) has called 
‘affordances’: an object’s ‘potentialities for a particular set of actions’. 
Even if you never have seen a suitcase before, the handle reaches up for 
the hand, the lid wants to be opened and the container filled.
The suitcase has thus enabled, or blocked, some avenues of use and in 
my discussion of this evolution I will also bring to my aid the suitcase’s 
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minor siblings, the handbag and the wallet, which are just as much part 
of the choreography of travelling. Researching such items also means 
encountering both the frivolous and the harrowing – suitcases go every-
where.
To carry or not
Let me start by looking back to when there were no suitcases. There is a 
winding history of luggage. For the elite, packing was for centuries not 
much of a problem. Well into the nineteenth century, dignitaries still 
travelled with wagon loads. Back in the Middle Ages, and in early mod-
ern times, such a train and its escort was an important way of signalling 
wealth and power, a travelling showcase. In a sense, the European elites 
remained semi-nomadic, moving between different homes and cont-
inuous ly paying visits – this is the world as depicted in Downton Abbey 
and its like.
The elite never had to worry about the actual packing: trained servants 
anticipated their needs and took care of the abundance of chests, boxes 
and trunks. Porters and footmen stood ready along the route. For the 
mobile poor, it was less of a problem; they didn’t have many belongings 
and had to make sure they took along with them what they could carry 
or drag along by themselves – from a bundle on a stick to a small chest.
This changed as mass travel by sea and rail accelerated in the late 
nineteenth century. The new travelling middle-class needed different 
kinds of trunks and cases. An entire industry of trunk makers developed, 
producing all sorts of containers for travel. The greatest innovator of 
them all was Louis Vuitton, who launched his firm in Paris in 1854. His 
early experience of packing for upper-class households gave him insights 
that were useful when he turned to developing new kinds of luggage for 
affluent travellers (see Pasols 2005). Vuitton’s luggage-making career is 
interesting because it highlights the constant interweaving of choices 
of materials and innovative technologies, as well as questions of social 
status and fashion. It was no coincidence that he started his firm in the 
same period that saw the birth of the modern department store and the 
fashion system of haute couture in Paris.
As Guiliana Bruno (2002: 373 ff.) has pointed out, Vuitton’s focus on 
fashion and women also put a focus on travel as a female possibility. His 
advertisements show women posing with new kinds of luggage, from shoe-
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boxes to collapsible travel beds, or a voyageuse at her travelling desk, with 
portable writing table and library. But these collapsible innovations could 
still only work with an infrastructure of maids, porters and luggage vans 
– it was a freedom for the privileged traveller. This also meant that there 
was no need to make luggage light or streamlined. The elite never had to 
carry anything. Heavy materials such as wood and even iron were used to 
make sturdy trunks that could be stashed in steamboat or railway storage 
compartments. They often had to be carried by several persons. The drive 
for innovation was more towards producing specialised kinds of luggage. 
The ‘suite-case’, for example, started out as a flat container designed for 
suits, to be carried alongside the boxes for hats and collars (Gross 2014).
Vuitton and other producers opened up a new world of ‘travel objects’. 
It was not only the trunks themselves that were developed, but also the 
idea that there should be special stuff to enhance the travel experience, 
such as picnic sets, toiletries, etc. This is how the countess Jean de Pange 
describes her journey from Paris to her house in Dieppe, a four-hour 
train ride in 1900:
One freight car was not always sufficient when you consider that 
each servant (there were at least fifteen) had a trunk and my 
mother alone had thirteen … She had some things sent ahead – her 
cushions, stools, foot warmers, screens, flower vases, and travel 
clock – as if we were going camping in the desert, when in fact the 
house in Dieppe was full of furniture … we settled ourselves in as 
though we were going to China. We would take several baskets of 
supplies and an array of ‘travel’ utensils. Folding knives and forks, 
tumblers that could be flattened like opera hats, small bottles of 
salt, eaux de cologne, mentholated alcohol, fans, shawls, small 
rubber cushions, and an awful rubber chamber pot that made 
me feel sick just to look at it. (Pasols 2005: 137)
The modern suitcase was developed during the late nineteenth century 
to cater for the new kind of travellers, who, unlike the countess, had 
to carry their own luggage. As opposed to the trunk, it was designed 
to be carried to the side with one hand, which meant that it had to be 
slimmer and more rectangular than a trunk, and with a single handle. 
(This is why the traditional flat and rectangular ‘suite-case’ was used as 
the starting point.) New and lighter materials such as leather and canvas 
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over thin wooden frames were used. The suitcase also became personal-
ised, an extension of the travelling body. People started decorating their 
suitcases with fancy hotel labels, and they also formed an attachment 
to ‘my suitcase’ – it became a sensitive object. The fashion dimension 
was accentuated in the process, although first and foremost the design 
had to fit with the new travelling body. Questions of balance, size and 
weight had to be solved in interaction with the new ways of carrying – a 
suitcase body. An American luggage factory even changed its name to 
Samsonite, evoking the biblical strength of Samson.
The material history of this piece of luggage is important, because it 
illustrates how a commodity emerges in dialogue between technological 
development, transport logistics and cultural conventions. Such entangle-
ments resulted in the modern suitcase, which presented a special kind 
of material affordance: a limited container, which people had to adjust 
to. The suitcase emerged out of new travelling needs, but it also came to 
redefine such needs.
Only the absolute necessities
‘When George is hanged, Harris will be the worst packer in this world’, 
Jerome K. Jerome (1889/1957: 34) writes in his classic description of how 
three men prepare for their holiday on the river. Their endeavours to 
decide what to bring and how to squeeze it into the suitcases turn more 
and more chaotic.
Here we meet the new travelling middle-class for whom the question 
of luggage – what to bring along and how – becomes an important part of 
their preparations. This is especially marked in modern tourism, which 
has produced an endless flow of advice and debate on what should go 
into a suitcase. In a sense, packing became a micro-journey in itself. As 
things pile up in readiness, the whole journey is anticipated and there 
is a lot of mental travel going on. Do I really need this? What have I for-
gotten? The needs and potentials of the upcoming journey or vacation 
are materialised in the sorting and handling of all sorts of stuff. And the 
whole time this process is done in front of the old suitcase, invitingly 
empty – both enabling and restricting.
The need for travelling light leads to discussion about what to take 
– a cultural definition of necessities, which, of course, will look quite 
different according to people’s social position and resources. The market 
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started to produce miniature and lightweight travel items. In the 1920s, 
Vuitton launched the small travel bag, the Keepall, which became one 
of the firm’s classics. The ‘overnight bag’ gained ground, again creating 
a new standard. What does one need for a weekend away?
As the social base of international tourism broadened after the Second 
World War, the advice industry intensified. A Swedish guide, ‘How to 
travel in Europe’ (Strömberg 1951: 49 ff.), was aimed at new middle-class 
groups ready to take the brave step of going abroad. At last the Continent 
was open for leisure travel again. The back blurb promises that the book 
will give the reader ‘a powerful travel fever!’ Reading the long introduction 
on travel preparation is a little nerve-racking, there is so much to think 
about. Suitcases shouldn’t be more than you can carry yourself and not 
look too fancy because this will make hotel porters ‘more hungry for tips’, 
the author states. He preaches the need for travelling light, but goes on to 
suggest lists of necessary items that cover several pages, from a miniature 
iron and a silk robe for walking to the bathroom in the hotel corridor, to 
an extensive medicine chest. Reading the long list of medicines and rem-
edies (always bring extra toilet paper, it is a scarce commodity abroad), 
the reader might have second thoughts about daring to leave home.
Reinventing the wheel
Suitcase technology stayed very much the same until the advent of air travel 
called for even lighter luggage. To keep fuel costs down, it was important 
to limit luggage weight, and by the end of the 1930s, regulations emerged 
in the US that were often standardised around a maximum weight of 20 
kilos, or 40 pounds. (This figure was seen somehow as representing a 
suitable amount of packing.) With the help of new materials, suitcases 
became lighter. The first aluminium case, made in Germany, was model-
led on the classic body of the Junker aeroplane. Later, plastic took over. 
Although there had already been experiments with suitcases on wheels 
in the early 1900s, this technology did not really catch on until the 1970s 
when flying became a mass activity. The innovator of this development 
was actually an airline pilot (Gross 2014). Dragging stuff along instead 
of carrying it came to create new motor choreographies of travelling.
Airlines continued the fight against excess luggage. People are much 
cheaper to transport than luggage because they do their own handling, 
and unlike suitcases they are also potential consumers once aboard. 
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Accordingly, budget airlines took a punitive line on any type of luggage 
other than carry-ons, with the introduction of heavy charges. Today, 
new emotional scenes take place at the check-in, with people trying to 
squeeze their carry-ons into the metal grid of acceptable measurements. 
Being a ‘smart packer’ has increasingly become a question of kilos and 
centimetres.
Airlines love people like the seasoned traveller Ryan Bingham, the 
main character of a novel turned into a film, Up in the Air (2009). Played 
by George Clooney, Ryan is a consultant who spends much of his life 
airborne on his way to new assignments all over the US. His home is the 
airport lounge and hotel. In an early scene, he is travelling together with 
a young woman whom he is supposed to be training to be a consultant 
like him. Her induction begins when they meet in the departure hall 
where she is dragging a large suitcase and a carry-on clothes wardrobe. 
This won’t do, he tells her, and takes her to buy a cabin bag on wheels, 
and in the middle of the hall he begins to systematically sort out her stuff, 
putting most of into the wastepaper basket. Life is too short to check in 
luggage. Then he teaches her to scan the waiting lines to see where one 
can get through security the fastest and avoid the holidaying families 
and slow senior citizens. Step by step she is taught the routines that Ryan 
has turned into mere body reflexes.
As a business traveller and commuter, Ryan has created a fantastic 
flow. The camera captures his elegant choreography when he glides with 
minimal friction through the security and ID controls, the hotel lobbies 
and waiting lines with his light and fast-rolling suitcase. With the per-
fectionist’s delight, he swishes his gold and VIP cards, juggles the plastic 
trays at the security check, cutting corners, finding the fast lanes every-
where. Not only his clothes are wrinkle-free, his whole life is liberated 
from demanding relationships or duties. He loves this no man’s land, 
where you can always be in transit – travelling light. ‘Moving is living’ 
is his motto. Watching him gliding through space is to see a man with 
a habitus that has perfected the union of body and luggage.
Learning to pack
The history of suitcases shows how the size and form of luggage help 
people select and deselect. One sets out with an invitingly empty case, 
which soon begins to overflow. What should I pack? Only the neces saries! 
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And what are they? Every item put into the case is briefly considered: 
will I need this, would it be good to bring this along, or fun …? Skills of 
anticipation and planning become important, and such skills are learned 
and relearned during a long travel career.
Children start early, being allowed to pack their own miniature suit-
cases but then having their parents going through their stuff and telling 
them what they can or cannot take. In their own playworld, however, they 
can pack whatever they want. A story by the Swedish childrens’ author 
Astrid Lindgren (1950) features a boy of four who is wrongly accused of 
taking his dad’s favourite pen. He decides to take revenge by leaving the 
family and moving across the yard to the outhouse. He packs for his new 
life, carefully selecting the necessary items for this exodus: a favourite 
storybook, a small ball and a mouth organ. He is already fantasising about 
sitting out there alone on Christmas Eve surrounded by his belongings, 
playing a sad melody on his mouth organ. ‘How they will miss me then!’
The Turkish author Orhan Pamuk (2006) remembers how he loved 
to unpack his father’s suitcase after his dad returned from his travels, 
handling the familiar and unfamiliar items, taking in the fragrance of 
eau-de-cologne and other scents of foreign parts. Another man [quoted in 
Nippert-Eng 2011: 149] talks of the ways in which he still follows meticu-
lously his father’s style of packing; he is performing a ritualised tradition.
Other people get out of the packing habit and have to start learning 
again. In the film As Good as it Gets (1997), Jack Nicholson plays a writer 
with pronounced behavioural disorders. He summons his courage and 
invites a waitress at his favourite café (Helen Hunt) for a weekend trip. 
In the next scene, we watch them both packing nervously. ‘You are, of 
course, shocked by being used again’, she says to her old suitcase, hidden 
away on the top shelf. Time to pack, but what? What kind of weekend 
is this? ‘There’s no way to pack for this trip!’ she exclaims as she weighs 
different garments in her hands. Meanwhile, the writer, with his obses-
sive–compulsive disorder, has made a detailed packing list with all items 
waiting in perfect order on the bed next to the suitcase. He surveys the 
piles like a commander inspecting his troops, preparing for battle.
The two scenes point to the performative dimension of packing; 
it is not just a routine but an event, sometimes heavily ritualised but 
always charged with affects as a long journey or simply a weekend trip 
is arranged through material objects. The suitcase is not just a container 




To watch the writer and the waitress packing is also a reminder that this 
is a heavily gendered activity. In the history of modern travel, there is 
a long tradition of men belittling of women’s packing as an irrational, 
emotional, and, above all, overflowing activity. In a visit to the lost prop-
erty office at Euston station in 1849, a male observer was baffled by all 
the stuff left behind, especially the women’s belongings:
How many little smelling bottles – how many little embroidered 
pocket-handkerchiefs – how many little musty eatables and com-
fortable drinkables – how many little bills, important little notes 
and very small secrets each may have contained, we felt that we 
would not for all the world have ascertained. (Richards and Mac-
Kenzie 1986: 309)
There is a long tradition of condescending male remarks about women 
who pack too much, who can’t restrain themselves, which the sociologist 
Jean-Claude Kaufmann (2012) has explored in his study of the handbag. 
He points out that women, and especially wives and mothers, never 
pack just for their own needs. Reading his book I am reminded of the 
Moomin mamma who always carries a reassuring handbag along, unlike 
the unfettered adventurer Moominpappa. Women have learned not only 
to anticipate their own needs but also those of others. When a mother 
packs for a family holiday she keeps adding stuff that is ‘good to have’, as 
she plans for all kinds of eventualities and mishaps. Paper handkerchiefs, 
plasters, painkillers, and other first-aid stuff, an extra towel, a corkscrew, 
maybe some plastic mugs, sunblock, and much more. Her suitcase carries 
a heavy responsibility and her husband cannot understand why she takes 
such a long time to pack – aren’t you ready yet, darling?
In Hollywood movies, lone heroes travel without suitcases; it would 
look unmanly. When the suitcase on wheels was introduced, some male 
resistance to it was also noted. Dragging luggage along seemed a little 
feminine. A real Samson carries his case, and, if he is a true gentleman, 
that of his female companion too. Hollywood movies also illustrate 
another gendered divide. For the male Hollywood gaze, women’s suit-
cases seem to hold a special fascination, as Michael Walker (2005: 277) 
has pointed out in his discussion of the film-maker Alfred Hitchcock. 
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What are they hiding, why do they carry a sexual charge and why are 
they a forbidden territory invaded by men who secretly go through their 
contents? But Walker also points out that the suitcase is used to signal a 
self-reliant and strong woman, able to take care of her own stuff and life.
Packing not for a weekend but for life
A different film shows a man packing his suitcase; meticulously he places 
all he needs in the case: clothes, toiletries, and finally a hairbrush. His 
movements are swift but orderly, he is in a hurry to leave Europe for 
Israel. The film is part of a campaign after the Second Word War to get 
Jews to leave Europe with all its recent memories of the Holocaust, and 
help build the new state of Israel.
The use of a suitcase scene is no coincidence. The film seems in a 
silent dialogue with another situation packing for a journey into the new 
and unknown: at Block 5 in Auschwitz, there is a large display of the 
suitcases brought by Jewish victims. The Gestapo had instructed them 
to bring along a suitcase each, in order to create a reassuring feeling of 
a temporary move, and people were told to mark their luggage for later 
identification. The names are still there in block letters, some carry the 
extra label ‘Waisenkind’: orphan. Inside these suitcases, packed in haste, 
were belongings brought along on a journey to a new life – a stay at a 
work camp, as most of the travellers thought. On arrival their suitcases 
were confiscated immediately, and when the liberators arrived in 1945 
there were stacks of these suitcases, which had been emptied and the 
contents sorted for further use by the camp staff. Why is it that these 
piles of suitcases produce such strong emotional reactions among visitors? 
Unlike the heaps of skeleton parts or the cramped bunks in the barracks, 
the suitcases bring to the fore a personal destiny. They may have been 
emptied but they are still loaded with anguish, hope and bewilderment. 
Although they rest there silently, they communicate action, the hurried 
packing of a few cherished belongings.
The suitcases at Auschwitz belong to harrowing memories of packing 
for the millions of people forced from their homes as refugees or deportees 
in twenteeth century Europe. Their stories are remarkably similar. Often 
there is a knock on the door, the militia or the police give the orders: 
get ready to leave, in an hour or tomorrow. Bring only a suitcase with 
the necessary things. Necessary for what? In other situations, there is 
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not even that much of a warning. In a panic people just throw anything 
into the suitcase. During the deportation of Estonians to labour camps 
in Siberia after the Second World War, people remember how some just 
started cramming stuff into the suitcase without any idea of what was 
needed. If the soldiers knocking were local militia, they occasionally 
gave a bit of advice. You should pack this but not that …
But, again, it is the container in the form of the one suitcase that frames 
the preparations for the journey. All over the world battered suitcases are 
still being dragged along, people’s belongings suddenly reduced to the 
items that could be squeezed into the case. It is not surprising that a book 
on refugee voices from Bosnia and Croatia bears the title The Suitcase, 
and in the texts suitcases appear in many ways. One woman remembers: 
‘When we rushed out of our homes into the city, perhaps forever, I took 
some of my favourite books, a checked vanity case, and undergarments.’ 
She asks her mother: ‘What did you bring?’ – ‘That which everyone needs, 
she says’ (Mertus et al. 1997: 87). People remember what they forgot to 
pack in the frenzied hurry and what they managed to take with them. 
Another woman packed lots of warm clothes although it was the middle 
of the summer, but also Marcel Proust, the book of the I Ching and a 
favourite scarf. Reading Proust in exile, with the scarf resting under a 
cushion, a reassuring link with the past was created.
The most intimate side of exile is tied to luggage, the Croatian writer 
Dubravka Ugrešić writes, as she looks at her luggage, ‘my only true 
companions, a witness to my wanderings. The suitcases travel, go across 
borders, move in and out with me. If there is something I dream of, it 
is not a new home, but a new suitcase … East, West, home is best, most 
people would agree. But the majority is always wrong. East, West, suit-
case is best!’ (Ugrešić 2007: 17).
Migrating suitcases
I’m watching Victor and Miguel pack. We have just returned 
from a shopping trip where they bought four gallons of water, 
three cans of beans, 11 cans of tuna, two cans of sardines, half a 
kilo of limes, two bags of tortillas, a loaf of bread, a bulb of garlic 
(to rub on their clothes as a defence against snakes), and a can of 
chilies. They are both trying to cram two gallons of water into 
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their backpacks that already are overloaded with food and clothes. 
Miguel tells me he has an extra pair of socks in case his feet get 
wet or he starts to get blisters from his uncomfortable knock-off 
Adidas sneakers. He has also packed a couple of black T-shirts 
that he says will help him avoid la migra. ‘It makes it harder for 
them to see us at night,’ he says … (León 2012: 477)
The backpacks are the cheap camouflage or black ones you can buy from 
the vendors that make a good profit selling cheap stuff for migrants try-
ing to cross the border into the US. In Jason León’s study of the material 
culture of illegal migrants, he shows how a set tradition of ‘what to carry 
in the backpack’ for this desert crossing has evolved based upon local 
hearsay and the stories of experiences exchanged between migrants, 
and the fact that most migrants can only afford cheap equipment like 
sneakers that rapidly fall apart. When Victor finally made the journey, 
he had to throw away everything in the backpack apart from the plastic 
water containers. He still keeps the backpack as a memento of that last 
successful trip.
There are hundred thousands of travellers like Victor, who pack for 
an illegal border crossing. For most of them, packing could not be more 
strategic; a negotiation of the absolute necessities, balancing between 
minimum weight and the maximum chances of survival. But, as Leon 
points out, migrants may be packing the wrong stuff. In the Mexican 
case, they carry blackened water containers and black T-shirts, because 
of the obsession with not sending out any dangerous signals, but later 
they discover that the water gets undrinkably hot and the body soaking 
wet under the fierce onslaught of the desert sun. Others may discover 
that their careful packing is no use at all when the middlemen rob them 
of their only belongings during the journey.
Suitcases or travel bags also follow different kinds of migrants across 
the borders. The nature of the journey is mirrored in the packing. There 
are people who commute between homes – to an overnight flat, a cara-
van, a hotel room away from home. Migrant labourers, transnational 
professionals, itinerant salespersons. What do they take along? Another 
category that also highlights ideas of what is needed to make a home from 
home is the children of divorced parents who alternate between mum’s 
or dad’s place. Ida Wentzel Winther (2015) has followed such child ren 
as they get ready to move again and pack their bags. Their packing tells 
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us a lot about tricky balancing acts and questions of belonging. She is 
observing a girl packing for the weekly switch between her parents’ 
houses. Her hands are moving among things, hesitating, there is a lot 
of affect here. Where is home actually (ibid. 224)?
A special case concerns migrants returning home for holidays. Their 
suitcases need to be stuffed with gifts, with careful consideration given 
to what the people back home might expect, demand or need; and on 
the return journey, to what one wants to bring back to one’s new home. 
Think of the masses of Chinese factory workers who go back to their 
villages for the New Year holidays with loaded suitcases (Chang 2009), or 
the many transnational migrants making return visits home. In a sense, 
what they are packing are social relations, but also, as Maja Povrzanović 
Frykman and Michael Humbracht (2013) have discussed, there is a flow 
of everyday objects connecting the two settings, which creates some kind 
of experiential continuity.
Transgressing borders
Transnational suitcases are open to inspection. One of Jean-Claude Kauf-
mann’s informants, Brunette, is stopped by customs. The official begins 
to search her car. She has no problems with this, but all of a sudden he 
sticks his hand into her open handbag and starts rummaging. ‘I turned 
ice cold, it was like he invaded my intimate sphere and without warning’ 
(Kaufmann 2011: 138).
At security checks and border crossings, people know that their lug gage 
may be searched by total strangers, and when that happens it often feels 
invasive. The last time it happened to me, I couldn’t but be embarrassed 
as my chaotic packing was disclosed to the bystanders, with everything 
a mess.
Luggage searches are thus heavily charged with strong feelings. Here 
are two examples. The first features two British tourists in Scandinavia 
in the 1870s. Their train stops at the Norwegian–Swedish border:
Our two portmanteaus were seized upon and carried into the 
custom-house, where the station-master, in a very magnifi cent 
dress of light blue, with silver facings, a three-cornered hat on his 
head, and a sword by his side, was walking about with a piece of 
official chalk in his hand. We feared all our well-packed effects 
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were to be tumbled about by the rude hands of the custom-house 
people; but we were spared that trial. Either the station-master was 
in an amiable mood, or (very probable) our train was behind time, 
for after gazing benignly upon us, he asked P. if we were tourists, 
and being told that we bore that character, he mildly begged to 
know if we had anything contra band. On being informed that 
we possessed nothing illicit, he smiled a gracious smile, affixed 
a mark upon our things, and motioned to a porter to take them 
back to the luggage-van. (Arnold 1877: 246)
Mr Arnold was asked about contraband, but not about his identity, 
which was a minor matter in the 1870s. Contraband were objects which 
must not be carried across a border – in earlier times, this meant things 
like special luxury goods, political pamphlets, pornography; later it was 
drugs, alcohol and certain foodstuffs.
In the travel handbook from 1951 quoted earlier, the author has a 
detailed section on customs problems, which begins ‘thoughts about 
Figure 6.1. All of a sudden your private life is opened up for inspection. Customs 
officials checking ferry travellers from Copenhagen, Denmark, in Malmö, Swe-
den, 1948. Copyright IBL.
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customs make travellers terrified’. He then produces an impressive 
list of customs duties and currency regulations in Europe. ‘How many 
gramo phone records or how much coffee is one allowed to bring across 
the border? Don’t forget that artworks are taxed according to the weight 
of the frame’ (Strömberg 1951: 460).
Mr Arnold feared the invasion of the privacy of his suitcase, but his 
social standing protected him. Others may experience worse humilia-
tions, such as the Nigerian art curator Okwui Enwezor (1996: 65) who 
describes his experience of the customs control at Charles de Gaulle 
airport, surrounded by other Third World migrants:
I hate being one of these people: the men and the women with 
their bundles, their world and dreams contained in bags and boxes 
long out of fashion. Even more, I loathe the pawing fingers of the 
coarse young French officer at Charles de Gaulle, his rudeness 
and sullen manner, his angry inferiority complex.
Enwezor felt the nonchalant hands moving through his belongings had 
a clear message: ‘you are an inferior person’. People do not forget such 
charged situations. The customs official holding up object after object, 
asking intimidating questions with his ‘rude’ hands, as Mr Arnold puts 
it, or his ‘pawing fingers’ as Enwezor describes it.
In recent decades, the search is not so much for contraband but for 
terrorists. Over time, border controls became laxer, but then the new 
threats of terrorism once again made luggage a problematic issue. The 
security control turned into a needle’s eye and a zone nerveuse. After 9/11 
in 2001 the lists of forbidden items grew, and even the most mundane and 
peaceful objects took on a new and menacing aura. A Swedish museum 
began to collect objects confiscated at a major airport, and it is a baffling 
collection of nail files, corkscrews, scissors, combs and cigarette lighters. 
Later, even mineral water bottles and shampoo were confiscated. Ten-
sions increased, and at Heathrow airport in 2007 signs warned travellers: 
‘Please be patient while we carry out important security procedures … 
We will not tolerate threats, verbal abuse or violence.’ As monitored and 
organised as the procedures at the security checkpoint are, the situa-
tion when travellers have been through it seems makeshift and chaotic. 
Businessmen fight for their dignity as they grab their belongings while 
trying to hold up their beltless trousers with one hand. People search 
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for somewhere to sit down to put their shoes back on as they attempt to 
reorganise all their things, put their keys and cash back into their pock-
ets, the computer into its travel case.
A man talks of his suitcase contents spilling out at the airport in 
front of some people: ‘it’s not like I cared that people would see them, 
but they’re like my things. So I feel attached to them in some way and it 
would make me nervous that anyone could see them because they were 
laying on the floor’ (Nippert-Eng 2010: 120). He felt even more nervous 
as he started picking stuff up as quickly as possible. Every delay meant 
more embarrassment.
In situations like these, bystanders are turned into voyeurs, with a 
unique chance of viewing the private belongings of total strangers, and 
also, maybe, having their prejudices corroborated. There are, for example, 
a number of cases in which travellers of the nineteenth century have their 
national stereotypes confirmed by observing others being scrutinised. 
Here is a Swedish academic in 1844 watching Englishmen open their 
luggage: ‘How orderly, clean and neat in comparison with the trunks 
of the German and the confusion and chaos which characterised their 
packing, Allgemeine Zeitung, unclean shirts, books, brushes, jars and car-
tons, entangled in a crazy and dirty mess’ (quoted in Arvastson 2008: 2).
The suitcase in the attic
After a busy life, many suitcases have stopped travelling: they are resting 
in attics, collecting dust and in the process they become a new kind of 
container. One such case belongs to Dmytre Zrchuk, which when it was 
opened contained 199 items: fourteen paper patterns for cut-outs of various 
animals, a coloured print of the Madonna and Child from Innsbruck, a 
paisley scarf and three peach-coloured towels, an alarm clock, a hand 
carved wooden dog, a bronze model of the Washington Monument, a 
photo album, a sewing kit, a silver fork and spoon, twenty-six postcards … 
books, dictionaries and pamphlets in German, Ukrainian and English. 
Zrchuk’s suitcase was found in the attic of the Willard State Hospital in 
New York. When this mental institution was closed in 1995 and demoli-
tion crews moved in, two female employees remembered that there was 
some stuff stashed in the attic of the Sheltered Workshop Building. When 
they managed to pry the door open they encountered an awesome sight: 
crates, trunks, hundreds of standard suitcases, doctor’s bags, and many-
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shaped containers were all neatly arranged under the watchful eyes of 
the pigeons. All 427 pieces were taken to a museum. It took years to go 
through and catalogue the contents. This was luggage that patients had 
packed neatly as they prepared themselves for a stay at the hospital. They 
had carefully chosen what they thought they would need and what items 
they would like to bring along, from family albums to elegant clothes. 
Little did they know that they would never open them and that many of 
the inmates would spend the rest of their lives in this institution, while 
their cases lay forgotten in the attic (Penney and Stastny 2009).
Some travelled light, like Lawrence Marek, a Galician immigrant and 
window washer from New York. He arrived at the hospital in 1937 and 
his suitcase contained only a pair of extra shoes, two shaving mugs and 
brushes, and a pair of suspenders. Maybe he packed for a short stay in 1937, 
but he remained in the hospital until his death in 1968. Others brought 
almost an entire life with them. Margaret Dunleavy, a nurse who arrived 
in 1941, had the most items of all in her trunk. It contained dishes, pots 
and pans, kitchenware, a nurse’s uniform, hundreds of negatives and 
photographs, a pair of ice skates and much, much more. She was ready 
to set up a home from home, with all her cherished belongings. Over 
the years, these possessions gathered dust in the attic, frozen images of 
a journey planned, with a selection of necessary or beloved items. All 
they would need for their trip …
There are other forgotten suitcases in attics around the world. In 
1923, Olga from Gammelnäs in Sweden went to America and worked as 
maid in a wealthy Boston family, whi le her fiancé Erik stayed at home, 
fishing and farming. Olga and Erik had to keep up their relationship 
through letters for many years, bridging two very different worlds. 
When she came back sixteen years later, they raised a family and her 
Boston savings helped to buy the small farm they had longed for. Olga 
died young, and after Erik’s death in 1993, their daughter found her 
mother’s old Ameri can trunks stowed away in the attic. They were filled 
with American clothes, embroidered silk blouses, stylish dresses, white 
gloves, Bakelite handbags and other wonders of 1930s fashion, as well 
as untouched cosmetics from nail polish to Luxor Complexion Powder, 
together with Boston theatre programmes, souvenirs and photos. These 
were belongings that a smallhol der’s wife in Gammelnäs had no use for, 
and could not show off back home. The trunks stayed closed up there in 
the attic, encapsulating a time that had been, but mattered little after her 
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return from the exotic world ‘over there’. All of a sudden, the daughter 
encountered a life unknown to her.
The life and labour of suitcases
The luggage in the attic is a reminder of the different life histories of 
things. One aspect which makes the sight of the Auschwitz suitcases so 
harrowing is the knowledge of the many earlier and joyful memories 
attached to them: a holiday at the grandparents, or a vacation by the 
sea. Affects can catch people unaware when the lid is opened, eliciting 
a wide array of sensations and feelings, drawing on personal memories 
or fantasies about the former owner.
In such ways, the suitcase also demonstrates the powerful entanglement 
of material and symbolic dimensions. With the gradual personalisation 
of luggage in the forms of the favourite suitcase or handbag, such items 
also come to carry a weightier symbolism. All kinds of meanings are 
projected unto them and they may take on a life as metaphor (‘living out 
of a suitcase’ or ‘a baglady’) or even end up as a rather empty symbol, as 
when old battered suitcases are transformed into decorative elements 
in home interiors or shop windows, where their power to produce an 
atmopshere of cosmopolitan adventure is put to work.
The personal bond between person and object is created above all 
by the constant handling, the packing and unpacking. ‘To live out of a 
suitcase’ is not just a metaphor but a real experience for many. A young 
American woman I interviewed puts it like this:
I feel I have been living out of a suitcase for so many years. Just 
like my friends, always moving between temporary lodgings and 
never really settling down. The case is always there, half-unpacked 
under the bed, signalling a state of impermanence and makeshift 
arrangements. The day it is emptied and put away in the attic, I 
know I have finally settled.
In a way, an old suitcase, which has been through a long life of packing 
and unpacking is a good example of what Sara Ahmed has called stick-
iness: ‘affect is what sticks, or what sustains or preserves the connection 
between ideas, values, and objects’ (Ahmed 2011: 29). The suitcase is an 
object attracting strong feelings. When Orhan Pamuk’s father died, he 
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was left with a full suitcase, as the daughter in the example above was. 
Although he had opened it so often as a child, he found it was hard for 
him to open it now, it seemed to be overflowing with feelings. Was he 
ready to confront his father’s life?
Why can it be so challenging to open someone else’s luggage? What 
makes a suitcase or a handbag such a special container of stuff and 
mixed feelings? It is a special kind of bounded universe. Analysing the 
life of the handbag, Jean-Claude Kaufmann (2012) asks how mundane 
items in the supermarket or on a table, from tampons and underwear to 
corkscrews and pocketbooks, are just this, everyday stuff – but collected 
together in a suitcase or a bag, they acquire a new aura of intimacy and 
often also of secrecy. It is a throwntogetherness that may turn into a 
personalised version of ‘me’. ‘Through what they choose to carry and 
not to carry with them, participants support specific narratives of self ’, 
as Christena Nippert-Eng (2011: 147) puts it in her discussion of the 
wallet. Similarly, suitcase contents are a material distillation of a life, 
a home or a style of living. It is no coincidence that artists often use 
the suitcase as an identity container (‘who could be the owner of this 
assemblage’ or ‘open your suitcase and I will tell you who you are’). 
The contents can be turned into a micro-biography – this material 
collection is actually me.
By being included in the select company of other objects, things 
may acquire a special aura, turning into talismans. A small stone from 
a holiday beach, a couple of photographs, a poem or a wrinkled letter. 
This process is enhanced by having them close and handling them (‘I 
just can’t be without them’). One traveller kept a small, dog-eared card 
with a prayer for starting out on a journey (Nippert-Eng 2010: 111) – ‘It is 
nice to have’, he said. But the longer such items are left in the travel bag 
or wallet, the more important they may become. They turn into more 
of a necessity than many other essentials. Even the illegal immigrants 
crossing the desert with only the absolute minimum often carry a small 
image of a saint.
A refugee from Estonia in the 1940s (interviewed for the Nordic 
Museum Archive) threw an old, rusty pair of scissors into his suitcase 
before his hasty departure. When he unpacked the case in Sweden, he 
realised that this item was now the only thing he owned that had belonged 
to his father and in the process a mundane object turned into something 
else that was overflowing with affect.
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Margrit Wettstein has discussed similar processes in her study of 
Jewish refugees – the author Nelly Sachs, for example, who escaped with 
her mother on the last civilian flight out of Berlin in 1940. She crammed 
a few clothes and some personal items, a few photos, her father’s military 
decorations and a beloved childhood album of bookmarks into her suit-
case. ‘With the Gestapo waiting it was what you put into your pockets 
that came to remain of your home’ (Wettstein 2009: 12 ff.).
The strong affects of suitcase contents are created by several processes 
of throwntogetherness and entanglement. First of all, an item inside the 
case has gone through a process of selection, it has been deemed worthy 
of being included among the necessities. Secondly, the size of the suitcase 
limits the number of things. It is a relatively small and clearly bounded 
collection, which may make it more powerful (unlike heaps of things). 
Inside the suitcase, things are joined into a ‘confederate agency’, or a 
vibrant assemblage as Jane Bennett has put it (2011: 23), a theme I will 
explore in the following.
Unattended luggage will be destroyed by the authorities
The summer heat is quivering over a rural railway station. On the 
empty platform stands a suitcase with a bouquet of drooping flowers 
on top. The luggage attracts attention, like a materialised form of travel 
fever. Who does it belong to? What’s inside it? From the shade by the 
station building, other travellers start to fantasise about it. This is the 
captivating start of a story by the Swedish author Stig Dagerman (1945: 
1), written long before unattended suitcases in transit spaces became a 
danger signal.
What are suitcases good for and what are they good at? I have dis-
cussed what suitcases can do, and what people can do with them, in very 
different contexts. They are mundane objects, dragged along, but they 
are also magic and sensitising tools and represent a number of container 
skills: separating, uniting and compressing. I began by referring to Doreen 
Massey’s evocative but somewhat elusive concept of throwntogetherness 
and have used the suitcase to develop the analytical potential of this term 
further. The suitcase creates special conditions for such confrontations 
between past, present and future as well as between objects with very 




As I have shown there are strong emotional attachments between 
travellers and their suitcases. The case may be charged with nostalgic 
memories and moods of belonging, it may be surrounded by an aura of 
Figure 6.2. To be surrounded by your own luggage can create a private comfort 
zone while waiting for the train. People arrange and rearrange, open and close 




adventure och secrets, but there are also strong dimensions of affect. The 
reassuring look at the contents before departing, the feeling of security 
when gripping the handle during the journey, the suspense of opening 
a closed, dusty trunk up in the attic, or vague sensations of unease and 
exposure at border controls or security points.
First of all, as objects are mixed and become entangled, a cell phone 
charger chord lovingly wrapping itself around a box of pills or a shirt, new 
constellations are formed; the beloved notebook is in strange company, 
squeezed in among the dirty socks. The suitcase turns into a cultural 
container by this throwntogetherness, enclosing and joining together 
stuff that may be seen as a personal micro-universe. Jane Bennett points 
out that an assemblage owes its capacity for agency through the ‘shi’ 
effect. She is using a Chinese term, which describes something that is 
hard to verbalise,
the kind of potential that originates not in human initiative but 
instead results from the very disposition of things. Shi is the 
style, energy, propensity, trajectory or élan inherent to a specific 
arrangement of things. (Bennett 2011: 35)
Feelings and materialities begin to work together through these proxim-
ities and are confronted, sometimes unexpectely; objects are emotionally 
charged in novel ways. And this goes for both the carefully planned 
packing and the stuff that is just thrown in more or less randomly.
Secondly, the suitcase as both a physical and cultural container brings 
key ideas into play – the necessary, the essential, the indispensable, 
the optional, the superfluous – in very concrete ways. Trying to decide 
whether to make do with or without this, objects are weighed in the 
hand. As a strong device of affordances, the suitcase has room for both 
constraint and potential. During its history, it has become a measure-
ment for ‘enough’. Over a century, the conservative form of the suitcase 
created a special standard. Comparing suitcases, handbags and wallets 
tells us about such spatial constraints, but also about cultural ones: pack-
ing each of them is done according to different genres. One important 
difference is that the wallet, and especially the handbag, is more rarely 
emptied and reorganised. Stuff starts to sediment in there, which may 
create stronger processes of entanglement.
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Another important dimension is the throwntogetherness of the past, 
the present and the future. For every object selected or left behind, a 
potential future is constructed: this weekend, my job trip, a family vaca-
tion, or a life-changing migration. Packing for possibilities, eventual-
ities, disasters, or for dreams of fun. The business traveller who adds a 
packet of condoms or a seductive nightgown is certainly not planning 
an extramarital affair, but then ‘you never know’. The suitcase starts 
looking ahead, but also backwards. People pack continuities. What 
elements of an earlier life demand to be taken along on a new journey? 
In this sense, packing can become a ritual of incantation, an attempt at 
controlling the future.
There is also the question of time frames, as I have shown. What is 
packed? Temporal or permanent lives, real or fantasised? Some of the 
cherished stuff bought during a journey and carried home turns out to 
have no place there; its special aura evaporates as the suitcase is unpacked. 
Feelings that get packed may turn out to be ephemeral or ‘sticky’.
Thirdly, the union between traveller and suitcase is created above all 
through constant handling. This entanglement or union between traveller 
and luggage can be observed in several situations. There are the constant 
routines of packing and unpacking, where deft hands, planning minds 
and an empty suitcase on the bed work together. A process of habitu-
ation is at work here. Think, for example, of the veteran long-distance 
commuter packing his or her suitcase every Sunday evening, creating 
a kind of rite de passage which marks the break away from the family. 
Who is leaving? Just me and my suitcase.
Luggage also does things to the travelling body, slowing people down 
or making them comfortable (Bissell 2009). Travellers are constantly 
lifting, dragging, resting. At railway stations and airports, I have spent 
time watching this interaction. The reassuring rummaging through a 
handbag, for example – visiting a familiar world in an alien context. 
People cling to their luggage, arrange it as a small fortress around them-
selves while they wait. Here, the suitcase works rather like a transitional 
object, bridging the owner and the alien outside world in Winnicott’s 
sense (1971). When people rest with their suitcases by the side, they seem 
like little children patiently standing close, sometimes held in a firm grip: 
‘unattended luggage will be removed by the authorities’.
Dimensions like these illustrate the ways in which suitcases handle a 
number of polarities in people’s lives: private/public, past/future, personal 
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idiosyncrasies versus shared cultural conventions and ideas. Packing 
and unpacking a suitcase means constantly negotiating such tensions 
and paradoxes. There is a constant entanglement here of material prac-
ticalities, affects and cultural projections, so evident in the turning of 
the suitcase into something private and very personal.
Out of the throwntogetherness of objects, memories and intentions 
in the suitcase, special moods as well as quickly passing affects arise 
when the case is opened and items handled. There is the melancholy of a 
suitcase in the attic, with its sense of unfulfilled dreams or nostalgia for 
times gone by; there is the optimism or anxiety of packing for a future 
life or short journey. Or, as Christena Nippert Eng (2010: 156) says about 
opening a purse:
Each time one opens one’s wallet or purse, the sound of the ocean 
may be heard. There is room for agency, for individual preferences, 
practices and other idiosyncrasies in these small islands of privacy.
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Death and inheritance may unleash a wide range of affects and emotions, 
with bitter mean-spiritedness at one end of the spectrum and wellsprings of 
goodwill and love on the other. Chapter 7 deals with the cultural processes 
of how bequeathed objects become sensitive, charged with affective value. 
Against a background of empirical material, the author investigates the pos-
sibilities of combining a phenomenological approach with affect theories. 
Examples from Swedish peasant society are used in comparison with reports 
and texts about present-day patterns of the breaking up of an estate. Central 
to the discussion are the Heideggerian concepts of worlding and gathering, 
together with Arendt’s notion of the space of appearance. The way the senses 
are ‘educated’ – as a result of socialisation and the day-to-day sedimentation 




A Phenomenological Approach to 
Affect and Material Culture
Jonas Frykman
Doreen’s fondest memories were of those rainy afternoons, sitting 
with her mother in mother’s bedroom. Mom would take down the 
wooden jewelry cases from the top shelf of her bedroom closet, 
and they would spread out Grandma’s bracelets, rings, necklaces, 
and pins on the bedspread. Doreen and her Mom would hold 
the pieces up to the light and Mom would tell Doreen about how 
Grandma loved to wear this necklace or that ring. Mom would 
talk about the family gatherings where she herself wore the pieces 
that Grandma had handed down to her. Mom would often tell 
Doreen that the treasured family jewelry, with all of its history, 
would be in Doreen’s hands one day.
After both parents died, the jewelry was made the part of 
the estate. Her two brothers made her go to the lawyer’s office to 
discuss its economic value, and then they explained to her that 
‘the law is the law’. The rings, necklaces and bracelets were all 
sold and the money shared. ‘In order to get her share she had to 
sign a release document. She signed it, as her brothers asked, but 
at the bottom of the release she wrote, ‘I’ll never forget what you 
did to me and I will always remember your words, “the law is the 
law,” but the law can’t force me to ever speak to you again’. (Fish 
and Kotzer 2009: 59)
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Two Canadian solicitors, Barry Fish and Les Kotzer, quote this example 
from their practice in the book Where There is an Inheritance … (2009). 
In the preface to a collection of around 80 similar cases, they write, ‘We 
have constantly found that death and inheritance unleash a vast range 
of emotions which embrace bitter mean-spiritedness on one end of the 
spectrum, and the deepest imaginable wellsprings of goodwill and love 
on the other’ (Fish and Kotzer 2009:12). Objects can often release very 
deep conflicts, the repercussions of which are deeply felt in the inheri-
tors’ lives. Things bequeathed are given an ‘affective value’, in that the 
inheritors find themselves in a liminal state and thus become open to a 
wide array of influences that are often difficult to name and grasp. The 
void that is created when parents die is manifested in how the order and 
loyalties that once defined objects within the family are lost. Things that 
were once integral parts of a family’s everyday life – the familiar bed, the 
everydayness of the cutlery – are suddenly transformed into mementoes 
and symbols that allow entry into a world gone by. However, what can-
not be passed on is the sensual, affective dimension of the family that 
we intuitively learn to recognise from early childhood. The well-known 
wrangling over an estate has some of its roots in this fluid state and in 
the knowledge of the permanent loss of what was once home.
Perspectives
In order to understand the intensity with which affect is evoked by material 
objects, the relation between the body and the environment needs to be 
further explored. To that end, the following analysis will delve into some 
of the concepts and perspectives that are most poignantly formulated 
within the phenomenological tradition in anthropology and ethnology, 
where the ‘ability to grasp the world cognitively only supplements the 
ability to grasp it practically and physically’ (Jackson 2014: 10).
To get a better picture of the way affects work in this relation, it is first 
and foremost crucial to focus on the very situation in which material 
objects are animated. By using Martin Heidegger’s concepts of worlding 
and gathering (further discussed below) it will be possible to understand 
something about the unspoken processes that occur at the moment of 
experiencing an object. Objects as worlding are not to be understood as 
discrete entities that stand apart from the context that gives them sig-
nificance. Instead, they ‘open up’ the entirety to which they belong for a 
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particular subject. Heidegger’s use of worlding implies that a set of events 
and relations is gathered in the things themselves; he also uses the term 
Umwelt in a way that refers to the English environment.
According to Pierre Bourdieu (1977), affects are a result of how the 
body’s senses are organised. When dwelling on habitus, Bourdieu (2001) 
focuses on the embodiment of a set of dispositions such as feelings, 
thoughts, tastes, and bodily postures (Reed-Danahay 2005: 107). Habitus, 
then, is made up of dispositions formed in relation to the objects that 
people handle and the tasks they perform.
Hannah Arendt’s notion (1958) of space of appearance is to a great 
extent concerned with affective atmospheres by describing how mater-
ial culture is brought to life in a certain situation and how affects are 
welded with objects, history, and narration. Jean-Paul Sartre’s notions 
of the imaginary and the real also stand out as important tools for the 
analysis attempted in this chapter.
The application of these theoretical perspectives will be discussed in 
relation to examples of estates being broken up in two different settings: 
peasant society and contemporary conditions. The examples that have 
been chosen indicate that the analysis is not taking a set of empirical 
material as its point of departure. Rather, two types of material are dis-
cussed: texts from newspapers, magazines, and literature; and statements 
from lawyers, counsellors, therapists, and researchers. Fish and Kotzer’s 
book, mentioned above, is one of many in which solicitors, therapists, 
and counsellors talk about cases and clients they have come across. In 
addition, the analysis utilises a collection of answers to a questionnaire 
about estates being partitioned (LUF 242) sent out in 2015 by Lund Uni-
versity’s Folk Life Archives. Informants from southern Sweden were asked 
to describe what happened in their own families when their parents’ 
property was to be divided among siblings.1 This material mostly serves 
as a background for the analysis. Out of the 75 answers received only a 
few mentioned conflict, and then mostly in relation to holiday homes.
There are methodological issues of considerable importance that 
surface when faced with these sources. Judging from the informants’ 
answers, families seemed to follow rational principles when the estate 
was to be divided. The procedure was described either as collecting the 
objects that were to be inherited into equally valuable heaps and dividing 
them fairly among members of the family, or receiving them from their 
parents’ ‘warm hands’ while they were still alive. It is highly plausible 
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that there is a pattern where the givers and recipients already knew one 
another’s preferences so well that the objects were transferred before the 
death of the giver. Such a pattern reveals family relations based on a rec-
ognition of individual preferences. Conflicts are abundantly described 
in the other types of material mentioned above, however, since they refer 
to situations where people were seeking legal or personal advice.
This absence or presence of conflict indicates some of the many pitfalls 
we meet when dealing with affects. In the case of life histories, it is pos-
sible to discern how memory, narration, and written texts can capture of 
affective atmosphere. As far as legal or therapeutic cases are concerned, 
however, single situations are often presented in relation to the material 
objects that are causing the crisis. Any life history will meet difficulties 
in capturing the affective atmosphere – the smug smiles, the envious 
glances, the not-so-well-hidden triumphs, and bodily reactions such as 
tear-filled eyes and the lump in the throat. Even if awkward moments 
are not easily forgotten, the way affects appear is evasive and hard to put 
into words. This discrepancy between the two kinds of source materials 
points to an analysis in which the understanding of affects, experience, 
and material culture takes us one step further.
In the example above, most readers will probably understand Doreen’s 
frustration and disappointment and sympathise with her. She was deprived 
of what she believed should be bequeathed to her on the grounds that 
it was part of her life with her mother. Asking why affects runs high on 
such an occasion is like inquiring into a humdrum truism; the challenge 
lies in describing how the affects works and the cultural processes by 
which such attachments develop.
It is obvious that if the gems and rings had been found in a jewel-
ler’s shop they would have been valued for their aesthetic qualities or 
financial value, similar to the way in which the brothers saw them, even 
if the jewellery was also ingrained with a familiar significance for the 
brothers. To have affective value for the inheritor, items have more than 
such symbolic importance; they can, as Doreen’s example illustrates, 
be conjoined with childhood events where the present is fused with the 
past and the future in a shared intimacy.
The questionnaire mentioned above can be used in a cultural anal-
ysis to describe how inherited objects are made the props of a narrated 
family history. The genre of life histories presents a very special dilemma 
in understanding the relation between people and objects. Any such 
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history tends to follow the intentions of the narrator (Tigerstedt et al. 
1992). To paraphrase Jean-Paul Sartre (1995), not only does the narrator 
have a sense of the plot that, from the very beginning, makes the whole 
story end-oriented, but he/she is also limited by what Sartre calls the 
‘imaginary’. In this context, Sartre contrasts the imaginary with objects 
of perception, i.e. the ‘real’. Any representation can only contain what is 
more or less consciously put into it (Sartre 2004; Detmer 2008). A narrator, 
who already knows the outcome of the story, fuels the representation with 
intentions and linguistic proficiency, and thus keeps it, in Sartre’s words, 
imaginary. Furthermore, such stories work with a double chronology – 
the past is portrayed through contemporary experiences, and objects 
fit into the present experiences of the narrator rather than the subject 
at the moment of perception (Burnett 1984). As discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5 in this volume, however, stories about difficult experiences have 
a capacity to create affects in the narrator that were neither intentional 
nor linguistically aligned. Later in this chapter the opposition between 
the imaginary and the real is again questioned.
Objections of this kind are beyond the essence of what Sartre is after, 
however. When he talks about the ‘real’, he is primarily trying to describe 
the experiential dimension, the many contingencies and junctures, the 
realm of the pre-reflective and the nonverbal; but above all, he is talking 
about seeing things as part of an environment and, in practical terms, 
in contact with everyday events. It is when this multitude is looked at 
under the pretence of our interests and projects that it might escape our 
attention (Sartre 1965; Detmer 2008) and thereby also our multilayered 
relation to objects.
In peasant society
The reactions that arise when property is bequeathed are bound by time 
and milieu. In literary fiction, the parting of an estate is often portrayed 
as the instance where people’s true state of mind is displayed. Greed, 
vindictiveness, callousness, mendacity, and pure mischief are frequently 
found in dramas and novels, from Shakespeare’s King Lear to contem-
porary detective stories, and the inheritance trope has remained as one 
of the favourite means by which to bring pitiful human imperfections 
into the open. But what is presented as the most basic of emotions and 
personal shortcomings is something that, upon closer inspection, is a 
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connection between people and objects that is mostly non-verbal and 
pre-reflexive, and is closely connected to the social and material context.
The author Gustav Hellström portrays a scene from a traditional set-
ting in his novel Storm över Tjurö (‘Storm över Tjurö’, 1935), and takes 
every opportunity to dwell upon the mentality of the islanders. The 
novel, set at the beginning of the last century, depicts a local clergyman 
who marvels at the readiness of farmers and fishermen on Tjurö to fight 
over heirlooms long before the body was cold. When reading the local 
newspaper,
he saw how sibling rose against sibling, child against father, or 
mother, father and mother against the children. The most sacred 
of blood relations was torn like cobwebs in the autumn air. For 
a couple of thousand kronor, or even the simplest piece of furni-
ture could suddenly acquire value, as was it about bare life. The 
very drudgery of human existence presented itself in the fine 
print of the notices in the papers. (Hellström 1935; translated by 
Jonas Frykman)
For the islanders, access to a farm and land was essential for their very 
existence. The economy was autarchic – no wages could be expected at 
the end of the month, no hand-outs from the state, no holidays abroad. 
Status and recognition within the community were based on ownership 
of land, and property was mostly in short supply and almost always 
inherited. Identity for the islanders was constituted in relation to the 
world as it was experienced, both materially and socially, but always in 
relation to the community. The habitus of one farmer mirrored that of 
his neighbour.
These people’s habitus took shape in the handling of farm equipment, 
the tilling of the soil, and the sowing of the grain. They had learned how 
to understand and feel with their land, which was a more thorough and 
assertive process than what they thought of (Frykman and Gilje 2003). 
They probed every piece of their farm; as they walked behind their horses, 
ploughing and harrowing, the stones and rugged outcrops had by and 
by become as familiar as their arms and shoulders. At sea the islanders 
either pulled up nets full of herring or had to return empty-handed. 
In their boats they learned to read the skies and gauge the swell. They 
knew where the shallows were and how far down the sea bed was. Land-
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marks helped them to navigate. Each glance at the sky was followed by 
the implicit question of whether rising early and casting out more lines 
was worthwhile.
Inside the house, the furniture, such as the chest of drawers, the 
writing desk, or the clock, was mostly singled out to be scrutinized only 
when questions of inheritance made it visible. The chiming of the clock 
indicated the hour when the different chores should be carried out, the 
men were due home, the cows were to be brought in, and when the food 
had to be on the table. At the writing desk the daughters of the family 
learned how to put a shopping list together, while the chest of drawers 
housed the dowry and the children’s baptismal gifts. The interior of one 
house mirrored that of the next.
All in all, things were not so much seen as singular objects from a 
certain period in life that people found reasons to bicker about or go to 
court for. They were rather things that made sense through their uses, 
chunks of ongoing life, objects through which people knew how to lead 
a life and survive on the island of Tjurö. The fact that people fought over 
heirlooms was only partially due to their family history and their mental 
and emotional dispositions. The heirlooms became real to the extent that 
the material culture was part of the medium through which the world 
was disclosed. This was precisely what Heidegger meant by ‘worlding’.
Atmosphere
Affects in contemporary societies are not as obviously community-related 
as on Tjurö, but appear more as a consequence of individual rights being 
violated, agreements broken, and love betrayed. When she was dispos-
sessed of the jewellery, Doreen was deeply affected, since something she 
and her mother had cherished had been lost. The two Canadian solici-
tors recount another incident in which personal relations were gathered 
interobjectively – between people and a material object. Two sisters 
were fighting over a treasured crystal vase. Their mother had received 
it as birthday gift from one of the two. When their mother passed away 
it was made part of the estate which had to be divided equally between 
the daughters. The one who had originally purchased the vase saw her 
chance to reclaim the treasured piece, even though it was equally dear to 
them both. She took it to the building in which the solicitor’s office was 
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housed. Outraged, she called them down to the parking area to make 
them witness the breakdown of a troubled sisterhood:
Her face was turned red and she was shaking with anger as she 
turned to open the door. She reached into the front seat and held 
the crystal vase over her head. She shrieked at us, ‘IF I CAN’T 
HAVE THE VASE, THEN NO ONE CAN!!!’ With those words, 
she shattered the vase on the pavement of the parking lot, jumped 
into her car, and took off. (Fish and Kotzer 2009: 34)
As the editors of the book The Affect Theory Reader, Seigworth and Gregg 
claim that it is unnecessary to emphasise the difference between inter-
objective, in between people and things, and intersubjective, between 
people. Things and the environment are included in ‘ongoing impinge-
ments and pressures from intersubjective and interobjective systems of 
social desiring’ (2010: 7). Above it was stated that affects relate to the 
pre-reflexive and the lower and proximal senses, such as touch, taste, 
smell, rhythm, and other types of everyday phenomena and can just as 
well be the outcome of an interobjective encounter.
‘Atmospheric affects’ on the other hand are frequently described as 
intersubjective communication which implies the body and the senses. 
When Spinoza uses the notion of affectio, he is referring to ‘the force of 
an affecting body and the impact it leaves on the one affected’ (Watkins 
2010: 269; see also Gilje, Chapter 2 in this volume). Affects then denote 
influence and change. To affect a person is to act upon his or her bodily 
state as well as state of mind. In the way it is used by Spinoza, it refers 
to the potential to act; the simultaneous power to affect the world and 
to be affected by it (Massumi 2002; Clough and Halley 2007; Autumn 
White 2007). What makes affects hard to pin down in neat definitions is 
that they belong to that bodily realm of the pre-reflective that Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) refers to as ‘that world which precedes knowledge, of 
which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific 
schematisation is an abstract and derivate sign-language, as is geography 
in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a 
forest, a prairie or a river is’ (ibid. viii, ix). The pre-reflexive is what one 
comprehends before even starting to deliberate.
Affects, then, are set apart from emotions that are more easily defined 
since they have found their way into words. Emotions are, in Sartre’s 
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(1962/94) famous definition, always directed towards an object: you are 
angry, in love, frustrated, or mad with someone; you are frustrated, 
enchanted, or bored with something. Emotions are ‘culturalised’, put 
into frames of reference, recognised by others and narrated.2
The psychologist Theresa Brennan, in her book The Transmission of 
Affects (2004), compares affects to the atmosphere that can be felt when, 
for instance, one enters a room and notices that the air is ‘so thick you 
could cut it with a knife’. Affects communicate important messages 
non-verbally, passing below the radar. Building on Spinoza, Brennan 
points out how affects are ‘also responsible for bodily changes, some 
are brief changes, as in a whiff of the room’s atmosphere, some longer 
lasting’ (ibid. 1).
This affective atmosphere – the transmission of affect – if only for an 
instant, alters the biochemistry and neurology of the subject. The social 
environment literally gets into the individual. Physically, something is 
present that was not there before, but it was not intended nor even gen-
erated solely or in part by the individual organism or its genes (ibid.).
As characterised by the philosopher Eirin Manning (2007: 17), affects 
are found in between people, through touch or by simply being moved, 
‘of reaching towards one another’, and exceed linguistic signification. In 
Kathleen Stewart’s definition (2007: 5), they are ‘complex and uncertain 
objects that fascinate because they literally hit us or exert a pull on us’.
For an anthropologist or ethnologist, the notion of affective atmos-
pheres becomes problematic or decontextualised when the related his-
tories or narratives existing in the field are not taken into consideration 
(cf. Jansen, Chapter 3 in this volume). In her ethnography of divided 
Cyprus where ethnic Turks took over the buildings and olive groves left 
by the expelled Greek farmers, the anthropologist Navaro-Yashin (2007) 
shows how melancholy radiated from deserted or half-ruined properties, 
but was also reflected in tales and narratives.
The solicitors mentioned above give almost an ethnographic descrip-
tion of how affective atmospheres are constantly interwoven with nar-
ration. For example, they describe an event concerning two cousins and 
the frosty atmosphere between them after the division of an estate. The 
son of a deceased client had been involved in a bitter fight with his cousin 
over the will. The business his father had run unexpectedly went to the 
cousin, which meant that the son was dispossessed while his cousin 
triumphed. After this the two men could hardly stand being together 
sensitive objects
162
in the same room, to say nothing of turning up at the same wedding 
party, where the relatives and wedding guests immediately experienced 
the icy coldness between the two antagonists. Was the other smearing 
his adversary’s reputation when seen whispering in the ear of the person 
sitting next to him? Was this whisper the prelude to him blaming his 
cousin in front of all the others? He was quoted as saying:
You don’t know how it feels to look at every person at the table as 
a buffer between you and the person you fought with. You don’t 
know how nervous you might get meeting your enemy while the 
two of you are alone in the washroom. There is a stress that words 
can’t describe. (Fish and Kotzer 2009: 37)
Simply being aware of the man moving around other people caused 
affective changes that were bodily. The man’s bearing, thoughts, emo-
tions, actions, and understanding of his surroundings were all affected. 
The anger, excitement, or diffuse discomfort he felt had, of course, a long 
prehistory that had been clearly narrated.
Worlding
Worlding is a concept where objects, experiences, and use/practice are in 
focus, where history is taken for granted rather than made the object of 
investigation. When writing about objects as filled with dormant ener­
gies, the Irish poet Seamus Heaney gives a good picture of how material 
objects are worlding. He takes the reader into the ‘world which precedes 
knowledge’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962):
The rooms where we come to consciousness, the cupboards we open 
as toddlers, the shelves we climb up to, the boxes and albums we 
explore in reserved places in the house, the secret spots we come 
upon in our earliest solitudes out of doors, the haunts of our first 
explorations in outbuildings and fields at the verge of our security 
– it is in such places and at such moments that ‘the reality of the 
world’ awakens in us. These are archetypal moments, occurring 
in every life irrespective of intellectual, social or economic dif-
ferences. And it is at such moments that we have our first inkling 
of past-ness and find our physical surroundings invested with a 
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wider and deeper dimension than we can, just then, account for. 
This is an unconscious process at the time. It is neither sentimen-
tal nor literary, since it happens during the pre-reflective stage 
of our existence. It has to do with an almost biological need to 
situate ourselves in our instinctual lives as creatures of the race 
and of the planet, a need to learn the relationship between what is 
self and what is not self. It has to do with exploring, sniffing out, 
settling in and shaping up. And just as the smell of the rubber 
sheet in a pram or the feel of boards in the bottom of a cot or the 
scrape of the nappy pin as the child creeps on a tiled floor or the 
slippiness as he creeps over linoleum, just as these sensations teach 
the child about the realm of the present, so in every life there are 
sensations which inaugurate contact with the large and inviting 
reality of the past. (Heaney 1993)
When Heidegger (1962: 116/84) introduces the concept of worlding, his 
intention is to describe the state where things are familiar and used as 
tools – implements that help to link individuals to a certain environment 
and make that environment of concern for the user.3 The philosopher 
Richard Polt explains Heidegger’s concept as ‘a system of purposes and 
meanings that organizes our activities and our identity and within 
which entities can make sense to us’ (Polt 1999: 54), and he explains that 
the potentials are there ‘before we formulate propositions about them’ 
and are thus filled with possibilities (ibid. 68). The objects are zuhanden 
– ready-to-hand – which implies that it is unnecessary to think about 
them because they are already there, ready to grasp and put into use. 
They influence the user pre-reflexively, as with a hammer or a pen, which 
dictate different possible operations, can be interpreted in different ways, 
and are to be used in order to follow an intention and create a totality 
of material and social relations – a world. Worlding conjures up what 
Heaney affectively discloses as the ‘world’ of his childhood home. World-
ing implies that things assemble a human condition in terms of time and 
space. In his biography of Heidegger, the German philosopher Rüdiger 
Safranski (1998) uses Proust’s famous cake to explain worlding: ‘Proust 
dunks his madeleine in his tea – and the universe of Combray unfolds. 
The madeleine, that sweet shell-shaped cake “is worlding”’ (ibid. 96).
Death and the inevitable inventory that follows disconnect the objects 
from this familiarity, their zuhanden state, and they become vorhanden 
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– present-at-hand – and perceived as symbols or representations. When 
they stop worlding it is like when a person dies and her clothes and 
objects are left behind, saturated with a void that, one eventually realises, 
is forever. The loss that is felt is proportionate to the complexity of the 
world that the object was once a part of and an opening into, while it is 
now reduced to something that can be sold or valued for a market price.
Gathering
Not all inherited objects are invested with what is usually called ‘affective 
value’. When fights broke out in peasant society they were mostly over 
property that would make its owner the rightful heir of the farm or the 
family domain. Conflicts in contemporary milieus often take place over 
things that bring to mind significant family events: Christmas celebrations, 
baptisms, weddings, or similar gatherings. Heidegger’s notion (1971) of 
gathering consequently does not describe family festivities or even how 
things are remembered per se, but how singular objects are endowed 
with the ability to bring a certain material surrounding and its web of 
relationships to life. Or, to put it differently, when things are gathering 
they summon both the people involved and the activities they perform. 
Heidegger’s classic examples are bridges, farming implements, and a family 
meal at which the social and culinary skills of the participants around 
the table are to the fore. In the example that introduced this chapter, 
instead of seeing them as broaches, rings, or bracelets, Doreen perceived 
the jewel lery as holding together something that now contained both the 
objects and her mother. Or, to put it differently by using Hei degger’s term, 
they were gathering a set of events and relations – an Umwelt (environ-
ment) – that had become sensitive since her mother’s death.
To gather, then, is not an outcome of the process of bringing together 
objects that are random or statistically present properties, ‘but a matter 
of how the thing itself ‘works’ – how it ‘things’’, as the Australian phil-
osopher Jeff Malpas puts it (2006: 234; see Polt 1999:58). With the word 
‘thinging’ he refers to objects as not just symbolic, i.e. present-at-hand, 
or even useful, i.e. ready-to-hand, but as evoking interwoven contexts 
through the perceiver’s personal experience.4
In the book The Perception of the Environment, Tim Ingold (2000) 
takes Pieter Breughel the Elder’s well-known picture The Harvesters (1565) 
to illustrate the usefulness of the concept of gathering. He describes how 
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the artist lets an entire picture of a landscape reverberate with how he 
paints the central motif of a tree. ‘This is not any tree’, Ingold writes:
Rising from the spot where people are gathered for their repast 
is an old and gnarled pear-tree, which provides them with both 
shade from the sun, a back-rest and a prop for utensils. Being the 
month of August, the tree is in full leaf, and fruit is ripening on 
its branches. For one thing, it draws the entire landscape around 
it into unique focus; in other words by its presence it constitutes a 
particular place. The place was not there before the tree, but came 
into being with it … In its present form, the tree embodies the 
entire history of its development from the moment it first took 
root. And that history consists in the unfolding of its relations 
with the manifold components of its environment, including the 
people who have nurtured it, tilled the soil around it, pruned its 
branches, picked its fruit, and, as at present use it as something 
to lean against. The people, in other words, are as much bound 
up in the life of the tree as the tree in the lives of the people. 
(Ingold 2000: 204)
The picture is not just a demonstration of how Breughel dreamed up 
the many riches in the lives of Dutch peasants in the sixteenth century. 
It also shows the homogeneity of its population and how closely people 
were integrated with fields, crops, and landscapes. People and nature 
were as one. Here, the process of gathering was released by the hand and 
imagination of the painter.
Until it mysteriously disappeared when moving a couple of years ago, 
I had in my possession my father’s bedside table. It was inconspicuous, 
but to me it gathered in itself my father’s profession as a doctor, his life 
history, the family that was his, our relationship, and my conceivable 
future. It belonged to the category of objects that emanated such strong 
affects among all of us five children; with great difficulties, it was made 
a part of my inheritance when father died. The world that gathered in 
it was dear to me, but also problematic because, among other reasons, 
I never fulfilled his dream of choosing the medical profession. This 
indeed was an object that became ‘sticky’ as Sarah Ahmed (2010) put it, 
close to the Heideggerian concept, of gathering filled with a surplus of 
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affects, emotions, and meanings. In other words, it was attractive and 
disturbing at the same time.
That bedside table stood in his room, a screened-off territory with a 
separate entrance and a restroom. The table’s design revealed the 1950’s 
fascination with teak and mobile furniture, and was acquired when father 
decided to move back home after having lived on his own for some years. 
It had two levels. The surface of the lower level, which was hardly visible, 
had bleached spots in the polish from diluted alcohol and ether. There he 
kept the constantly leaking circular steel container for sterilising syringes. 
Some of the small metal files for cutting the tops off of glass ampoules 
were stuck in the cracks in the woodwork. He suffered from an illness 
that eventually took his life and that needed regular, self-administered 
treatment. The upper level was the table’s public space and was littered 
with poetry books, cigarette packets, a overflowing ashtray, and a black 
Bakelite telephone with a direct line to the surgery. The surface also had 
several circular stains from the pots of yoghurt that father downed when 
he arrived home, there being little time to eat at work. This surface told 
the story of a cultured, busy, and devoted doctor of his time, while the 
lower part had more sombre connotations and murmured of personal 
shortcomings, spells of anxiety, and crumbling health.
Sitting on the other side of that table at night, I listened to father, 
inhaling the smoke from his unfiltered Philip Morris cigarettes, while 
he talked. The smoke that drifted towards the ceiling blended with the 
chemical smells from his medical practice. In our nocturnal sojourns, 
when his last patient had gone and I had sneaked away from my home-
work, I learned about diseases, cures, remedies, and heard stories about 
his own childhood and his family’s material and emotional poverty, hard-
ships that obviously made him follow a vocation that allowed him to help 
people in need. Hovering over the table was an equally thick yet invisible 
ambience made up of his professional knowledge, my filial affection and 
admiration, and my deepest compassion for his many crises, which as 
a youth I found difficult to fully comprehend. The fact that something 
is worlding makes it come alive with its connotations and many uses. 
The phenomenon of gathering lays bare the object’s particular context of 
activities, in this case the setting of the world of patients, relatives, and 
friends that surrounded us in the 1950s, their stories and characteristics, 
all filtered through the relation between father and son, and powerfully 
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gathered in a piece of furniture made out of teak and standing on four 
wheels. In other words, this object had a very special affective value.
Space of appearance
We have now seen how affects can be stirred up at the parting of an 
estate due to the special power objects become endowed with, here 
described by the notions of worlding and gathering. The pain following 
the realisation that some of this magic is jeopardised when the things 
are taken out of their original Umwelt, however, only partially explains 
the turbulence that define this event. The agitated atmosphere that sur-
rounds the loss of parents presents the objects with new connotations, 
bestowing them with a new meaning.5 Breaking the objects off from 
their original setting is often felt as a trauma, yet it is also the beginning 
of another momentum. As referred to above, when a person’s clothes or 
objects become saturated with a vacancy after he/she has departed, it 
can also be the beginning of a new phase. To start with, however, such 
objects evoke a sense of vagueness and uncertainty among the bereaved. 
Some of the objects from home will be integrated into the homes of the 
children, some will be sold, and others given away. And sometimes they 
become part of an arsenal by which the inheritors attack one another. 
The affective backdrop for such a transition is often precarious, writes 
the professor of social psychology Bertil Törestad; respect for the ageing 
parents might have stopped the children – the inheritors – from showing 
their irritation and feelings of long-lasting injustice, but
[r]eality has to be renegotiated when the parents are gone. The 
bereaved have to deal with inheritance at the time when they are 
mentally most unfit to deal with it … Many children regress and 
end up in what could be described as trench-warfare, where both 
sides adjust their arsenal in order to injure their counterpart most 
severely. Old violations are brought up and now finally have my 
revenge and settle the old scores! (Uppsala Nya Tidning 11/5/2011)
The lawyer Carola Erixon describes the ambivalent situation when emo-
tions and affects that have been kept at bay are brought out into the open: 
‘We usually take a lot [of crap] from family members, and have a kind 
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of ‘wild card’ on being mean’ (Svenska Dagbladet 16 Nov. 2006), which 
we are able to brandish at this moment of emotional crisis.
At the inventory of the estate, what has been private and held within the 
family must, to some extent, become public. The dissolution of what was 
once a household is a legal process by which the familiar attains publicity 
– at the risk of dirty linen being hung out for all to see. Hannah Arendt 
(1958) has coined the concept of space of appearance to capture the fact 
that at such and similarly highly affective occasions, people, objects, and 
material culture form a tightly interlaced unit; furthermore, it is a unit 
that is political to the extent that it facilitates a specific kind of future.
Originally Arendt used the concept to describe the role played by 
the public sphere – agora – in the city-states of ancient Greece. There, 
citizens met in dire contexts to discuss and decide on upcoming matters. 
The term denotes how seemingly spontaneous flares of political action 
are deeply anchored in what appears around the actors: the history of 
previous decisions, the existence of ingrained habits, and the anticipation 
of a reachable future. Arendt persistently points to the role played by the 
environment in the shaping and recharging of culture and politics. The 
things that surrounded the ancient Greeks at the agora, such as buildings, 
monuments, statues, art, and all those objects that carry the offprint of 
history, memory, or common efforts, are all activated in such a space of 
appearance.6 Arendt (1958: 95) claims that continuity without objects is 
not continuity in the real sense, for ‘The whole factual world of human 
affairs depends for its reality and its continued existence, first, upon the 
presence of others who have seen and will remember, and second, on the 
transformation of the intangible into tangibility of things’. Thus, Arendt’s 
use of ‘space of appearance’ becomes the spot where something new is 
created against the backdrop of something tangible that already exists. 
Through this reciprocity, the space of appearance becomes invested by 
the power of the past in projecting possible futures on the present.
The summer house
The home, the neighbourhood, the village, the town square, or even a TV 
programme might create a space of appearance. On the island of Tjurö, 
it was the family farm that was the immediate space of appearance, 
which extended to the community of which it was a part. The inheritors 
on Tjurö were surrounded by furniture, houses, and land that were to 
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be passed on to them without very many alternatives. The objects had 
been incorporated and were worlding due to their daily use; any loss was 
likely to cause deep despair. The physical Umwelt that once made them 
could just as well undo them.
A very special space of appearance stands out in contemporary mate-
rial under the name of the summer house. Books and articles with titles 
like Saving the Family Cottage: A Guide to Succession Planning for Your 
Cottage, Cabin, Camp or Vacation Home (Hollander et al. 2013) flood 
the market, mostly written from a legal point of view as a kind of first 
aid kit for families trying to steer clear of inheritance conflicts. In the 
answers to the questionnaire LUF 242 about inheritance, the holiday 
homeon some occasions was described as the scene where nasty conflicts 
between siblings could be played out.
This underlines deep emotional attachments to the place and the pre-
cautions taken to retain happy memories. Or, as the American professor 
of English Ken Huggins writes in the essay ‘Passing It On: The Inher-
itance, Ownership and Use of Summer Houses’ (2003: 87):
Going to a summer home each year may be the most treasured 
of childhood memories. If you were fortunate enough to have 
done this when you were young, you may have stronger, clearer 
and fonder memories of your times at ‘your summer’ house than 
from your year-round house. And as you married and had kids 
of your own, you may have wanted to give them the opportunity 
for the memorable and treasured times you had.
The holiday homesymbolises days away from school and obligations, 
of staying together as an extended family with grandparents, aunts and 
distant cousins, of rummaging through the woods and meadows, of get-
ting mosquito bites, of building huts and claiming places of your own. 
The holiday homeoften turns out to be the place where the happy family 
life happened that you later keep looking back at. As with all import-
ant places, belonging becomes a stronger link than nostalgia. Michael 
Jackson (2014: 87) describes this attachment as ‘a haunting presence, an 
afterimage, a ghost’ that lingers since this is the place from which one 
once drew sustenance.
Counsellors and solicitors interviewed about inheritance matters in 
Swedish newspapers tell stories about how deeply inheritors are affected 
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when the holiday homemust be split up or sold. Heirs line up to seek 
legal and personal advice as to how to settle conflicts and injustices. It 
is as if the place makes them revive not only the happy days but also the 
troubled relations: who was the most privileged, who was given the most 
attention by the parents, who was there when the ageing parents needed 
help and care, and who never turned up. In short, who had received the 
most of that affective substance that used to be the heart and soul of 
the family? What solicitors call ‘family relations’ are more at stake than 
objects of economic value. A person involved in many estate inventories 
concludes that ‘it is mostly about love lost when disagreement turns up. 
If I did not get enough love, at least I want money or things’ (Svenska 
Dagbladet 12 Nov. 2008). The worst scenes take place, he says, when sib-
lings are involved in a conflict, whereas more distant relatives seem to 
have a more rational attitude.
Fights over the elusive, affective family substance stand out as a 
recurrent theme in stories about holiday homes. In one story, two sisters 
told of their disgust at their brother for monopolising not only most of 
the parents’ affection, but also metaphorically claiming the emotional 
essence of the summer house. When it could no longer be kept it was put 
on the market, and the sisters were unduly blamed for having violated 
the spirit of togetherness and affection:
We are three children, one brother and two sisters. We were given 
the summer house to share, provided that our parents were allowed 
to construct a separate building. When our parents passed away 
our brother insisted that he should take over the big house while 
we sisters shared the small one. My sister and I did not agree, 
mostly because we found out that our brother had been favoured 
in so many ways that we had not known about – and eventually 
the entire property was sold. There was no longer a place where 
memories could appear. This very sad story means that we can 
no longer meet. Our brother’s children talk about us as the ‘mean 
aunts’ and what our sister-in-law says cannot be repeated. (Svenska 
Dagbladet 30 Nov. 2008)
In another unhappy fight over who was getting the most love from the 
parents, a sister and brother inherited the holiday homethat had been 
in the family’s ownership for a long time. The sister, who was the apple 
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of her parents’ eye, wanted to keep it and buy her brother out for below 
the market price. The situation made him aware of years of neglect and 
a constant lack of moral support. When as a young man he went to sea 
he was scolded by the parents, and when he later started to study he was 
again told to find a proper job. ‘Nothing I did was good enough. Finally, 
I decided that I would have as much a say as my sister and not succumb 
to being yet another victim of parental authority’ (Dagens Nyheter 17 
Aug. 2004).
The holiday homebecame a space of appearance where much of the 
affective atmosphere was gathered in its very Umwelt, its things and 
activities, and where the imbalance in family relations became visible 
when the summer house’s future had to be decided.
On the formation of affects
Heidegger’s concepts of worlding and gathering can be combined with 
chronological perspectives such as history, narration, socialisation, and 
what Sartre, as noted above, called ‘the imaginary’. When stories are 
told about how family-owned objects, like a cut-glass chandelier, the 
collected works of Selma Lagerlöf, a necklace, or the summer house, 
cause so much trouble, ‘it really turns out to be about something else’, 
claims the psychologist Madeleine Gauffin Rahme. As a therapist she 
specialises in clients who have ended up in the middle of a family feud 
against their will. The root of the feuds could be anything from a father 
not providing enough of love or attention to a daughter whose efforts 
to take care of ageing parents had not being recognised (Svenska Dag­
bladet 12 Nov. 2008).
When material objects surface as symbols and become ‘imaginary’, they 
are in every sense of the word also ‘real’ and usually founded on child-
hood experiences. A closer look at the difference between the upbringing 
in peasant society and the contemporary world makes this point clear. 
In premodern society, the farmstead, with its fields and animals, was a 
home that one only left through marriage or death. The days were defined 
by a seasonal rhythm of work and children were engaged in tasks and 
production according to their strength and ability from a young age. Toys 
were rare and the potential for expanding the self into a world designed 
to stimulate the imagination, for example by playing with dolls, did not 
exist more than was necessary. Inside the house the rooms looked very 
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much the same as they did in the houses in the neighbouring village; 
they might be poorer or richer but were all variations on the same theme. 
This existing Umwelt was incorporated into a person’s habitus from an 
early age, with little room for an individualized subject to expand.
Nowadays, family members only live under the same roof and share 
material experiences for twenty or so years. Primary as well as second-
ary socialisation takes place within this time span. During these years 
children are preparing for a professional trajectory that requires consid-
erably more flexibility than the old model that was built upon imitation. 
Regardless of whether the children end up as dockers, entrepreneurs, 
doctors, artists, or scholars, during childhood they are surrounded with 
a wide range of objects and imaginary rooms that they learn to master, 
love – and transcend. Childhood then becomes that cherished foreign 
land where life was lived at its fullest and moments of happiness and 
betrayal are never to be forgotten. This was the heart where affects were 
experienced, named, and dealt with as emotions. To the Heideggerian 
approach we must then add what is brought up in the space of appear-
ance where education of the senses happens.
The training ground par préférence for this childhood learning pro-
cess was the holiday home– at least in middle-class families (Frykman 
and Löfgren 1987). In every phase of the family cycle it was the place that 
conjured the old and young back to the days of childhood, where inno-
cence in the children was expected and eccentric behaviour among the 
grown-ups was allowed. The emotional and affective disposition acquired 
here remains the ideal of what holiday homes are all about, and are the 
answer to why the loss of such an estate brings up such strong affects.
In one family described by Fish and Kotzer (2009), the father bequeathed 
the summer residence to his two children. His dream was that they would 
share it equally and keep it as it was. Here they were supposed to enjoy 
the lightness of life, cooking dinners and being at the very heart of real 
family life, ‘swimming in the pool, playing cards around the kitchen 
table, and laughing hysterically as his children told their children the 
funny stories they shared when growing up’ (ibid. 157 ff.) Now, however, 
they were no longer children and had developed new tastes and habits. 
Nevertheless, the summer place transported them back to a time of 
irresponsibility, where parents stood ready to move in and preclude any 
misunderstanding or rivalry, but now they had to sort out every grievance 
themselves. In the end they decided to time-share the place. When the 
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son arrived, he found to his dismay that his sister and her family had left 
the house in a mess: ‘rotting food in the fridge, crumbs on the floor, beds 
unmade, pots still on the kitchen counter, dirty dishes in the sink’ and 
obvious traces of teenagers having used the place for partying. Clothes 
were not properly hung in the wardrobes and swimwear, sandals, and 
tennis racquets were not in their proper places (ibid. 157 ff.).
What had once been part of the expectedly unbothered behaviour 
at holiday time stood out as slothful, and the darker sides of what was 
supposed to be a fairyland were brought out into the open. The holiday 
homewas turned into a material rebuke of the fundamental qualities the 
sister and brother had accumulated when growing up. Again, as in many 
other cases, the property had to be sold and the bonds between siblings 
were severed. Something that is so deeply ingrained is difficult to put 
into words. The only remedy seemed to be to fight over the possessions 
when what was really lost was the heart and soul that once gave life to 
the material objects.
Conclusion
This chapter on affects and material culture took as its point of departure 
the division of an estate. It was inspired by theories of affect combined 
with a phenomenological approach based on the works of Heidegger, 
Sartre, Bourdieu, and Arendt. The ways in which affective atmospheres 
work help to describe how objects are to be approached through their 
uses and show how affects are an ‘in-between’ phenomenon, passed on 
between people inter-subjectively, but also between people and objects 
inter-objectively. When a daughter, for instance, is denied her mothers’ 
jewellery, it becomes clear how the bonds to her mother were contained 
in and transmitted through the physical experience of the objects. The 
jewellery truly was worlding to the extent that it brought to life a world 
shared and known to her and her mother. But this relation is hard to 
verbalise and thus difficult to ‘prove’ to her brothers, since they had not 
shared the same intimate relation with the mother that the jewellery 
gathers.
Through the case of peasant society, the question of the sedimentation 
of affects was addressed. The peasantry were allegedly prone to fighting 
over property, and the parting of an estate was an occasion for the bas-
est of affects and emotions to be displayed. In interpreting such milieus, 
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the analytical tools of worlding and gathering make perfect sense. What 
was at stake was not individual or personal dispositions, but rather the 
objects they were bickering about had become a part of their habitus 
and the very medium through which the world was disclosed. Affective 
responses arose when this self-evident connection was jeopardised.
The breaking up of a home comes at the worst of times: when the people 
concerned are grieving. Here again the phenomenological approach to 
material culture has proven helpful. Through Arendt’s concept of space 
of appearance, it became possible to see the part played by material 
culture in palpably trying to create something new out of a harrowing 
situation. The recharging of objects that is more seldom brought to 
attention ‘before we formulate propositions about them’ turned out to 
be graspable though such an approach.
The analysis of the holiday homebrought to the fore the matter of for-
mation of affects through the combination of material culture and sociali-
sation – in a way similar to Bourdieu’s analysis of habitus. The difference to 
peasant society was clearly demonstrated with regard to the individuality 
and the development of self that has become such a critical part of growing 
up. The holiday home turned out to be a place where formation of the self 
is most poignant since it is there children are given free rein to find their 
own way. What happens there on holiday are important affective events, 
often mulled over on winter evenings while leafing through photo albums 
and repeating stories.
Finally, this chapter showed that catching this formation of the senses, 
the affiliation to objects and milieus that had been important in the process 
of growing up, was only partially reachable with the phenomenological 
toolbox. The analysis has to reach out for life histories and other types 
of narratives, and consider the wider question on how the socialisation 
of members of a culture is done in everyday practice.
Notes
1 Since the questions explicitly asked about events in the informant’s own family, almost all 
of the answers turned out to fall within the genre of life stories.
2 Raymond Williams uses the notion of the structure of feelings to describe how a certain time 
or epoch could be characterised by a set – a structure – of thinking, emotions, and affects 
‘which is indeed social and material, but each in embryonic phase before it can become 
fully articulate and defined exchange’ (Williams 1977: 131).
3 This kind of worlding is described by Arendt in The Life of the Mind (1971: 20): ‘Living beings, 
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men and animals, are not just in the world; they are of the world and this precisely because 
they are subjects and objects – perceiving and being perceived – at the same time’.
4 For Heidegger, the use of gathering is part of an epistemology where the ‘fourfold’ (earth, 
sky, gods, and mortals) are brought together. Elaborating on this is beyond the scope of 
this chapter.
5 Heidegger uses the general term assertive to describe the transition of things as they lose 
the uses to which they were once put in a certain context.
6 Arendt’s concept has common traits with Heidegger’s view of how worlding works: the 
environment is taken for granted to the point that it becomes innate.
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The multiplicity of affective reactions released by just one object is at the 
core of Chapter 8. The authors describe how a retail chain staged a kick-off in 
northern Norway in what is also the territory of the indigenous Sámi popula-
tion. To make it ‘authentic’, mock Sámi costumes made in China were given to 
the employees. This event caused an intense debate in the local and national 
media where opinions about the rights of indigenous people, colonialism, 
safeguarding heritage, and the humiliating abuse of the Sámi national dress 
were voiced. It turned out that although most of the population formed an 
affective community to the extent that they all were animated, they did not 
react in similar ways. The authors stress that when analysing affects in relation 
to material culture, time and place matter as well as the relations and context 
that give the object substance.
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chapter 8
What Alters When the Traditional 
Sámi Costume Travels?
A Study of Affective Investments in the Sápmi
Britt Kramvig & Anne Britt Flemmen
The wearing of a traditional Sámi costume (gákti) that was light green in 
colour and produced in China at an internal event staged by the employees 
of the Norwegian grocery retail chain KIWI1 resulted in an emotional 
public debate in Sápmi/Norway.2 Some saw the use of the traditional Sámi 
costume as disrespectful, while others saw it as harmless fun. People reacted 
in different ways: some were disgusted, some were frustrated and angry 
and some were amused and intrigued. We were faced with a situation in 
which the majority population was seen to tread on the (already sore) 
toes of the indigenous Sámi people. In the debate that followed multiple 
positions were performed – and within the Sámi community too. This 
was one of these rare occasions when the respectful use of indigenous 
Sámi objects was publicly debated and differences in opinion within the 
Sámi community became publicly visible. Disagreement and discontent 
within the Sámi community is not often verbally expressed in Norwegian 
public arenas. It is rather communicated in other, subtler ways.
Our task in this essay is to track what it is that alters when matter, 
terms, and aims travel from one place to another. We will argue that the 
costumes need to be considered as more then iconically charged objects. 
Objects such as the gákti enact connections to a specific heritage that 
is celebrated, as well as to memories and a sense of nostalgia and loss. 
The gákti is part of some highly affective practices for a group of people 
exposed to centuries of persecution and marginalization. We also sug-
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gest how affect aroused by the presence of objects can be articulated. 
We take inspiration from Navaro-Yashin’s claim (2012: 203) that affect 
is contained and emitted through the solidity, presence, visibility, and 
tangibility of objects. In line with Frykman and Povrzanović Frykman 
(Chapter 1) we attempt to approach objects as materiality that become 
sensitised through use, but also serve as containers of affects.
We use the ethnographic story of the KIWI jacket debate to argue that 
we need to view affect through the qualities, textures and potentialities 
of the objects themselves. The affect that is transmitted by objects can be 
explored through the disconcertment and tension present in the debate. 
With this story we want to explore what happened when the traditional 
Sámi costume (gákti) travelled into the internal building of collective 
identity amongst the employees of the grocery retail chain KIWI, and 
how this can be understood. The emotions and heated debate that fol-
lowed testified to the challenges of recognising and establishing respect 
for difference in a postcolonial era.
The KIWI jacket
In autumn 2010 there was a Norwegian media storm when 630 KIWI 
employees wore a specially made ‘KIWI green’, Guovdageaidnu/
Figure 8.1. The KIWI jacket. Photo with permission, ryan.txanson@gmail.com
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Kautokeino-inspired traditional costume made in China. The group of 
employees took to the streets of the city of Tromsø on their way to an 
event created by ‘Better and Better’, a company based in southern Nor-
way. This company had been commissioned to gather KIWI employees 
from the entire country to celebrate the philosophy and strengthen the 
identity of the KIWI group using untraditional means. On meeting 
members of the group in their green copies of the Kautokeino-inspired 
gákti, the artist Sara Marielle Gaup,3 from the Sámi band Adjagas, said 
on NRK Sámi Radio that she was in total shock: ‘This is an insult to us 
[Adjagas] personally, but also an insult to the Sámi people.’4 Adjágas had 
been booked to play later that evening, but decided to withdraw from the 
Figure 8.2. The Guovdageaidnu/Kautokeino gákti. Photo: Valerie Stalder. With 
permission, Tromsø Museum – Universitetsmuseet.
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KIWI event with immediate effect. The Sámi lawyer Ande Somby said in 
the local newspaper Nordlys that ‘this was like pissing on a Sámi symbol’.5
Hans Kristian Amundsen, the editor of Nordlys newspaper, wrote an 
editorial entitled ‘Relax’:6
I think that Sámi lawyers should take it easy. Their fierce con-
demnation is more harmful to the Sámi reputation than the green 
jackets from China. The image of the Sámi as sensitive and lack-
ing in self-irony is unfortunately confirmed by the verdict of the 
morality police. We suggest relaxing. It is not harmful to any part 
of the Sámi community when people dress up in green jackets.
I hope that Sámi lawyers will learn from this incident. In 
2010 the Sámi have to tolerate tasteless elements without inter-
preting them as oppressive. The Sámi culture is strong enough 
to withstand the ridicule and teasing. Moreover, it was nice that 
650 KIWI employees came to the High North and learned about 
Sámi culture.7
The event sparked a lively open debate about the extent to which the 
Sámi community should be expected to accept and tolerate the (mis)use 
of Sámi national symbols.
The Sámi designer Anne Berit Anti regarded KIWI’s use of the colour-
ful Kautokeino costume as positive:8 ‘They may simply have wanted to 
build bridges.’ When interviewed by the Sámi newspaper Sagat, she 
suggested: ‘Why not take advantage of this media frenzy and get KIWI 
to run a big campaign on reindeer meat?’ She believed that this would 
be a fruitful cooperation, especially at a time when reindeer meat was in 
abundance. This could be done ‘quickly, safely and cheaply’ she chuckled, 
referring to KIWI’s slogan. She also added that she could understand the 
Sámi’s reactions, especially in the light of the Finnish tourist industry’s 
extensive (mis)use of Sámi culture, and in particular the gákti.
Another contribution to the debate expressed a somewhat different 
point of view:
We have inherited these somewhat painful things from Norwe-
gian Sámi interactions, and the KIWI jacket with its colourful 
splendour reflects these stories. I believe we will be able to pro-
gress further if we deal with this more honestly, rather than just 
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being politely self-ironic, to secure that the recognition of the 
Sámi will not be damaged.9
KIWI’s CEO used the media to apologise for hurting people’s feelings 
and explained that they had collaborated with the Sámi people via a local 
Sámi company prior to the event and that no objections to their plans 
had been raised. The event company explained that: ‘We simply wanted 
to be part of the culture, with lavvu, reindeer, a fireplace and the whole 
package. We had set up camp at Breivikeidet (outside Tromsø). Jeans and 
suits do not fit into such a camp.’10 The story was published in the south-
ern regional newspaper Drammens tidende under the headline ‘KIWI in 
Sámi trouble’. Prior to the production of the KIWI jacket the company 
had also checked the legal aspects of the matter and found no concerns. 
A very heated debate followed in Nordlys, on the website iTromsø and 
in the social media. This debate ranged from supportive and humorous 
contributions to scorn and anger.
This is a very interesting case because it contains all the necessary and 
fundamental prerequisites for indigenous people’s cultural expressions 
to travel from one place (the Sámi community) to another (an internal 
company event). One of the more interesting aspects of the debate, in 
addition to its intensity, is that it did not simply take place within the 
Sámi community. On the contrary, many new and unexpected constel-
lations and statements and inter- and intra-ethnic alliances were formed 
and clearly articulated. The object multiplies in such a process and gives 
us the chance to explore and rearticulate the similarities and differences 
of this specific event.
Positions in the debate
Three major positions were at play in this debate. We refer to these as 
the cultural flexibility argument, the rights argument and the equality 
argument. In different ways, all these arguments address the issue of how 
to bring the past into the present. The tensions arising from this debate 
can appear as postcolonial moments, a concept introduced by Verran 
(2002), where differences and similarities are seen as possibilities.
The cultural flexibility argument resonates with the overarching 
values that guide everyday Sámi practices (Kramvig 2005). The flex-
ibility argument, launched by for example Anne Berit Anti, claims 
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that the KIWI jacket could be laughed at and seen as a way of building 
bridges. She also points to the commercial potential of KIWI copying 
Sámi items. At the same time she understands that someone might 
experience this as a violation of Sámi culture. In the everyday life of 
ethnically mixed communities, which most Sápmi communities are, the 
concept of Sáminess is dynamic, flexible and situated. Social practices 
that sustain ambiguous identity categories are present. After a century 
of institutionalised assimilation, some people still insist on ambiguity 
as a way of resisting Norwegian society and the logic of nationalism. In 
the practice of everyday life, objects are mater ials that are employed in 
the creation of a local, collective self-perception that transcends ethnic 
boundaries. In the flexibility argument, memories and experiences of 
different pasts are recognised as being present and in need of articula-
tion. The complexity of memory and affects performed in emotionally 
conflicting situations is also recognised.
The rights argument refers to the work done to ensure indigenous 
people’s rights to their own cultural expressions, self-determination 
and land. In Norway, this work has meant a balancing act between the 
transnational channel of NGOs and institutionalised ways of conducting 
politics. Bargaining for their rights as indigenous people within the state 
system, or ‘bounded entities’, the Sámi rights movement has been able to 
bring about institutional changes in Norway (Minde 2008). After colo-
nisation, in both politics and everyday life indigenous people have lived 
the complex relationship between citizenship claims and partici pation 
in transnational social movements. Indigenous people strive towards 
visibility and acceptance. Since the 1960s many liberal nation-states have 
made space for their ‘rights movements’ and other forms of ‘identity 
politics’. Nevertheless, according to Brown (1993: 398) these claims have 
become a ‘vehicle of subordination through individualisation, normal-
isation and regulation’.
In our case, we consider the rights argument to have been put by, for 
example, Sara Marielle Gaup (Adjagas) and the lawyer Ánde Somby. 
They viewed the KIWI jacket as a violation of Sámi tradition and identity 
and as a disrespectful mockery of the political work done to recognise 
Sámi autonomy.
In his PhD thesis, Mattias Åhren explores who has ownership of 
the traditional Sámi costume and beauty pageants. Through his work, 
the rights positions are now in the process of being stabilised in legal 
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terminology (Åhren 2010). These questions have not been considered 
as pressing in Norway in the same way as they have for example in 
Finland (Junka-Aikio 2014). The Norwegian Sámi Parliament has not 
(yet) adopted Åhren’s suggestions and taken up the global indigenous 
rights arguments in these cases. This hesitance can be viewed as a way 
of maintaining the flexibility and not being forced to fix Sámi cultural 
objects legally in terms of rights. It can also be viewed as a way of sus-
taining a local perspective and not simply adopting a global indigenous 
rights argument. It could be argued that in each specific case it is the 
local community’s right to judge how matter or objects can travel. The 
argument about local communities’ rights to decide on these issues is also 
launched by Åhren (2010). The Sámi gákti are different and the patterns 
reflect and are ‘owned’ by specific communities or by the local siida or 
families using the specific patterns.11
The equality argument has an immediate and particular force in any 
debate, because it appeals to an (implicit) understanding that the same 
rules apply for everyone. Here, the questions asked seem to be why or 
how are you (people) different and why should you be treated differently? 
Marianne Gullestad (2002) argues that Norwegian discourses are per-
formed through a specific combination of a bureaucratic welfare state 
and an open globalised capitalist economy, with a particular relationship 
between egalitarianism, nationalism and racism. Gullestad (2001) fur-
ther argues that equality conceived as sameness (‘imagined sameness’) 
underpins the equality discourse in Norway. This makes statements of 
equality and difference challenging for the Sámi, as well as for other 
minorities. The imagined sameness becomes a prerequisite for equality.
When Amundsen stated that Sámi culture is strong enough to withstand 
ridicule and teasing, we read this as an equality argument. His appeal is 
for the Sámi to tolerate ‘tasteless elements’, to ‘not be so sensitive’ and to 
‘have more self-irony’. It is an appeal to allow the (colonial) past to remain 
in the past without bringing it into the present, the here and now. In the 
debate, the space for laughter was very limited, and with the exception of 
the Sámi designer Anne Berit Anti, very little laughter was heard.
How can we analyse these tensions and controversies regarding 
the respectful use of and ownership of the Sámi gákti in particular, of 
indigenous (symbolic) objects in general, and their naming and use? 
These objects come with different stories. What kinds of stories are told 
in moments of tension and conflict about the use of traditional Sámi 
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objects? Our reflections on these questions are inspired by Verran’s 
own questions (2013), which are both ontological and political: How 
can we be respectful of difference, but not intimidated by it, in practical 
engagements between practitioners of disparate knowledge traditions? 
How can we imagine struggles of doing difference together in the here 
and now (Verran 2013: 141)?
Doing pasts differently
Like other indigenous people, the Sámi have often been described as wild, 
unruly and uncivilised, and their religious beliefs seen as an expression 
of a barbarism that has to be overcome (Kramvig and Flemmen 2010). 
The first expressions of ‘civilization’ in Sápmi often came with the intro-
duction of churches, followed by the establishment of trading posts. 
This was followed by military fortifications, educational institutions, 
trade routes etc. The fascination with indigenous people – like the noble 
savage – has been described as deeply rooted in the Western modernity 
project (Said 1984; Hastrup 2007). The authentic ‘we’, which we in the 
West lost access to as a result of modernity’s disintegrating effects, could 
be recovered as a nostalgic vision into the past that was derived from 
their contact with others.
The othering of the Sámi people can be regarded as a prerequisite 
for colonial projects to discipline the Sámi in terms of law, religion, 
education and language. This disciplining was part of an aspiration to 
‘help less fortunate others’. Sámi society has changed radically over the 
past 30 years, with new images emerging of Sáminess and the Sámi as 
one people (Stordahl 1994). The process of ethnic incorporation and the 
establishment of a Sámi political movement required images and symbols 
that worked both internally within the Sámi population and externally 
vis-à-vis the Norwegian government and public. These images were 
based on language and other cultural features, such as Sámi costumes, 
music, handicrafts and ecological sensibility, which articulated some-
thing different than the symbols of Norwegian culture (Schanche 1993). 
As reindeer herding was a very specific Sámi occupation, it lent itself to 
being used in the creation of a Sámi culture and history.
Schanche (1993) focuses on the paradoxes of this creation of an official 
Sámi past. The emphasis on the different Sámi values and symbols means 
that, at least to a certain extent, the Norwegian majority indirectly (by 
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negation) defines these values and symbols. Earlier research on Sámi 
issues focused on the process of ethnic revitalisation that began after a 
hunger strike outside the Norwegian Parliament in 1979 and the protests 
against the development of the Alta–Kautokeino river basin for hydro-
electric power and the subsequent flooding of important Sámi pastures 
in 1980–81. Inspired by Fredrik Barth’s study (1969) of ethnic groups and 
boundaries, the social construction of ethnicity and the establishment 
of boundaries between the Norwegian and the Sámi are seen by Thuen 
(1995) as important processes in the production of the Sámi nation.
The terms colonisation and decolonisation have only recently entered 
the public debate in Norway. The movement for Sámi rights was not 
really on the international agenda until the hunger strike outside the 
Norwegian Parliament and the civil disobedience at Stilla (the protests 
against the damming of the River Alta–Kautokeino). These events made 
the Norwegian state’s treatment of the Sámi nationally and internationally 
visible. The government’s assimilation policies gave way to increased Sámi 
consciousness, a gradual recognition of Sámi rights and support for the 
development of Sámi institutions, such as the Sámi Parliament (opened 
in 1989). In the 1980s and 1990s, the consequences of the colonial pro-
cesses were brought to light, and the young people who had become more 
aware of a suppressed history claimed Sámi ethnicity to be increasingly 
relevant. Nevertheless, the social and political hierarchies and epistemic 
regimes that regulate the relationship between indigenous and dominant 
societies are hard and slow to undo (Kuokkanen 2010). Moreover, as 
Fanon (1963) argues, the undoing of colonial relations risks provoking 
conflict. In the contemporary process of decolonisation, our particular 
interest is how pasts are constructed differently and how objects come 
with different affects and pasts.
When we refer to the Sámi people we need to remember that we are 
actually talking about differences. Both the Sámi and Norwegians have 
lived in the same or neighbouring communities in which intermarriage 
and different kinds of bridging practices have been relatively common. 
The Sámi communities do not only differ when it comes to language 
(there are nine different Sámi dialects), but also in terms of artistic expres-
sions and knowledge traditions. The traditional chanting (joik) differs 
from one community to the next; likewise traditional costume (gákti), 
Sámi practices and stories. In addition, it is important to remember that 
these practices have been multiplied by the processes of colonialism and 
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decolonialism. It is important to many that differences are respected 
and not erased in the eagerness to establish the category of the Sámi as 
a particular subject or citizens with specific rights. It is emphasised that 
people as well as communities should be able to ‘speak for themselves’ 
and not be reduced to one category with one voice and one past.
Some communities never gave in to the government’s assimilation 
policy. Others lost track of their Sámi past and are now trying to revital-
ise it. All these practices, and the different affects related to them, add to 
the complexity in Sápmi, where different indigenous communities and 
generations bring the past into the present in different ways. The sense 
of pain, shame, and guilt are more vivid for the older generations than 
the younger (Stordahl 1994). For some, memories are extremely intense, 
while for others they can be just a vague ‘something’ (see Chapter 1 in 
this volume). Younger Sámi organisations taking part in these debates 
often express respect for Sámi ownership, heritage and ways of life.
Questions about how to bring the past into the present are painful for 
many people. At times they have led to conflicts about how to connect the 
past, places and indigeneity. Families and places are reinterpreted, while 
‘forgotten’ Sámi pasts are retrieved and often the subject of turbulent 
debate. This makes Sámi cultural expressions fragile, because they contain 
highly contested, valuable, repressed and often painful experiences and 
stories. The challenge in today’s Sápmi is mainly related to the effort to 
reclaim and revitalise the traditional Sámi culture and knowledge. These 
efforts are undertaken at the highest political levels, for example through 
the construction of institutions and the development of autonomous 
administrative units, such as environmental and resource management, 
culture, education and health. In addition, the same efforts are made in 
people’s everyday lives, in the challenge of recapturing the Sámi traditional 
knowledge, and the challenges related to self-articulation in a turbulent 
and complex landscape (Kramvig and Flemmen 2010).
The KIWI jacket as boundary object
An object is something people act towards and with (Star 2010: 603). Its 
materiality derives from action, not from prefabricated stuff or ‘thing-
ness’.12 These actions are manifold, which means that (some) Sámi objects 
have multiple and conflicting stories to tell. Further, these objects differ 
in the sense that they do not travel easily from one place to another. For 
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example, the gákti belongs to a very specific place, a specific community 
of siidas and to the people inhabiting these specific areas. The traditional 
costume thus enacts a given area and is connected to given place. Patterns, 
ribbons, belts and silver accessories also point to specific places. Social 
positions, such as married–unmarried, woman–man and differences in 
economic resources, also become visible. But the gákti has some flexi-
bility. In areas that have recently reclaimed their Sámi heritage, such 
as Stjernøya (a Coastal Sámi area in Finnmark), reconstructions of the 
gákti have been made using old pictures, old fabrics and the stories told 
in the different communities. Furthermore, young people often make 
their own fashion statements by adding to, combining or introducing 
new objects to the gákti. All this is done with a sensibility of the tradition.
Given this flexibility, what went wrong in the case of the KIWI jacket? 
How should we understand the anger, frustration and conflicts that 
were provoked on this specific occasion? We argue that the emotions, 
or rather the affects of this object, need to be understood in relation to 
the object’s ability to travel from one place to another. On this occasion 
movement provoked alterity. It is important to understand what alters 
when objects, here represented by the gákti, travel in this way. We follow 
Navaro-Yashin’s argument (2012) that the transmission of affect between 
object and subject that produces disharmony, tension or uneasiness 
needs to be considered. This, she claims, is a specific quality of affect 
and follows it up by asking where this qualification comes from. The 
multiple qualities of the objects and the different stories they embody 
in relation to the viewer’s knowledge of their context evoke anger and 
tension among those who come into contact with them. ‘Objects and 
a material environment can generate affect, then, but only as they get 
entangled in forms of human mediation’ (ibid. 214).
Science and technology studies (STS) are helpful in an analysis of 
this topic in that they suggest that objects are effects of stable arrays or 
networks of relations (Law 2002: 91). Law (2002) argues that objects hold 
together as long as the relations hold together and do not change shape. 
Our argument is that in the case of the KIWI jacket the relations changed 
and the object was instead connected to networks that were not regarded 
as responsible and trustworthy for sustaining the shape of the gákti. The 
traditional Sámi costume was thus not flexible enough to withstand this 
new enactment, at least not for some. The way the object, in this case the 
KIWI jacket, was held together or stabilised was challenged.
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Some objects are referred to as boundary objects (Star and Griesemer 
1989). These objects are of particular interest to us because they enable 
different views and practices to coexist without consensus and enact 
interpretive flexibility. According to Star (2010), they mean a shared space, 
where the sense of here and there are confounded (ibid. 602–603). Star 
argues that the distribution of standards is at the core of many social 
justice issues concerning standardisation. We need to study the stand-
ardisation and both the ill-structured and well-structured aspects of a 
particular boundary object (ibid. 613–614).
The KIWI jacket holds on to the differences between an ill-structured 
object and a locally tailored one. As we see it, standardisation is what is 
at stake in the present public debate. With regard to international law, 
Åhrén (2010) addresses the appropriation of ‘non-members’ and the use 
of parts of indigenous people’s culture. As previously indicated, Åhrén 
aims to establish the extent to which international law gives indigen-
ous people the right to own and/or determine their distinct collective 
creativity and does this by analysing human rights law (in particular 
the right to self-determination) and property rights. Åhrén concludes 
that indigenous people are the beneficiaries of ‘collective rights proper’, 
including the right to self-determination. This means the right to con-
tinuously pursue their cultural practices and to maintain and develop 
their distinct cultural identity (ibid. 215). It also means not making use 
of indigenous people’s cultural elements in ways that seriously harm 
their collective cultural identity.
Standardisation is a clearing of the field and the elimination of con-
tradictions. All standardised systems throw off or generate residual 
categories, i.e. the ‘not categorised elsewhere’. These categories then 
form new boundary objects and a cycle is born (Star 2010: 614). Ongo-
ing unsolved standardisation issues balance the need for flexibility and 
the need for order and stability (which are necessary in order to define 
rights): ‘the battles and dramas between the formal and informal, the 
ill-structured and the well-structured, the standardized and the wild, 
are being continuously fought’ (ibid.).
Even though standardisation produces new boundary objects and 
does not offer a final solution, a certain degree of standardisation is 
needed in order to protect people from the experience of violation and 
harm to cultural identities and property rights. Åhrén (2010) argues 
along these lines when he discusses that not all non-members’ uses of 
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indigenous people’s dress should be regarded as ‘prohibited’. In order to 
be considered damaging, the use must be seriously culturally offensive 
or risk integrating members of the indigenous people into the majority 
population. According to international law, a respectful use of objects 
that acknowledges the Sámi as a distinct people is allowed (ibid. 278).
A heated debate can be productive for recognising affects and for 
raising awareness of difference and awareness of an object with all its 
ambiguity and contingency. One of the actors expressed this turbulence 
in the following story:
If you wear a gákti outside the core Sámi area people throw the 
Ánti-joik at you.13 I do not know how many times this has hap-
pened. But then I also think it is not done in bad faith, for nowa-
days the non-Sámi also talk about the Sámi in a positive way. 
But even though people mean no harm with jokes and imitate 
the Sámi joik, it has become easier for non-Sámi to denigrate the 
Sámi. Thinking and saying things like ‘they are only colourful 
clowns that speak in a funny way’ are now standard.14
There is a wide array of unspoken affective attitudes at the basis of dis-
criminatory names (see Chapter 1 in this volume). These affective atti-
tudes are not easily changed but – as argued by Sarah Ahmed (2004) 
– naming emotions can involve different orientation towards the objects 
they construct. Discriminatory naming practices can be done in good 
faith, as indicated in the quote above, or in bad faith. We therefore need 
to focus our attention on the ever shifting but temporarily stabilized 
entanglements of place, embodied practices and discursive constructions 
(Di Masso and Dixon 2015).
Objects of affect
Navaro-Yashin (2012: 203) challenges the way affect generally has been 
theorised through metaphors that invoke abstraction, imaginaries of 
immateriality and conceptualisations of invisibility – in both the psycho-
analytic and the sociological traditions. She claims that affect is both 
contained and emitted through the solidity, presence, visibility and 
tangibility of objects. Inspired by her position, we have viewed affect 
through the qualities, texture and potentialities of the object itself. In this 
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essay, we have illustrated how the affect for a specific object, the KIWI 
jacket, only becomes felt and known to us as human beings when we 
engage with it via mediation and qualification. We have illustrated how 
affect is in this case qualified, and how affects emitted by materialities 
can mean anything in a specific context.
We have analysed the KIWI jacket as both an unconventional clas-
sification practice and as a boundary object. What is the significance of 
the KIWI jacket? In this specific situation, what affects does the object 
transmit? We argue that the remnants and residues that link it to the 
Kautokeino gákti also have tangible affects. More specifically, it is the 
sense or knowledge of the context in which such objects are normally 
used that mediates the affects that people experience, qualifies the trans-
mission of affect, puts it into words and meaning. For people who are 
distanced from the colonial history of the Sámi people, the tangibility of 
the KIWI jacket may not produce the same affective tension. Together 
with Navaro-Yashin, we would thus argue that tangibility transmits affect, 
but that these affects are mediated and qualified by the knowledge that 
people have about the object’s context. Affect is tangible (and not just 
immaterial), but it is also mediated and qualified by the specific people 
who experience it.
The story of the KIWI jacket represents an affective transmission 
between objects and human subjects that produces laughter, uneasiness, 
tension and anger. In order to decide where this qualification comes from, 
we need to look at the KIWI jacket and its qualities: the green colour, 
the pattern, the ribbons, the Chinese producer etc. It is these qualities 
of the object, in relation to the observer’s knowledge about its context, 
that evoke the laughter, the unease, the tension and the anger. Objects 
and the material environment can generate affect, but only when they 
become entangled in forms of human mediation (Navaro-Yashin 2012: 
214). This affect may cause disharmony and disturbance.
Closing remarks
The KIWI jacket highlights the differences within the Sámi commu nities 
in the Norwegian (but still mostly regional) public debate. Different 
standpoints have been taken on how the multiple (colonial) past should 
be articulated, how Sámi objects move and what alters when they do. 
We have argued that in order to understand the affects, the tensions in 
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the debate, the KIWI jacket should be considered a boundary object. In 
line with Wetherell (2015: 86) we consider that ‘body/brain landscapes, 
meaning making, feeling, communication, and social action entangle 
and become figured together in emotion episodes. The affective and the 
discursive intertwine’. We have furthermore argued that three major 
positions have been at play in this debate: cultural flexibility, rights 
and equality. In their different ways these three arguments address the 
issue of how to bring the past into the present. The tensions arising from 
this debate can appear as postcolonial moments, where differences and 
similarities are present as possibilities (Verran 2002). What is for some 
an eager promise becomes for others a situation without hope. This also 
signals the different positions that (indigenous) people can take, and their 
possibilities for articulation. As DeMasso et al. (2015: 87) argue, there are 
‘some huge advantages, however, to not attempting to disentangle just 
the affect in the moment, and advantages, too, to ranging more widely 
in our analyses beyond participants’ orientations and accounts to reflect 
on the histories of affective discursive meaning making and their bio-
graphical and ideological place and force.’
The question here is how to bring the past into the present. People 
live in different affective and narrative communities, where some see 
the past while others see the present, and where some see a post-colonial 
situation while others see a colonial one. The conflicts that take place 
concerning the standardisation of Sámi objects such as the gákti can 
be harmful, tiring and humiliating, however, the creation of a public 
space for discussing how complex cultural objects can be respectfully 
dealt with would be helpful.
The affects of the KIWI jacket show that not everyone attaches them-
selves to the objects in the same way and for the same reasons. The 
affective community involves positive, hopeful attachments for some 
and alienating and unequally shared burdens for others. These affective 
states show that the histories of race and racism cannot be wished away 
by commonly asserted attachments to abstract ideals of shared belonging 
(Ahmed 2010). These affective states demonstrate that differences are not 
eliminated by abstract ideas of shared belonging and the contemporary 
dream of unconditional movements in time and space. At the same 
time, examining these affective states provides a greater understanding 





1 KIWI is one of Norway’s largest grocery retail chains, with around 600 stores nationwide.
2 There are different Sámi dialects and spellings, and we have followed the advice of the Swed-
ish Riksantikavieämbetet, as this is a Swedish-based publication, even though we consider 
Norwegian material.
3 Gaup lives in the Sámi municipality of Guovdageaidnu/Kautokeino and is also a duodji 
(Sámi handicraft) student at the Sámi University College in Guovdageaidnu/Kautokeino.
4 ‘KIWI i sametrøbbel’, Drammens tidende 12 Sept. 2010. Available from: http://www.dt.no/
nyheter/KIWI-i-same-trobbel-1.5621079 [accessed 8 Aug. 2014].
5 ‘Raser mot KIWI’s koftestunt’, Nordlys 11 Sept. 2010. Available from: http://www.nordlys.
no/nyheter/article5306233.ece [accessed 12 Sept. 2012].
6 The authors have translated this and other contributions to the debate into English.
7 ‘Slapp av’ comment by the editor in Nordlys first published 14 Sept. 2010 www.sett-fra-
nord.origo.no 14 Sept. 2010 Available from: http://www.sett-fra-nord.origo.no/-/bulletin/
show/595154_slapp-av?ref=checkpoint [accessed 15 Feb. 2015].
8 ‘KIWI kofte gir reinkjøtt muligheter’ The newpaper Sagat 15 Sept. 2010 Available from: 
http://www.sagat.no/hovednyheter/2010/09/15/28034/ [accessed 4 Nov. 2014].
9 Ludvig R. Comments www.sett-fra-nord.origo.no published 13 Sept. 2010. Available from: 
http://www.sett-fra-nord.origo.no/-/bulletin/show/595154_slapp-av?ref=checkpoint [accessed 
4 Oct. 2014].
10 ‘Raseri mot KIWIs tulle-kofte’, the newspaper VG, 13 Sept. 2010, p. 8.
11 The northern Sámi expression siida has multiple meanings, including community and 
home. Siida is a particular and flexible form of organisation for reindeer herders and has a 
central place in today’s husbandry legislation. The Reindeer Act uses the term siida when 
referring to a group of herders who jointly practise reindeer herding in specific areas.
12 As Frykman and Povrzanović Frykman remind us (Chapter 1 in this volume), objects do 
not have an independent affective charge. We are concerned with the practices of people 
using objects.
13 Ánti and the Ánti­joik (or Sámi song) was first seen on Norwegian TV in 1975. The series 
focused on a boy called Ánti and the difficulties he had fitting into the Norwegian school 
in Kautokeino. The series was a major success, was sold to 26 different countries and is part 
of the Norwegian collective memory.
14 From a radio documentary made by NRK, available from: http://p3.no/dokumentar/sapmifil/ 
[accessed 12 May 2016]. Translation from Norwegian by the authors.
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In this book a phenomenological approach is often used to explore how 
objects are sensitised: the analyses explore what is happening interobjec-
tively. Humanitarian aid, political portraits, and bequeathed objects are 
examples of such sensitising in the previous chapters. Chapter 9 adds an 
analysis of place and dwells on affective atmospheres. The point of depar-
ture is a Norwegian black metal musician. While being part of a subgenre 
of heavy metal music associated with being macho, aggressive, grotesque, 
and even satanic, this musician has a striking tendency to constantly involve 
nature – meadows, trees, streams, and a watermill from his homestead – in 
his music and performances. Building on a sophisticated interpretation of 
Heidegger’s understanding of how place works, the author demonstrates 




Place and Tools in the Music Industry 
with a Focus on Entrepreneurship
Elisabet Sørfjorddal Hauge
How the moods and emotions of composers and performers of music 
influence their artistic entrepreneurial work is a rewarding field of 
study. Usually, prominent musicians are portrayed in terms of their 
personal biographies, career, friends, intimate life and political views, 
as though important answers can be found there. But to what extent 
is their creativity the outcome of milieu and context? Music, like other 
art, cannot be reduced to the representational. In The Origin of the 
Work of Art (2001), Heidegger claims that the power of art lies in its 
capacity to ‘open up a world’ and unveil a truth that lies beyond and 
is more complex than the symbolic, the linguistic or any other kind of 
representation. What art makes ‘appear’ is a ‘totality of equipment’. Here 
he is referring to our practical dealings with the world – as opposed to 
a theoretical, cognitive knowledge where objects are supposed to mean 
something and be understood. In his vocabulary, such appearance is 
akin to the ‘worlding’ of things or events (see Frykman, Chapter 7 in 
this volume).
The power of art is revealed when this opening up or ‘disclosure’ is 
recognised, performed or presented. Perhaps Heidegger’s most famous 
analysis is that of Van Gogh’s portrayal of a pair of shoes. Shoes gener-
ally appear all in everyday situations and can be scattered around in the 
entrance hall or aesthetically exposed in a shop window or advertise-
ment. As the American philosopher Richard Polt (1999: 137) indicates, 
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what Heidegger writes about is how the artist manages to make them 
‘expose the world of a peasant woman, a world oriented by work, need, 
childbirth and death’, which means that in the viewer’s imagination the 
shoes are ‘worlding’. Correspondingly, when music is performed it gives 
new dimensions to situations or raises questions about environments 
or encounters the composer has been party to – trees, wind, climate, 
meadows and people – or the moods they evoke. For Heidegger, this 
feeling often means ‘gathering’ the space into a place. ‘Place’ is given 
a particular meaning in his vocabulary and is never conflated with 
spatiality or a certain position in space, because it refers to existence 
and perception rather than area. It is a locale made up of humans and 
non-humans, norms, values, rules, potentialities, possibilities etc. His 
own formulations are never easy to decrypt and have given rise to dif-
ferent interpretations: ‘Place is always the definite “over there” and the 
“there” of a useful thing belonging there’ Jeff Malpas (2007) points to 
how ‘place’ can be seen as the beginning of something rather than the 
end. He uses the same German word as Heidegger – Ort – to clarify 
this: ‘the term originally indicated the point of the or edge of a weapon 
– the point of a spear for instance – at which all of the energy of the 
weapon is brought to bear’ (ibid. 29). In short, ‘place’ becomes the site 
or platform where people act and live their lives and where objects serve 
as useful tools.
In this chapter a musical entrepreneur and his relation to place and 
tools are explored since entrepreneurial opportunities are often born out 
of place. Entrepreneurial opportunities such as musical expressions are 
seldom (or never) the result of a one-man act, but are usually socially 
derived (Ridderstråle and Nordström 2004). The affective dimension 
is brought into the analysis by adding another of Heidegger’s terms 
– ‘attunement’. Attunement is all about mood; the mental and phys-
ical states through which the world is seen– predominately despair, 
boredom and the feeling of estrangement (Heidegger 1996: 135; see 
Gilje, Chapter 2 in this volume). Being attuned to a place means being 
affectively alert to it and to act according to how place ‘opens up’ new 
possibilities. This is why Heidegger claims that moods are ‘disclosive’ 
– they reveal the potential of a place and thus uncover what there is. 
Moods disclose things such as the vibes of a room, the fear produced 
by an encounter, the fists clenched in the pocket, or the attentiveness 
on seeing a beloved face. Being an entrepreneurial artist implies being 
in the mood
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sensitive to places, people and things and being able to arrange this 
into words, images or music.
This chapter takes the experiences of a Norwegian black metal musi-
cian as its point of departure in order to analyse how place affects ini-
tiatives in this particular field of entrepreneurship. The text is based on 
comprehensive fieldwork resulting in a PhD dissertation (Hauge 2012).1 
Theoretically, inspiration is drawn from phenomenology and especially 
the role that affects play in relation to place and enterprise in the field 
of music.
Black Metal at the Mill Studio
Knut Magne Valle is an established name on the Norwegian black metal 
scene. Black metal is a subgenre of heavy metal music and is associ-
ated with being white, male, macho, aggressive, grotesque, satanic and 
misogynistic (Bossius 2003). Since 2000 an important stage and studio 
for this extreme subgenre of heavy metal is to be found in a poetic, rural 
place, namely an old watermill close to Valle’s parental home, beautifully 
situated on a cliff beside a waterfall and surrounded by deep woods. In 
different ways the mill’s interior embodies the mysticism of the Norwe-
gian metal world, with its loudspeakers and high-tech recording equip-
ment and old-fashioned handicrafts with plenty of references to Norse 
legends and the medieval world of magic. From here he has produced 
over 100 records and it is from here that Norwegian-inspired black metal 
has spread throughout Europe, Asia and North America.
Valle’s career took off in 1996 when he was invited to join the 
up-and-coming, but not yet fully established, band Arcturus. The band 
was actually founded by other key people in the metal scene in 1987 
Mortem. When the band released its second album, La Masquerade 
Infernale, in 1997, Valle was the lead guitarist and sound producer. The 
album represented a stylistic break with the black metal genre in that 
it introduced a clear voice and straightforward verse–refrain songs and 
led to the band’s breakthrough. Most of the changes were a direct result 
of Valle taking over as the band’s songwriter and producer. As he told 
me in an interview in my research:
For me, Arcturus’ breakthrough was also the time when my 
activities as a producer also started to take off … I was the band’s 
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producer and when I got very good reviews and feedback, new 
production possibilities opened up. Suddenly I found myself in 
a position where I could produce for other bands. I was at the 
beginning of my career as a producer. I started out producing 
hard-core extreme metal music and have ended up with a broad 
CV of albums covering most genres of rock music.
Self-realisation
Norway’s musical scene in general seems to be neglected when income 
from industry is counted nationally. Oil, the processing industry, fishing 
and tourism are traditionally associated with the country. As entrepre-
neurs, metal musicians display characteristics that are different from 
other groups, be they technologists, computer scientists, communica-
tors, or service providers such as plumbers, hotel and restaurant workers 
(Hauge 2012). One of the traits that makes them different is that profit is 
rarely a motivating factor. Rather, inspiration comes from the musicians’ 
purposeful desire to realise themselves (ibid.). Authenticity through 
music is the basic prerequisite for this self-realisation and is inextricably 
related to its originator. 
Although the project sounds like a reflective and self-absorbed cul-
tural construction, it is at the same time deeply rooted in place and 
environment. ‘Atmosphere’ is a key concept and, for Valle, the milieu is 
both carefully chosen and gives rise to new artistic opportunities. Pro-
cesses of this kind are of course reciprocal, in that the musician affects 
the context and at the same time searches for unique expression. For 
musical entrepreneurs such as Valle, this amounts to a lifestyle that is 
paradoxically place-bound and deeply individualistic, in that it expresses 
a state that can never be finalised.
The idea of atmosphere and the possibilities of ‘tuning in’ to a place 
are recurrent themes in Valle’s entrepreneurship. It is generally known 
that nascent entrepreneurs do not search for the optimal place in which 
to establish and develop their enterprise (Stam and Bosma 2014), but, 
like Valle, establish their firms in the area to which they belong; the place 
where they were born or where they are among family and friends. This 
is yet another of the many paradoxes connected to black metal, namely 
that authenticity and self-realisation in a music genre that is to all intents 
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and purposes hostile to mainstream culture rely on a strong attachment 
to the familiar and sedentary.
Nevertheless, it would seem that in such places a passion for engag-
ing in entrepreneurial acts is born and fostered. For many musical 
entrepreneurs, new projects and business ideas have been connected to 
place through economic transactions in worldwide markets. The way it 
is described in phenomenology: the home is a potential site filled with 
tacit knowledge that is of crucial importance for the entrepreneur. It 
seems to evolve, take shape and become creatively and economically 
viable through the interaction with the founder. This way of perform-
ing entrepreneurship is a developing process, where the entrepreneur 
merges affective self-realisation through the place and at the same time 
changes it. Or, to formulate it in more general terms, the actors choose 
how to act from a horizon of future possibilities where projecting onto 
an imaginable future is based on what is meaningful to the musicians 
and their past experiences (Weick 2004, 2006).
In the mood, identifying opportunities
The literature on opportunity recognition is vast, although it mostly 
focuses on the perception, cognitive capacity and behaviour of the entre-
preneur – plus the infrastructure that facilitates entrepreneurial work 
(cf. Gaglio and Katz 2001). By looking at the influence of such factors, 
one usually finds the answer to how ideas could be developed into more 
commercially oriented concepts. The art of leading a future-oriented way 
of life is all about the disposition of becoming. To a certain extent this 
is also true for Knut Magne Valle who, based on his past experiences 
and future possibilities, is able to recognise which new realities can be 
actualised. In this process he moves from ‘what is’ to highlight ‘what is 
possible’ (Ardichvili et al. 2003). However, recognising new entrepre-
neurial opportunities does not just involve plans and consciousness, but 
also includes the affective impulses from objects and places that make 
up a lifeworld.
Every musician has to be in the mood for writing and composing, 
but also for recognising and acting on entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Producing new songs, albums, giving concerts and so on means tuning 
into the environment. Being able to provoke specific musical moods 
also gives the musician access to the worldwide music market. The suc-
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cess of cultural entrepreneurship is therefore on the one hand a process 
that is dependent on the musician’s creative power, energy and desire to 
express new sounds and on the other hand a question of how the audi-
ence becomes attuned to the musician’s world of art.
The success of any opportunity recognition depends on the actors’ 
persuasion and communication skills in order to procure the necessary 
resources and stimulate buyers’ interest (Gaglio and Katz 2001). Holt 
(2008) claims that opportunities are socially embedded constructs that 
need to be recognised by others. For a musician like Valle, it is not simply 
a matter of identifying a market niche, possessing a patent, or designing 
a new business model, but being able to engage with and persuade others 
to become attuned to the elements that constitute this particular life 
project. Becoming attuned means that the audience discerns what the 
musician’s artworks disclose – something that resonates with them.
Musicians make entrepreneurial history by attempts to trigger people 
to respond to and obtain the practice or product that they create and pres-
ent into music markets; they make it when they invite listeners into their 
world and involve them in their art. The dialogue between musician and 
audience engenders meaning and new understanding. This differs from 
the entrepreneurial processes of engineers or those in the tourist sector, 
who offer a time-limited commodity or service. Such history-making or 
meaning-production is seldom the result of one person’s intentionality. 
Instead, it comes out of the subject’s actual engagement with the world 
in all its complexity.
When making music Valle interacts physically with his place of birth 
and belonging. The Mill Studio located by a waterfall, the surrounding 
forest and the carefully scythed fields are all objects that put him ‘in the 
mood’, make him feel that there is ‘something in the air’ and inspire his 
compositions and performances. The atmosphere that the Mill Studio 
contributes to also affects other musicians, producers, record manag-
ers, volunteers and audiences who gather in Valle’s home village and 
that contributes to an effective attunement to the world of metal music. 
However, concentrating his inspiration in only this one location would 
be a mistake. The exchange of musical and entrepreneurial experiences 
between Valle and his partners is also a movement that connects differ-




A man of many places
Born in 1974, Knut Magne Valle is the youngest of a family of five, which 
includes his mother, father, brother and sister, all of whom live in the 
small municipality of Gjerstad. Everyone in the family is interested in 
music, and from an early age Knut Magne was fascinated by the possi-
bilities of changing sounds. He tested how different configurations of 
wires and loudspeakers produced new sounds and soon became familiar 
with the creative potential of guitars, amplifiers and mixing boards. In 
an interview he describes himself as a turbulent pupil, where episodes of 
mischief often resulted in letters to his parents. He was not a slow learner, 
but simply disliked most of the theoretical subjects. Valle also admits 
having been in need of a mentor who could show him the right path; a 
person who was open to the ideas and possibilities of pupils interested 
in subjects other than mathematics, grammar and languages. Therefore, 
for him school was a place that he was forced to attend, but where his 
potential was not tapped. Full of energy, breaks were more attractive to 
him than the lessons. As Valle notes: ‘During the 1980s the formula for 
primary and lower secondary education was very theoretically oriented’.
In his free time Valle took part in the development of the local extreme 
metal scene. His parents allowed him and his friends to practise in an 
old sawmill attached to the farm. He and his friends reorganised and 
remodelled the sawmill and turned it into a rock club. The place became 
a meeting area for practising, concerts and where young people could 
hang out. His concerts attracted a network of metal lovers from all over 
southern Norway and the club became a central place for the growing 
Norwegian underground of extreme metal music. In interviews Valle 
nostalgically remembers how the activities at the club were not always 
legal. Like other teenagers it was important to dig music, have a good time 
with friends, down a few beers and ‘live life at its best’ (see Spinosa et al. 
1997). Registering their small business activities with the local council and 
paying taxes on entrance fees were not on their agenda. Nevertheless, the 
youngsters learned to take care of the mill, arrange and host concerts, 
carry and repair equipment and engage in other practical tasks. ‘The 
rock club was the start of something’, as Valle explains:
At the beginning the sawmill was in many ways just an empty 
shell. We arranged concerts with our band Saga Rockers to earn 
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money to insulate the house. Afterwards we built a stage and the 
club became a very nice place to hang out in and visit. When we 
arranged concerts a lot of other bands, and also local metal lovers 
and those from the eastern part of Norway kept coming back. And 
when other bands performed I was the sound technician, because 
I had learned and experienced a lot about rigging sound. This 
was actually the beginning of my career as a sound technician.
Valle moved to Oslo after completing a year-long sound technology course 
at a college in northern Norway. Here he became a hard core member 
of the capital’s extreme metal underground. In addition to playing in a 
few bands, he also established himself as a music producer. Although the 
equipment he had invested in was good for producing demos, it was not 
professional enough for albums. Life in Oslo was quite expensive, but 
he found suitable premises in a dilapidated building in the city centre 
where he could both live and make music. Three rooms were rented out 
to three heavy metal colleagues. For the four this location turned out 
to be important for their musical careers. In addition to having their 
own bedrooms and sharing a bathroom, kitchen and living room, they 
also had access to a large space for playing music that included studio 
facilities. The accommodation was located in an old block of flats where 
about 50 to 100 other metal fans and musicians also hung out. In their 
individual ways they were all part of the black metal scene that turned 
out to be a hothouse for future entrepreneurial projects. The milieu also 
became a kind of melting pot for musicians entering and exiting band 
projects. According to Valle, this block of flats became the playground 
for what was to become the famous Norwegian black metal genre, where 
sounds were experimented with, techniques were polished, competence 
was acquired and band members were tested and exchanged.
Unfortunately, in 1994 the young musicians were given notice to 
leave the premises due to the impending demolition of the block of flats. 
This meant that they had to find alternative premises, and dispersed. 
Although the past is a closed chapter and cannot be changed, Valle says 
that on several occasions he could not help wondering what might have 
happened if people had stayed put. If they had, the entrepreneurial story 
would have been quite different. He explains that,
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the milieu became a breeding ground for all the best bands in 
Norway. Enslaved, Gorgoroth, Empirior, Mayhem and Arcturus – 
they all played here. Even Satyricon was allowed to practise here. 
It was an environment that had a head start, and some of the pro-
cesses of synergy and dynamics resembled those of Silicon Valley.
For Valle this turned out to be a decisive place where, together with other 
people, he was practically and emotionally absorbed; ‘gathered together 
with other persons and things’ he opened up to the world and invited 
the world to him (Malpas 2006: 221). Impressions from here were carried 
into another flat in the city centre, where he established an amateur stu-
dio, updated its profile and called it Jester Studio. One of his colleagues 
from Arcturus established Jester Records in the same premises. This 
co-localisation enabled them to make use of each other’s competence 
and share the rent. It was here that Arcturus’ breakthrough album La 
Masquerade Infernale (2012) was recorded and produced.
It became clear that the sound studio generated money, while the 
record company was in the red. This led the two friends to end their 
business partnership. Valle began to call his studio Møllar’n Studio (The 
Mill Sound Studio) and moved to a set of studios in Oslo where he joined 
forces with Turbonegro (one of Norway’s most popular and successful 
death punk bands) and Kåre and the Cavemen (a Norwegian rock band). 
This new partnership constellation continued until the owners decided 
to sell the studio premises and equipment in 2002.
Getting attuned
Over the years Valle has played at numerous concerts and done many 
tours. He eventually concluded that returning home to Gjerstad was a 
possible but also necessary step in his artistic development. The Mill 
Project moved physically from the old sawmill to the beautifully located 
watermill described at the beginning of the chapter. After 12–14 years 
of development, the studio is now famous throughout the heavy metal 
world. Attracting metal musicians from far and wide, the Mill also pro-
vides accommodation for long-distance travelers. Today, the Mill Sound 
Studio, in its rural setting, is not only imbued with the spirit of mystical 
metal identity, but also with a sense of opportunities materialised.
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The studio is filled with the right tools; the equipment that Valle needs 
to engage in music production. This equipment is constantly used in new 
ways and the existing tools have to be replaced and upgraded as the world 
of sound creation moves on and evolves. In parallel while Valle develops 
his music productions, his toolkit also expands to create new music of 
constantly improved quality. In this sense music and sound production 
are neverending, but rather work as openings for new sounds, albums, 
festivals, new technological equipment and so on.
Without the early links to the metal scene Valle would probably never 
have incorporated the specific tools needed to produce the distinct sound. 
For example, when he reflects on his years in Oslo he says that: ‘I think 
the Mill project would have been stillborn without my time in Oslo. Of 
course I might have produced some small local bands’.
The merging of place and equipment can be studied in the arrange-
ment of the Water Mill Festival, which has been arranged in August 
each year since 2003 and is determinedly anti-commercial: ‘We will not 
advertise, since the radical motive of the festival is not to earn money, 
but to spread metal music to people. Any profits made from the events 
are used to fund future festivals’. Here, lesser-known bands are given a 
chance to perform live. Valle’s strategy has been to recruit for the music 
trade whilst simultaneously giving the audience a varied musical expe-
rience in picturesque surroundings. The festival is totally dependent 
on volunteers, such as festival crew and musicians, who are given free 
tickets. The musicians who perform have an inspiring backstage area 
in the shape of Valle’s sound studio universe. Due to the sound studio 
the festival attracts metal-loving musicians, bands, their fans, people 
from sound studios, record companies and the music press. According 
to Valle the festival serves as a meeting place and synthesis for metal 
music lovers, where ideas are born and evolve. The Water Mill Festival 
also acts as a hotbed for new business deals, although no deals are for-
mally made there.
As there are no barriers around the stage the concert area is quite 
intimate. In an attempt to integrate nature, the grass around the mill 
is scythed. As environment-friendly mushroom soup, moose burgers, 
moose casserole and organically grown vegetables from the family farm 
are all on the menu. Come nightfall torches are lit and illuminate the 
festival area and stage. When the last concert of the day is over, the party 
moves to the festival camp at Valle’s farm. The camp has two zones: one 
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for people who want to party and a quiet family camp with swings and 
slides for children. How Valle is constantly striving to improve the qual-
ity of his festival is a good illustration of recognising and actualising a 
well-known and at the same time diffuse atmosphere of ‘something in 
the air’. This ambiguous something is composed of the physical place 
with musicians, producers, record managers, volunteers and audiences 
all contributing to an affective attunement to the world of metal music.
Creating the perfect sound is a crucial part of Valle’s life work and 
a treasure that he wants to pass on to metal lovers and festival partici-
pants. A problem in the early history of the Water Mill Festival was that 
the soundconditions were not optimal on the outdoor stage. In order to 
address this, Valle contacted a former student, Rune Skramstad, who 
just had completed his Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering 
and product design. Could a loudspeaker be built, based on a horn 
principle, to produce the required sound? Rune found the challenge 
exciting and spent three days simulating the bass horn. He and Valle 
then built a seven-metre subwoofer under the stage at the Mill, which 
worked perfectly.
The story of Valle’s lifeworld proves that the world of sound is not 
only something that is heard. People, sound, place and objects become 
entangled into a significant whole – a context that comes alive during 
the Mill Festival. As the manager of this happening, Valle tries to make 
visitors part of the environment that has come alive for him. His affinity 
with the Mill is never confined to one particular location, but to the 
music that takes shape through the place. When circulating between the 
different platforms, for example the studio in Oslo, on tour and at con-
certs, it would seem his lived experience matures and turns into embodied 
knowledge. Here it is clear how he as an entrepreneur stands apart from 
other inventors. He makes the visitors/customers members of the place 
by inviting them to share the mood of the Mill with its studio and music, 
and the family farm with its game, plants and ambience. The outcome is 
more of a shared subculture than a producer–client relationship.
Conclusion
Heidegger is very explicit about ‘how moods give emotional depth to 
our experience’, which resembles how Spinoza saw affects as lessening 
or heightening our potential. They both agree that thinking and know-
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ledge production cannot be separated from the emotions of our body 
(see Gilje, Chapter 2 in this volume). For Valle, place in the shape of the 
Mill is first and foremost something that is embodied and felt. For him 
it sums up what he has learned throughout his career. As a musician 
and an entrepreneur he has explored the different potentials of things.
Heidegger (1996) writes that tools help us to see – feel – the world. The 
tools used by the musician Valle, together with places in which he oper-
ates, have shaped his identity. They are tangible and filled with content 
and include guitars, basses, drums, loudspeakers and amplifiers. For the 
professional musician in his entrepreneurial career, tools like these are 
necessary but not sufficient. Professionalisation requires their adoption 
and internalisation to the extent that they almost become invisible and 
are extensions of the body. The extreme black metal sound is created by 
musicians playing their instruments with an abandon that confers their 
hard-won self-realisation and authenticity. However, this is a process and 
not a state. In order to be successful in a changing world an engaged actor 
needs to be constantly on the move. As tools are acquired and skills grow, 
sounds become more sophisticated, more knowable and more distinct. 
Valle’s motivation is to play the guitar faster, heavier, darker, slower, 
backwards or in response to whatever challenge or innovation arises. 
Place and tools are pathways to the world in which he lives and acts. In 
his case the process of becoming an accomplished musician and entre-
preneur starts at home. In his early career Valle had access to a limited 
set of tools. As new tools have been included in the working processes, 
old tools have been replaced, thus allowing for renewed learning. In the 
process of using and learning how to handle the equipment, the band 
expanded its repertoire and in practice discovered and created a wider 
world of music.
This step-by-step disclosure of a wider musical world is a decisive 
effect of becoming an entrepreneur and a skilful musician. Training 
brings change, as well as a change of direction. As Valle explains it; 
‘Even if your goal is not necessarily your goal all the time, you have to 
work in that direction. Still, you have no guarantee that you will suc-
ceed’. Becoming entrepreneurial was not an apparent intention when 
Valle went into business. The intention was rather a passion for music. 
Footprints, presented as events, are left behind in the entrepreneurial 
process; new interpretations, understandings and visions are made and 
pave the way for new beginnings.
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In this chapter Valle’s story has been presented in a narrative form. 
But the real story lies in the skill of the body and sleight of the hand, the 
music wrought from the guitars, the perfection of the sound system and 
everything gathered in the place. Entrepreneurs in other business sectors 
may follow similar guidelines. Inherent in the experience of Valle is his 
successful involvement with black metal music, which mirrors a world 
of which he is part. The concluding remark on the production of music 
is, in this chapter, that it is released through the entrepreneur’s moods 
and attunement, which in turn brings the place and tools alive. All this 
is articulated in a way that others can appreciate, because it resonates 
with something they too have perceived.
Notes
1 For the uses of a Heideggerian approach to phenomenology and an analysis of how concepts 
such as place, tools, potentiality, the actual and projecting are used in relation to entrepre-
neurship, see Hauge 2012.
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Innovators engage in activities that tend to absorb them body and soul. In 
Chapter 10 the authors walk through a typical day with an innovative hotel 
manager. Notwithstanding her training in the hotel trade, she seems to be 
in a constant dialogue with hotel rooms, furniture, buildings, and the urban 
surroundings. Facetiously, she claims to be using ‘whim as a method’. That, 
of course, turns out to be a cover for how she succeeds in staying attuned to 
her material and social circumstances, sensing their potential. This chapter 
shows that her energy also tends to be atmospheric, animating wider circles 
of the local community and thus affecting institutions and administrative 
people that before had only had formal contact with this particular hotel.
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chapter 10
Innovation and Embodiment in a 
Small Town Hotel
Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl & Jonas Frykman
A hotel and its owners
An invitation to ‘Experience the idyllic atmosphere of Lillesand at Hotel 
Norge’ appears on every page of the hotel’s website. It is also states that 
‘at many hotels, you wake up in the morning not knowing whether you 
are in London, Oslo or New York’. Hotel rooms are often similar the 
world over, and somewhat nondescript. Claiming that this is not the 
case at Hotel Norge (Hotel Norway) in Lillesand seems rather bold. To 
the question ‘Could Hotel Norge be anywhere else than in Lillesand?’ 
the answer is ‘Hardly’. The website presentation also describes how the 
hotel and town were and still are intertwined – for example how this 
once important seafaring town was linked to Europe, and that many of 
the town’s architectural elements originate from this golden age, with 
their traditional English sash windows, Dutch tiles and half-hipped roofs.
The historical aspects are also covered. The earliest parts of Hotel 
Norge date from 1837 and were originally a tanning mill. To give it an 
extra twist, we are told that the tannery was built by an escaped Irish 
rebel. The town of Lillesand was given its privileges in the following year. 
In 1873 the mill was converted into a hotel, by which time the town had 
become an important centre for trade and shipping. This also meant 
that the hotel became the heart of the town’s flourishing cultural life 
and enabled it to expand. The First World War was a time of crisis for 
shipping in general, and both the hotel and town experienced difficul-
ties. This was followed by the Nazi occupation during the Second World 
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War. For the remainder of the century the town experienced peaks and 
troughs. In 2006 the hotel’s current owners, Beate and Wolfgang Töpfer, 
took over and decided to continue the work to restore it to its original 
style. This proved to be a major undertaking – externally the buildings 
were restored to reflect the 1890s, with copies made of details that had 
disappeared. As Beate Töpfer is quoted as saying, ‘We have tried to pre-
serve the cultural history of the hotel, while still daring to look into the 
future’ (www.hotelnorge.no).
In her work Beate pays much attention to feelings and intuition: ‘If 
you had known how much I base my choices on feelings and intuition, 
you wouldn’t believe it. I don’t have a single thing written down. I run 
everything based on how I feel.’ By this time Hotel Norge had become 
a member of a cluster called USUS, a project in which local business 
life, Innovation Norway, the Norwegian Research Council and aca-
demia work in consort to develop the tourism and culture industry.1 
Here, more than one hundred studios and businesses work together to 
encourage tourists visiting the region to return and to recommend the 
destination to others. The aim of the cluster is to explore and strengthen 
the potential for innovation, value creation and competiveness. Hotel 
Norge is an active member of the cluster, involved in the research 
and innovation programmes offered by USUS, and visited regularly 
by members of the project team and the research team for interviews 
and follow-ups.2 It amounts to a kind of applied ethnography, in which 
members of the team converse with the owners for a period of five 
years, starting in 2010. In 2011 the hotel became a dialogue partner 
for the development of innovation projects, and in 2012 was made a 
formal partner in research projects on innovation praxis in the field of 
tourism, culture and creative industries (TCCIs).3 This essay is based 
on a collection of interviews and conversations with the owners. In 
this way, the material from Lillesand constitutes a paradigmatic case 
for other members of the cluster.
It eventually became obvious to the research team just how much 
innovative activity is based on affects and the ability to take in both the 
material and the social environment – Umwelt to use a Heideggerian term 
– through the senses, and how meanings are often hidden or neglected. 
This kind of intuitive scheme can be difficult to put into words and 
structures. To the owner of the hotel, the art of formulating what had 
hitherto been done at will turned out to be a learning process, where 
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experience was put into words and plans, and its role in choice-making 
and implementation became visible to us as researchers.
In most research on tourism, this and similar areas are dominated by 
the academic disciplines of economies. Its ability to describe and meas-
ure parameters in quantitative terms has been indispensable in a sector 
experiencing rapid expansion. Today, Norwegian tourism contributes 
over 2 billion Euros to the national economy and makes up over 6 per 
cent of the GPD. However, the outcome of the TCCIs venture is more 
easily described and measured than the incentives and ideas that make 
creativity flourish. After working on this for some time as ethnologists, we 
have noticed how easily discourses containing concepts such as business 
models, profit, turnover and regional outcomes seep into our minds and 
language. What is constantly left out, of course, is the answer to our perti-
nent question of what makes people take the initiative at all, and how they 
become and stay entrepreneurial. The study of Hotel Norge has helped us 
to focus on the complexity of the entanglement between innovator and 
environment. This analysis of a specific entrepreneurial case thus starts 
by looking at how the entrepreneurs begin on a small scale by caring for 
the hotel, staff and guests, and after some time expand their activities 
so that – quite unexpectedly – this enterprise turns into something that 
gathers together many of the cultural activities of this small coastal town.
Affecting tourism
What are the special traits of entrepreneurship in the tourist sector? 
How, for instance, can they be distinguished from artistic activities 
like the performing arts or technical inventions? In the first place they 
seem to share the entrepreneur’s strong passion – the affect that builds 
up towards the object. But the differences between working in a world 
that you also inhabit and constantly augment and having a secluded 
studio or workshop (see Hauge, Chapter 9 in this volume) that is totally 
dependent upon creativity, are multiple. How do you keep deadening 
habits, routines and duties at bay when running a hotel? How do you 
make the milieu vibrant and energetic day after day? We met proof that 
profit is not sufficient a stimulus. The traits that Beate and many other 
entrepreneurs in the hotel business constantly demonstrate are personal 
qualities that have something to do with skills such as presence, charm, 
friendliness, empathy and the ability to listen to guests and visitors. The 
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ability to share your enthusiasm with the staff is also of crucial impor-
tance; running a hotel is teamwork. But equally important is the capacity 
to stay in dialogue with the material surroundings and the geographical 
location. The analysis below demonstrates how these attitudes add extra 
value to the local community, and ultimately the entire region.
During the interviews Beate shows affects that are close to love for 
her hotel. She talks about the building and the rooms with their different 
wallpapers, curtains, windows and paintings with passionate commit-
ment. They seem to give her energy and it is as though the two have a 
reciprocal relation. Like many entrepreneurs she has an all-engulfing 
relation to her projects that permeates her entire way of life. ‘We see’ 
write the psychologists Cardon et al. (2009) ‘evidence of this in entre-
preneurship research, where for example passion has been described as 
“the underlying force that fuels our strongest emotions. It is the inten-
sity we feel when we engage in activities that interest us deeply. It fills us 
with energy and enables us to perform at our peak”’(ibid. 6). This is the 
mood – or Stimmung as Heidegger would call it – through which she 
encounters her environment; the affective state that makes her percep-
tive to its potential, body and soul (see Gilje, Chapter 2 in this volume).
In order to understand how Beate feels about being part of the mate-
rial environment we need to parallel such affects with the phenomeno-
logical insight of what happens when things are ‘worlding’. Heidegger 
uses the concept to describe the phenomenon that people can be seen 
as porous; that the environment seeps in and ‘affects’ the way they feel, 
think, dream and get on with their lives. Or, to put it differently, that 
people often function like batteries that are energised and charged by 
their environment. Heidegger’s use of worlding is similar to how affects 
are treated by Brian Massumi (2002). Affects are mostly pre-conscious 
experience; a potential that does not have to be realised in language. 
Following Spinoza, Massumi describes affect as the body’s way of prepar-
ing itself for action, which adds the dimension of intensity to worlding. 
For Beate the environment is obviously worlding in multiple ways and 
radiates energy. But the different parts and dimensions of the hotel also 
‘gather’ into new meaningful wholes, in that she includes significant traits 
in the local milieu and makes them accessible to guests (see Frykman, 
Chapter 7 in this volume).
Phenomenology has falsely been accused of being ‘stuck in repeti-
tions and preventing the emergence of the new’, in that it deals with 
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the pre-reflective and leaves intentionality out (Leys 2011: 457; Massumi 
2002). As will become evident in this presentation, our research shows 
that Beate’s project of managing the hotel and successfully changing it 
into a profitable business is guided by affect – in this case a combina-
tion of a non- or prelingual capacity to gather dormant potentials in the 
environment and a solid training within the trade. This training includes 
four years of education at the École hotelliere de Lausanne in Switzerland 
in economics and management, and experience of working in big hotel 
chains, in which daily reports are a decisive theme. All this training shines 
through in the way she runs Hotel Norge. Despite this, Beate knows that 
this knowledge and experience is not sufficient to come to grips with how 
the hotel could develop. On the contrary, she fears that formal plans or 
structured schemes will lead to eternal repetition and habituation.
Things that inspire
When the Töpfer family bought the respected but run-down old hotel 
in the centre of Beate’s home town in 2006 the challenges facing them 
were enormous. The hotel had only 26 rooms and turnover was NOK 
7 million. Besides the renovations, personal service was their hallmark. 
Not a penny was spent on marketing. The emphasis was on delivering 
the best to guests and relying on word-of-mouth recommendations. 
However, the business idea proved so successful that within the space 
of ten years turnover had risen by 142 per cent to NOK 17 million. Every 
year since then the family hotel has shown a healthy profit. Beate’s way 
of running the business, invigorated by the way she feels her way for-
ward, obviously works:
It sounds totally – when hearing myself saying it – it sounds as 
though the business is run on a whim. But I feel that everything 
becomes so much better when it has been adjusted in line with 
what I have observed, what I have felt, what I have seen and the 
reactions of the person standing in front of me. So it becomes a 
form of memento, or a kind of experiential basis. I feel I make 
a qualified judgement as we go along – a choice. At least up to 
now this has resulted in very little time being spent on writing 
long-term strategies or plans. It has worked for me, or for us, to 
work in this way.
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How creativity works for this entrepreneur became clear to us as we 
followed – literally ran – in her wake as she went about her daily busi-
ness, doing our best to put her actions into words and reports. It turned 
out that a large chunk of her inventiveness comes from plans – she has 
them at her fingertips. ‘It is wrong to say that I have no strategy, because 
I have!’ she says. ‘But it is not expressed in a written format and put into 
a document. Perhaps that’s a bit silly, because it is distressing to have 
things only half expressed. By working in this way it is still possible to 
be flexible and make changes. I am still in the process of convincing 
myself that I have to go down that road.’
When talking things through with us, Beate also walked them through. 
She took us into to the hotel garden, where the walls had been restored 
and all the windows replaced. ‘Our most captivating renovation’, she 
jokingly called it. Continuing her tour she showed us the latest devel-
opment in the back garden – an outdoor stage where only temporary 
permission for performances had been granted and for which the future 
is uncertain. She told us about her dreams for the use of the stage and 
the plight of having to submit a full application to the authorities when 
the visions she had were still in the making. ‘Look now! I have decided to 
update you on everything as I have come across it. Some of these things 
might be totally irrelevant, but I can’t bother brooding on what might 
have been!’ she said. When leaving the garden and climbing the stairs 
to the first floor and the building’s ballroom she filled us in on some of 
the key ideas for future performances, how they fitted with the hotel’s 
other activities and how they related to experiences from previous years.
What we are presented with in the ballroom is a pleasant intimate 
atmosphere consisting of a patterned parquet floor, dark brown wall-
paper that makes you feel as though you are back in the good old days 
and a huge painting of light playing on the surface of water created by a 
renowned local contemporary artist.
Looking around Beate notices scuffs on the wallpaper and marks on 
the wooden floor. ‘What we think of doing now, just here, is moving the 
stage over to the other end of the room’. She stands where the new stage 
was planned and seems to be remembering the past and envisioning the 
future as she surveys the scene. ‘We had a theatre performance recently 
and the actors discovered that it was more convenient to have the stage 
here. I don’t remember exactly why, but it was something about the feel-
ing of the room. I then realised how such a radical change could work 
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really well.’ She goes on to describe a planned new curtain, the kind 
of technical equipment and musical instruments that will be acquired 
and put to use, and how the room can be reverted to the theatre it once 
was. ‘This was the town’s theatre. It was here that things happened. It’s 
so much fun to put it all back. You can almost picture the tragedies and 
such.’ As Beate continues to talk we gain a good sense of how she pictures 
the future of the space:
For a person like me who’s always talking about the multiple uses 
of things it is so great to see the possibilities that a partition made 
by a curtain might lead to. It has to be equally nice on both sides, 
so we also can turn this into a chambre separée, a chef ’s table. The 
entrance is here, the exit to the balcony is there, the staff entrance 
is there and above it is a chandelier. Fantastic!
Beate’s fluid way of managing and developing Hotel Norge in Lillesand, 
without any real office space and apparently dependent on the know-
ledge and inspiration received from a direct contact with the objects 
and immediate surroundings, demonstrates how her entrepreneurial 
acting is embodied. Bourdieu (1977) refers to well-developed skills in 
his description of habitus as a set of dispositions that are formed in 
relation to work and the material culture that people are dealing with 
(see Frykman, Chapter 7 in this volume). When Beate enters the hotel’s 
rooms, dreams, possibilities and new initiatives come to life, take shape 
and fill functions. To use Kathleen Stewart’s words (1996), as Beate walks 
through the rooms ‘it was the things that remembered’. Beate is like a 
‘battery’ and is energised and charged by her Umwelt. In all her openness, 
she incorporates what Stewart in Ordinary Affects (2007) calls a ‘highly 
affective subject’; a subject drifting through scenes letting life wash over 
her, feeling empowered and thus embodying ‘a collection of trajectories 
and circuits’ (ibid. 59).
From infrastructure to content provider
Being entrepreneurial in the hotel business also means being able to draw 
energy from and mutually inspire the local community. The relationship 
between Hotel Norge, the town of Lillesand and the region serves as an 
example of how such an activity is dependent on the ability to energise 
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the surrounding community and identify its slumbering potential. In 
Beate’s case, this process is animated by her contacts with USUS and 
our year-long discussions.
Becoming a member of the regional cluster in 2013 and taking part 
in an USUS Conference was a turning point. The purpose of this was to 
promote repeat visits, referrals and recommendations based on coopera-
tion between businesses involved in tourism. The goal of TTCIs – culture 
and experience industries – is to improve guests’ total experience. Pres-
entations were given and workshops arranged to show and discuss how 
public and private risk capital could be made available for enterprises 
engaged in innovation projects. Prior to this it had never occurred to 
Beate that public investment could be available for the renovations and 
cultural upswing of the hotel. This put her in line with the majority of 
tourism companies in Norway (Aas and Hjemdahl 2015).
An eye-opener for Beate was a graphic presentation of the different 
functions in the tourism sector. A Power Point presentation (see Figure 1) 
showed a hierarchical, pyramid-shaped model displayed the most impor-
tant factors. At the top of the pyramid were the companies providing 
the guest streams: national and international companies transporting 





Figure 10.1. The ‘value chain’ of the tourism, cultural and creative industries, as 
presented by the USUS cluster (www.usus.no).
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providing distribution, working mainly through digital channels or as 
niche companies. Third in line were the content deliverers, the art and 
cultural institutions and other members of the ‘experience industry’. 
At the bottom of the pyramid model Hotel Norge in Lillesand was rep-
resented under the label infrastructure – meaning traditional locations 
where guests could sleep and eat.
Beate reacted instinctively on discovering that her hotel belonged 
to the bottom section. This was too challenging a position to be in! ‘It 
seems as though I am too dependent on other actors to attract any stream 
of guests to my hotel. I have to develop the hotel so that it includes the 
broader parts of the value chain. The hotel must grow so that it takes a 
much more active part as a content deliverer and does not remain under 
infrastructure. Could Hotel Norge Lillesand be turned into a Culture 
Hotel?’ she wondered. The very next day she appeared at a workshop 
discussing just those possibilities.
For the following two years she systematically worked with different 
programmes from public agencies to develop such projects. The first to 
invest was the corporate fund Innovation Norway, which gave a prelim-
inary grant. The Norwegian Research Council then provided funding 
for another preparatory project, and finally a main project was funded 
by Innovation Norway. The requirement for such a financier was that 
the project should meet the demands of particular stakeholders, in this 
case the County of Lillesand. At the end of the first year of the project 
Beate said,
Having a strategy in your stomach is not the same as having a 
document on the shelf.
Why, because you know where you are going?
Yes, so it’s wrong to say that I have no strategy and no plan. 
Because I have!
Having to formalise the different steps of the innovation process, partly 
due to the public funds she has received, also made her look at her pre-
vious experiences in a new way. Writing applications, reorganising her 
actions into side and main projects and delivering reports on results help 
her to clarify what was originally embodied knowledge and sensations. 
However, formalising the steps does not mean having to change her 
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winning concept. Writing reports is one thing. Successfully managing 
her innovative business is another.
This project has forced me to … look at the description in a new 
light, tick off what has been done and see what has not been done, 
just the work with reporting – like before Christmas when I had 
deadline for reporting to Innovation Norway, to actually see what 
I had done, I was totally shocked. It was a really good feeling, to 
be honest, and one that I am not really used to. For the nine years 
before you arrived I didn’t have anyone to report to about anything.
And you haven’t really been properly aware of what you were doing?
Yes, it is sort of… like a carousel.
But how do you orient yourself, give substance to what you are doing?
I am not conscious of what that might be!




Because that seems to be your entire office.
Yes, that is correct.
Don’t you have an office?
No, not at all, I don’t have anywhere special to work. I walk and 
walk and sit down wherever possible with the laptop and the phone.
What are your tools for innovation, besides instinct and emotion? 
Do you employees understand that ‘now Beate has a clever idea’?
I talk a lot with them, so they are very involved in what’s running 
around in my head. Yes, very much!
Do you think that they understand that you’re immersed in new 
ideas? Do you think they sense it?
Yes, because they know me very well.
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What are you like in that mode?
Well, it depends what I am up to. When I am into arrangements, 
which is something I really love to plan and deliver, I am in my 
element. If a customer has asked for something specific it’s our 
task to make the practical arrangements so that it happens, so it 
will be perfect for them. Then I am up and about and all over. 
Well, I’m not sure. Someone else has to observe, I have no con-
scious relationship to this at all. But it is probably a hands-on 
experience. But I always seem to land on my feet.
How do you know that you are landing?
When I deliver! That is usually obvious when the guests arrive.
In a success story such as Beate’s, creativity and innovation in the field 
of TCCIs is very much a matter of the unspoken, of experience, and 
also the capacity to be affected by the milieu and the project ahead. Joy, 
struggle and uncertainty are the brick and mortar of this particular 
type of innovation.
Town and total concept
Schemes and business models are available that show how innova-
tive enterprises can be structured. As summarised in Figure 10.2, the 
innovation management literature (e.g. Frohle and Roth 2007; Tidd 
and Bessant 2013) suggests that the innovation practices of enterprises 
can be divided into two broad categories: (1) process-oriented practices 
including sub-categories such as strategy, portfolio management, devel-
opment process, tools and effect measurement, and (2) resource-oriented 
Figure 10.2. Resource- and practice-oriented practices in innovation (Aas et al. 2015).
Resource-oriented service innovation practices
-   Intellectual resources
-   Organisational resources
-   Physical resources
-   Culture
Process-oriented service innovation practices
-   Strategy
-   Portofolio management
-   Development process
-   Front end
-   Tools
-   Measures and metrics
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practices including the establishment of the resources needed to carry 
out innovation processes.
Seen from the outside, the developments at Hotel Norge in Lillesand 
align with many of the points in the above boxes, especially as in this case 
the process is both supported and controlled by external financiers and 
evaluators. However, in practice the development project becomes some-
thing quite different; something that captures chance and opportunity 
and is able to tune into the surroundings, people, places and objects. This 
way of working proved to be helpful when Beate took the daring step of 
trying to engage a larger section of the town and region in ‘a total concept’.
Beate invites us for breakfast and we sit in a room with a beauti-
fully restored light-blue wallpaper on the wall. Outside we can see the 
archipelago that has made this part of Southern Norway so beloved and 
widely known stretching into the horizon. Beate wants to discuss how 
to develop the project from a preliminary to a main phase and encom-
pass the ‘whole’ – the whole being the participation of the town and the 
region. Up to now she has trusted her intuition, energy and moods, but 
wonders whether this is too risky and provisional for a major project.
USUS Art was called in to help.3 They engaged a site-specific artist – 
Laura – who helps USUS companies to sense the place, take in the atmos-
phere, and capture the vibe. USUS Art is only available for companies that 
are capable of being challenged, because the artist often contributes with 
insights and suggestions that are offbeat. Beate regards this as strength:
The really good thing on the day that USUS Art was here was that 
she made me see things in a new way. Seeing her in this house and 
inspecting the most everyday objects was liberating. Suddenly we 
saw the rooms from a new perspective. We dis covered the attic 
and the possibilities there, and got several creative angles on 
things. It was really exciting! But it was also a difficult starting 
point. She had no concrete mission. No agenda for the day. In 
order to get acquainted with the hotel she touched and in a way 
altered the way we saw things. I was aware that she was feeling 
her way through the terrain. But with the wrong person it could 
have been a total failure.
The result was that Beate was put on the track of exploring a dramatic 
historical background for the hotel that would later prove useful. The hotel, 
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as we have seen, began with an Irish rebel, who for various reasons had 
to escape from home on a trading ship. Close to the Norwegian coast he 
was placed in old trunk, put in a smaller boat and hoisted overboard. He 
drifted ashore in Kristiansand, where he made his fortune and eventually 
became one of the most powerful men in town. He owned three ships, 
two pirate ships and one cargo ship. He then moved to nearby Lillesand 
and bought the tannery from a man called Reiersen.
As we sat eating breakfast and after hearing about the outcome of the 
meeting between Beate and USUS Art, the entire USUS team started to 
throw ideas and possibilities around. USUS Culture suggested that ‘You 
could have Irish Days!’ USUS Art filled in with ‘Did you know that he 
married here and had seven children and then killed himself? Henrik 
Wergeland wrote the poem ‘Robert Major’ for his funeral.5 How cool! 
You could put someone in a trunk to be washed ashore every year.’
This was so much fun. I started to think more freely, and it made 
my imagination move in a new directions … Being a midwife 
for ideas and pointing to a totally different starting point, when 
you don’t have to think about anything to do with economy and 
all that. Matching these two worlds! I mostly get totally tied up 
thinking about costs and limitations. That is the drawback of 
everyday management.
Beate kept on tossing ideas around, all the time anchored in the town of 
Lillesand and what she had learned about its history, sensing the possibility 
of creating something that could have happened there a long time ago.
Staging the past
Beate had an outdoor summer stage built in 2012 (see Figure 10.3). A 
number of different shows and concerts were staged, all of which were 
a sell-out. She got a glimpse of what a Culture Hotel could be. The town 
was ready for live events and performances. Together with local artists 
and cultural institutions the hotel sizzled with enthusiasm.
However, the most decisive moment came in the shape of a request 
from an event company. The company had been promising special treats 
for international customers with high demands. Could Beate stage some-
thing really different in the town of Lillesand? A group of media people 
sensitive objects
228
who had already surveyed many different sites in Norway were now 
on the lookout for a ‘real deal’ and something unusual. The company 
had checked Lillesand out a couple of times, liked the location and its 
beautiful architecture and now wondered how much more there was to 
Figure 10.3. The hotel garden with an outdoor stage erected temporarily during 
the summer of 2012. Beate has big dreams for the stage. Photo: Beate Holm.
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offer in the shape of events. This request made Beate aware of how she 
had packaged and presented the hotel and how similar this was to other 
places, but also how much there was still to explore and develop.
When searching for the ultimate local experience Beate first turned 
to the maritime museum. The director was thrilled by the unorthodox 
possibility of staging a joint event. They decided to present a dinner table 
in late nineteenth-century style. The theme, ‘The Captain’s Table’, was 
portrayed in the living room of the former owner of what later became 
the museum, the famous Captain Carl Knudsen. The event was preceded 
by intense discussions about whether one was allowed to use museum 
objects, move hotel furniture into the museum and how to organise the 
tableware and food. In the Hotel Norge kitchen the answer to all the 
challenges was standard: ‘no problem’. Preparing the food, setting the 
table, serving the meal – all were swiftly managed by the hotel. The female 
museum director dressed up in authentic clothes and styled her hair in 
turn-of-the-last-century fashion. She took her seat as one of the guests 
at the dinner table in a room that had not seen food for 60 years. Story-
tellers were summoned and contributed something extra to the staging. 
The event turned out to be a re-enactment, where the actors blended in 
as guests. By the end of the evening the museum director was visibly 
touched and taken by the atmosphere of a reconstructed past: ‘Imagine, 
this must have been how they lived there and then’.
The following evening, an actor impersonating the Norwegian author 
Knut Hamsun appeared at Hotel Norge. In fact, a suite at the hotel was 
reserved for this Nobel Laureate in the 1930s. Given that Hamsun became 
a most controversial figure in national literature when he joined the 
Norwegian fascists and collaborated with the Quisling regime during 
the war, this was a daring step. Nothing about this background was on 
display, however. The hotel website instead claims that:
Knut Hamsun was a quiet and modest man. When life became 
too troubled at home in Nørholm, or when one of his books was 
released, he ‘escaped’ to Lillesand. He didn’t enjoy all the media 
attention. But he loved the quiet and peaceful life of the small 
town. Here he got his inspiration from wandering along the piers 
and chatting with people. In the early 1930s he came on several 
occasions and at Hotel Norge was given room 302 and special care. 
The room was big and airy with a fantastic view of the harbour … 
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Whether Hamsun wrote any of his books in room 302 is highly 
uncertain, but there is no doubt that he came to the town and the 
hotel for inspiration. Some of the characters in the August trilogy 
are recognisable. (www.hotelnorge.no; translated by the authors)
The guests who were invited to the re-enactment were served an aperi-
tif on the building’s third floor. In smaller groups the 20 or so people 
were taken on a tour that ended on the fourth floor, where the actor sat 
reading from one of Hamsun’s books. When he had finished reading, 
Hamsun led the group down to dinner at the Kings Table, situated in 
the ballroom. Here he continued to play the grand author while eating 
and conversing with the guests (perhaps not the ideal company for a 
person who was said to love the quiet life). During the meal the leader 
of a local literature festival gave a lecture on Hamsun. The event was 
totally constructed to enforce the feeling of ‘being there’, combining a 
lecture, presentation and live performance by Hamsun.
The event company experiencing the two Lillesand evenings clearly 
enjoyed the different ways of creating new impressions. They wanted 
to return the following year, if possible to follow in the footsteps of 
Henrik Ibsen. The museum staff were also thrilled. They gained new 
insights by letting the pieces in the exhibition come alive. The increase 
in the museum’s economy occasioned by this event was welcome too. 
The hotel too saw new possibilities ahead. Beate said: ‘Sure it was a lot 
of work, but we still have treasures to unpack. If we had managed to 
put it into our marketing system we could have reached out to more 
people’. She also started to wonder how such an event could be made 
sustainable. According to her calculation, the hotel would break even 
with ten events per year. What other concepts could be themed and 
staged? ‘Imagine if we could focus on preparing theme packages for 
international tourists, we would develop even further qualities that 
would make us unique and stand out.’
The ultimate local experience
Research and development projects both demand an intense contact 
with local stakeholders at the town and county level. In our case it ini-
tially proved more demanding than simply changing the concept for 
Hotel Norge, especially as such cooperation is based on the ability to 
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persuade by means of budgets, long-term activity plans and detailed 
working schedules for employees. However, the main obstacle was the 
possible merging of publicly administered cultural activities and com-
mercial ones: ‘“What kind of prioritising is this? The hotel is a business 
actor! What are you doing?” You can understand the reaction from a 
body traditionally concerned with optimising the conditions for the 
development of local culture.’
During our conversations Beate explained how it took ‘quite some 
time to get the library, the museum, the office for culture at the town-
and-county level as well as artists to understand that this was not only 
about our plans for Hotel Norge. It was about contributing to the already 
existing cultural activity in the region. We wanted to engage in what was 
already going on in Lillesand’s cultural sector. We thought that together 
we could make it flourish even more.’ Her most important message was 
promising but blunt: ‘we already have a guest stream; we have the infra-
structure and if we can manage to cooperate this could take off for all 
the agents of art and culture in Lillesand’.
Instead of presenting the plans for innovation hinted at above, Beate 
stuck to her informal pattern and invited representatives from different 
local cultural bodies to lunchtime talks and a dinner. ‘Did you get the 
impression that they understood your ambitions?’ we asked. She answered:
To start with no one knew exactly why they were summoned. I 
had invited them to brain storm and no one managed to spot any 
common thread for the meeting. But everyone was a bit curious 
and perhaps even honoured, in a way. I had not prepared a pres-
entation but trusted the usual dialogue. Starting with the USUS 
context I told them that Hotel Norge was regarded as infrastructure 
in the value chain and I found that a problem. Yes, they seemed 
to understand what I am trying to accomplish with this project.
As the discussion continued and the ideas became more concrete, it was 
clear to everybody that the hotel could increasingly be seen as a stage for 
different activities and performances. The outer facilities of a hotel garden 
and rooms already existed, but were too one-dimensional. Beate’s vision 
– aided by her cooperation with USUS – was to develop the hotel from a 
place for eating and sleeping in nice surroundings to one permeated by 
the sensation of entering a different world. She explained:
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Regardless of whether you drink hot cocoa in the library, attend 
a conference, stay overnight or are a garden guest, I want you to 
feel invited to a specific cultural experience. One way or another 
we want to unpack parts of the history of Lillesand that mean 
something unique for the place. The project can be copied in 
other places and hotels, but they would have to build on their 
own unique material. I’ve spent a lot of time making sure that 
this is not only about the four walls of a hotel. Everything is in 
close proximity in town and the more our guests are invited to 
discover something of what there is to experience the more value 
they will get for their money. This was why our potential partners 
understood that we genuinely wanted to offer our visitors a full 
package and we that have something unique for everyone who 
wants to join in.
‘So you managed to get everyone to pull in the same direction?’ we asked. 
‘Definitely! This is what I have sown, and so far so good. This meeting 
went really well. It was so much fun!’
One of the pillars turned out to be something called Together for 
Culture, where different local initiatives were offered to the hotel and its 
garden stage. Together with a local design bureau the hotel staff worked to 
brand the concept. Prior to every arrangement they produced posters to 
put up all over the town, were present in social media, on digital screens, 
in advertisements and in the editorial columns of the local newspaper. 
As many partners as possible could be gathered under one heading. 
The idea was that people would recognise the concept, even though the 
content changed from time to time. According to Beate, the entire event 
was ‘an example of something that is anything but profitable. This will 
only be cost, no revenue … we will still do it, because it is important for 
us to connect to such good partners’.
There is no doubt that Beate has initiated the project with profit in mind, 
not only for her hotel but also for all the partners involved. According to 
her, in the long run it is certain to pay off. Her main idea is to establish 
new market positions using this innovative business model. In addition 
to increasing and retaining guests looking for that little extra in terms of 
regional conferences and seminars, the targeted groups are national and 
international tourists on the lookout for something genuine and romantic 
at the same time (see Kjaer, Chapter 11 in this volume). By branding the 
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town, different actors are perceived from the perspective of the travelling 
visitors. Beate believes that: ‘With a good dialogue and a sincere wish 
that the others will succeed the cake is big enough for everyone’. She 
seems able to express the same hope for what it is possible to achieve to 
the other partners. In other towns and localities the cooperation between 
art, culture and business have failed because the different parties do not 
know enough about each other’s’ reasons for joining and what a com-
mon outcome might be. Leadership, a belief in making dreams come 
true, building trust and sharing knowledge among the participants are 
all important. Although this proves to be hard to capture in words, it is 
obviously something that is felt by the participants and emanates from 
Hotel Norge in the town of Lillesand.
Conclusion
In her book Ordinary Affects, Kathleen Stewart (2007) advocates the 
importance of focusing on affects as an alternative to a rigid or too sys-
tematic approach to the cases under study, irrespective of whether this 
is a well-known totalising system like structuralism, a ‘linguistic turn’ 
in ethnology or anthropology, models of globalisation, neoliberalism, 
capitalism in other disciplines, or mainly trying to squeeze the everyday 
processes in ordinary lives into overarching patterns (for a discussion 
see Jansen, Chapter 3 in this volume). In Stewart’s writing the central 
matters are always about how people are ‘affected and affect others’ in 
the Spinozian way (see Gilje, Chapter 2 in this volume). Using what are 
now classic formulations she wants to ‘draw attention to immanence, to 
bodies, to their attunement to each other and to objects. ... to bring them 
into view as a scene of immanent force, rather than leave them looking 
like dead effects imposed on an innocent world’ (ibid. 1). Something new 
may arise when the environment starts ‘worlding’ to the people living 
in it and their ability to make objects, people and places ‘gather’ in ways 
that were not seen before.
As became evident to the team following Beate in our many walk and 
talks, interviews over meals and helping her to formulate applications 
and reports, structures such as ‘resource-oriented’ and ‘process-oriented’ 
faded into the background. Instead, her attunement to places, people 
and objects was exceptional and was constantly displayed to us. Beate 
paid more attention to her gut feelings than to pondering rationally on 
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resources or portfolio management. It seemed as though her creativ-
ity was affectively based on, her strategy situated in, embodied know-
ledge – ‘whim as a method’. In this way she managed to sway not only 
the librarian and the museum director who felt so deeply moved when 
staging a captain’s table, but also the guests and the representatives of 
the town and council as well. As she expressed it: ‘I have so much faith 
in this project. I draw so much energy and inspiration from it.’
To some extent, helped by the USUS cluster and taking part in inno-
vation conferences, Beate’s contribution expands the notion of being a 
Culture Hotel for wider purposes – a total concept. In a complex land-
scape of new partners she manages to cover wider parts of the value 
chain than we had foreseen and thus gives important feedback to the 
wider TCCIs project. The project is still in its initial stages and to some 
extent the future seems to lie in the hands and mind of the innovative 
owner. After following the processes at Hotel Norge in Lillesand for sev-
eral years we can see how things are still in the making. As researchers 
we are more used to looking back at cases that are settled and closed. So 
when Beate says ‘so far, so good’, it captures our understanding of the 
innovative process precisely.
Notes
1 A USUS cluster consists of more than 100 businesses in the tourism, creative and cultural 
industries in southern Norway that works towards the development of innovation capabil-
ity, value creation and competitiveness by means of a systematic, holistic and coordinated 
development of existing guest streams (see www.usus.no). USUS Advanced is the research 
programme of the cluster, which involves numerous national and international research 
projects, all of which are user-driven and cooperate with some 20 different research milieus 
and universities.
2 The research team, led by Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl, visited the site regularly for a period 
of four years.
3 Her key contribution was as a specialist within culture projects, and in addition as a spe-
cialist within site-specific art and experience design.
5 Henrik Wergeland 1808–1845, Norwegian patriot, poet, playwright, historian, and linguist.
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Lindesnes Lighthouse is a well-known Norwegian tourist attraction. Few 
museums can compete with this windswept cape where an affection of the 
senses is concerned. Within the new museology and experience economy, 
museums have been redefined as storytellers, performers, and event-makers; 
above all, they are supposed to communicate with the visitors in diversely 
emotional ways. The staff at the lighthouse have been trained to appeal to the 
visitors not primarily by cognitive means, but rather in visual, tactile, as well as 
in audible ways. The author of Chapter 11 follows two groups of middle-class 
visitors to Lindesnes, one from Western countries and the other from China. 
It turns out that the two groups display very different preferences due to the 
ways their senses have been educated through their backgrounds. This chap-
ter shows that whenever affects is on the agenda, the cultural organisation 




Designing a Total Experience
Sarah Holst Kjær
Observing
Nearby, we saw a group of white wooden houses. We drove further 
and at the end of a road, there was Lindesnes Lighthouse, the south-
ernmost place in Norway and a coastal heritage museum. Here, 
they were very innovative with coastal food culture – although 
the products didn’t have labels in English. The location itself was 
a selling point – it felt special to be here at this extreme point. 
Although the wind was cold and there was lack of information, 
this place felt like a hidden attraction.
This ethnographic observation and diary extract from our research team 
includes the language of museum development:1 innovative lighthouse 
staff and the location as a selling point. It has a vocabulary of bodily 
sensations and feelings: nice food, special feeling about the place and a 
cold wind. It is also a touristic description: white wooden houses, the 
lighthouse at an extreme point and a hidden attraction.
The description, written in 2014, reflects a larger societal trend, namely 
that Scandinavian local heritage museums situated in regional settings 
deal with globalisation when they receive visitors from many national 
and cultural backgrounds. From a visitor perspective museum, materi-
ality and landscape are met with diverse underlying assumptions which 
affect the relationship between certain bodies and particular places. At 
this windswept, coastal museum, not only neighbours from Denmark, 
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Sweden, Germany and the UK came. Visitors as far away as from China 
were also beginning turn up.
Like most Scandinavian museums, the Lindesnes Lighthouse’s officially 
defined target group was school children. In addition, sailors used the 
museum as a navigation point. As a result of the changing market con-
ditions in the traditional culture industry (see Hjemdahl and Frykman, 
Chapter 10 in this volume), the museum did not take it for granted that 
it would be possible to be publicly subsidised in the future. The museum 
hence wanted to understand and possibly expand into new markets. 
Taking the point of departure in ethnographic observations, qualitative 
interviews and questionnaires, the scope of this chapter is to discuss 
how the Lindesnes Lighthouse Museum communicated the experience 
setting of the coastal landscape, its materiality and artefacts, by mainly 
taking for granted that the museum’s own espoused values of the coastal 
landscape would be understood and approached in predictable ways by 
two visitor groups of Northern European pensioners and Chinese young 
adults. The tourists in both groups were well educated and middle class, 
but coming from a Northern European and Asian context.
Taking the view that cultural background affects people’s basic under-
lying assumptions when interpreting a museum landscape, this chapter 
will discuss various phenomenological perspectives on the relationship 
between body and place. It may be usual that museums develop by 
analysing and understanding visitors’ cultural backgrounds. Through 
investigation it becomes clear how easy or difficult, familiar or strange, 
a particular experience setting can appear to people who are not ‘in the 
know’. Museums will try to adapt their communications and market-
ing through a language and translation approach. But opening up to 
a body and place perspective reveals how a particular cultural body is 
experiencing a setting through more or less ‘obvious’ cultural objects in 
uncharacteristic ways. In this example a dramatic coastline landscape 
and a traditional red and white coloured lighthouse were experienced 
through many unpredictable cultural objects: the taste of biscuits, souvenir 
toys reminding of grandchildren, the smell of thermos flask coffee, and 
even the feel of paperware was to associate to the quality of the coastal 
lighthouse experience.
Using experience economy concepts identifying the performative 
museum through marketing concepts, ‘storytelling’, affinity and a ‘total 
experience’ perspective (Skot-Hansen 2008), I focus on how museum 
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visitors from these two cultural backgrounds assimilated the material 
and emotional stories which the staff more or less explicitly applied to 
the lighthouse and its harsh coastal setting.
It is assumed that most impressions are interpreted through personal 
experience and cultural background (see Jansen, Chapter 3 in this vol-
ume). In this case, the less instructive the two tourists groups found 
the museum materiality to be, the more likely they were to bring into 
play their own preferences in leisure habits, social rituals and consumer 
desires. Scandinavian museums often rely on visitors already having ‘cur-
riculum knowledge’ or in-depth familiarity with what is on display. This 
chapter discusses what happens when a limited amount of information 
is available to certain groups of museum visitors and how they relate – 
or would like to relate – to the coastal landscape through their cultural 
background and with their bodily preferences. In order to analyse the 
relationship between certain bodies and a particular coastal material-
ity, I interpret utterances and sensory impressions given by Northern 
European pensioners and Chinese young adults during their visit to the 
Lindesnes Lighthouse Museum (see Pink 2009: 12, 17).
Lighthouse materiality
Lindesnes Lighthouse dates back to 1656 and is thought to have been the 
first of its kind in Norway. Located on the dramatic coastline of southern 
Norway, it became a national heritage site in 2000 and started function-
ing as a museum as well as an active maritime navigation point. On a 
national scale, Lindesnes Lighthouse is amongst the ten most visited 
attractions in Norway.
Besides its traditional obligations, such as collecting, documenting 
and communicating research, the museum also became part of an ambi-
tious Norwegian cultural policy. In a national white paper on museum 
responsibilities from 2002 the museum was expected to ‘surprise and 
challenge emotionally and intellectually’.2 Although this can be inter-
preted in many ways, it was mainly understood by heritage museums as 
a way to deal with being a ‘boring’ or ‘old-fashioned’ museum.
In order to meet policy requests, several approaches originating 
from the experience economy were tested. ‘Experience economy’ can 
be defined as the practice of using aesthetics and consumption in order 
to commodify cultural expressions and settings. Experience economy 
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is thus a consumer-orientated way of staging and performing cultural 
expressions with the purpose of making a profit. In order to become 
successful from a commercial perspective, the Lindesnes Lighthouse 
Museum interpreted the policy demands of being ‘emotionally chal-
lenging’ by creating strong place brand and setting up a souvenir shop 
with local and high-quality products. The museum even opened a fish 
restaurant and transformed one of the buildings into an apartment hotel. 
By being consumer-orientated, the museum stopped being boring at the 
same time as it became a corporate entity. Hence the museum tried to 
meet new public expectations that a cultural institution should maxim-
ise profit through commodities and consumption (Aronsson 2007: 16; 
Skot-Hansen 2008: 73, 82).
Still, the everyday routines suggested that the Lindesnes Lighthouse 
Museum was mostly occupied with dealing with how materiality could 
associate to the lighthouse itself. If was difficult transforming the many 
layers of historical events, instruments, objects and remnants of earlier 
lighthouses, military bunkers from wartime and inscriptions from kings 
who arrived at the lighthouse, being both faithful to the storyline of the 
museum while at the same time being consumer-oriented. Matching 
the landscape with different entertainment interests of pensioners and 
young adults should not only create the right emotional response, these 
matches would also change the museums materiality. Prioritising things, 
foregrounding one thing while backgrounding another, would create 
consequences in the experience setting of the museum.
The museum’s staff had nonetheless transformed the lighthouse’s 
technical equipment and work-related apparatus into tourism-oriented 
experiences. As the lighthouse was part of a seascape, the surrounding 
views were spectacular, especially from the very top of the lighthouse. The 
museum had focused on service consumption such as events, exhibitions, 
festivals and live concerts. The restaurant and souvenir shop sold locally 
produced seaweed products – beer, bread, salt and crackers – with a clear 
brand reference to the museum and to the ocean below where you could 
see the fresh seaweed before it was collected. In addition, the museum 
had engaged in digital storytelling using new technology. A cinema has 
been created for both education and entertainment. Since the Lindesnes 
Lighthouse Museum had begun narrating romantic feelings in relation 
to the dramatic weather at the coastal landscape, honeymoon tourism 
had been on the rise. It was possible to have a wedding ceremony held 
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out on the cliff and the old lighthouse keeper’s cottage which was turned 
into the apartment hotel mainly served couples who had food delivered 
from the restaurant or nearby caterers. A champagne dinner served at 
the top of the lighthouse could even be arranged.3 When the museum 
staff and other visitors had gone home for the day, the landscape and 
the weather, often extreme wind, sun, rain or snow, offered a solitary 
experience. Being one of the most well-known tourism establishments 
inside and outside Norway, the Lindesnes Lighthouse Museum was an 
year-round attraction which did not suffer from any off-season problems. 
On the contrary, the staff would point out that the museum’s coastal 
location was the most impressive when summer was over. Then, autumn 
and winter weather conditions had a pronounced effect on the bodily 
sensing (Kjær 2011b).
The visitors
In 2008 and 2013 I conducted interviews and participant observations 
with groups of Northern European pensioners and Chinese young adults 
at the Lindesnes Lighthouse Museum. The two groups presented a new 
global reality, in that the European population is ageing and has more 
leisure time while the Chinese population is becoming wealthier and is 
therefore more eager to travel to faraway places such as Norway.
In the wake of the empirical investigations it became clear that the 
studies had a lot to say about the local–global tourism situation of a 
national heritage museum. The visitors often involved previous experi-
ences of completely different museums and amusement parks. These 
comparisons were quite unpredictable to the museum staff, but shed light 
on how local ways of communicating were perceived as rather cryptic 
and esoteric by the experienced visitors (Meethan 2001).
The two groups were not asked identical questions. Nevertheless, their 
experiences and views helped the museum to (re)invent the landscape by 
suggesting new experiential service products related to the visitors’ own 
preferences as leisure consumers. The practices, desires and opinions of 
the Northern European pensioners were identified in a qualitative ques-
tionnaire survey that resulted in 78 responses. In the questionnaire the 
pensioners had an opportunity to discuss topics such as their general 
impression of the experience landscape and how the museum could be 
developed further in relation to service consumption. Their responses 
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were then followed up by intermittent ethnographic observations. In 
this context, the questionnaire responses were examined in relation to 
how the museum could become even more attractive, providing for the 
visitors’ needs and demands (Kjær 2011b).
Sixteen Chinese visitors were approached and interviewed at the 
museum in 2013. How they moved around in the landscape, looked for 
information, took pictures, took in the views and used the place was 
observed. The Chinese visitors were invited to freely elaborate on their 
experiences, their access to the lighthouse and information about it. 
These brief in situ interviews led to a clearer understanding of how they 
understood this particular museum, its coastal sensations and museum 
activities (Kjær 2014).
The museum staff knew very little about the lifestyles of Northern 
European pensioners and Chinese young adults. Demands from the 
national cultural policy proved quite superficial. How far should the 
museum go in meeting the needs of particular consumer groups? Did 
approaching visitors in a ‘service-encounter manner’ and adapting to 
particular cultural backgrounds also mean compromising the experience 
setting itself (Mossberg 2007: 84)?
The performative museum
Nowadays museums are expected to offer entertainment and education 
and to be performative, i.e. act as a ‘museum theatre’ by using drama-
turgical techniques of staging and performing to convey emotions and 
personal attachment to visitors. Emotional attachment to the museum 
is a concept that more and more has been borrowed from traditional 
businesses and the commercial experience industry, e.g. the theme 
park or amusement park (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2000: 58). In order 
to address its visitors the museum needs to know something about 
their cultural background: the specific habits, needs and rituals. The 
museum materiality and experience landscape should be arranged 
in such a way that the visitor feels ‘absorbed’ and ‘transformed’. The 
imperative is that ‘positive emotions’, ‘feelings of fun’ and the use of 
‘imagination’ are ways to perform an intense visitor experience. The 
overall intention is thus to stimulate all the senses, and meaningful 
intensity makes the consumer more willing to spend money (Lorenzen 
2015: 72; Bosjwijk et al. 2007).
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Already in 1995, the English marketing-researcher Fiona McLean 
(1995: 601) wrote that ‘over the past 20 years the environment in which 
the museums have been operating has changed radically. Museums 
have not come through unscathed. Increasingly they are being forced or 
encouraged to generate their own income and to respond to the demands 
of the public. Although some museums may not consciously recognize it 
as such, they are being expected to develop a marketing orientation.’ The 
Lindesnes Lighthouse Museum management and staff had embraced the 
marketing orientation which created the affective trends in Norwegian 
cultural policy. Making the traditional heritage museum ‘surprising’ and 
‘challenging’ was ultimately a goal-orientated strategy aiming at getting 
more people interested in going to the museum in order to obtain an 
acceptable return on its public subsidy. Although schoolchildren – the 
quickly distracted consumers – were probably the policy’s main target 
group, the museum wanted to test what surprise and challenge meant 
to the greater spending power of Northern European pensioners and 
Chinese young adults.
In order to avoid the possible clichéd description of museums as ‘cold 
marble mausoleums that house miles of relicts that soon give way to 
yawns and tired feet’ (Kotler & Levy 1969: 11) the Lindesnes Lighthouse 
had in many ways begun to perceive itself more like a experiential service 
organisation, shouldering the role of performer, event-maker and sto-
ryteller. Influenced by marketing theories and the experience economy, 
communicating with visitors in challenging ways meant ‘targeting’ and 
dramatizing the immediate experience of objects and materiality in order 
to affect the visitors’ emotions and intellects. It also means using the 
museum’s experience landscape in intentional ways by creating oppor-
tunities for service consumption. In very concrete ways, the museum’s 
materiality – artefacts and sceneries – became the main tools to engage 
the visitors. Examples of this were how the museum used souvenirs and 
Internet access in order to affect visitors. Guests would consume more 
by feeling connected through materiality: being able to ‘get in touch’ 
through commodities and communication with their fellow visitors 
and even with family members back home. Designing photo-oppor-
tunities at certain chosen locations, being able to hang out at the cafe, 
or ‘liking’ the museum on its social media pages, were also norms of 
how the performative museum was consumer-oriented. In the eyes of 
management and staff, the museum could and should be a place where 
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theatrical elements – staging, scripting, acting – enhanced the sensory 
experience by means of producing relationality and emotionality (Skot-
Hansen 2008: 83, 130–131).
On an experiential and sensory level, the Internet has created a gen-
eral awareness of ‘the total experience’. The museum visitors increasingly 
expect to sense and feel in multimodal ways, e.g. through movement, 
touch, smell, sound, visuals, moving pictures and texts, all of which can 
be perceived as a single yet complex experience (Kjær 2011a). Activities 
– weddings, guided tours, climbing the cliffs – accumulated intensity. 
The haptic, bodily feelings, moving, tasting, listening and smelling 
the lighthouse landscape was a way the museum designed totality: a 
multi-modal experience that was meant to compete with or even perform 
more intensely than imaginations or the cyber world.
A total experience
The museum visit is part of general culture-tourism practice. As noted 
by architectural historians Gunilla Jivén and Peter Larkham (2003: 69), 
tourism involves ‘the most deliberate search for sense-related place 
experiences’. Leisure consumers interact with and perform a range 
of practices, such as eating, gazing, walking and resting, in order to 
activate and enrich their senses. A phenomenological perspective on 
culture tourism can be starting to focus on that ‘something’ which the 
camera is unable to capture (ibid.). Investigating a lighthouse landscape 
will then not be about observing tourists’ common habitual practice of 
taking popular snapshots of the magnificent view. It will not be about 
how the best panorama pictures can(not) capture the essence of being 
there. Instead, the total and absorbed experience can be about viewing 
the place from all angles, turning your head, moving around, feeling the 
wind in your face and perhaps having difficulty breathing in the sudden 
gusts of wind. When time is limited and space is compressed, certain 
‘must-sees’ and activities, such as getting to the top of the lighthouse, 
having your attention directed to certain scenes and being affected inter-
subjectively by other visitors, make deep sensory impressions. According 
to the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s definition of how the body 
‘perceives’ place it is always about connecting to a particular moment in 
time through the authentication of the senses, affects and emotions (cf. 
Sjørslev 2015: 159). For that reason, a phenomenological perspective can 
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be used to understand how a particular cultural body experiences a place 
through e.g. ‘feeling heritage with one’s hands’ or even sensing a place 
through souvenirs, lunchboxes or the survival kit of the journey (Kjær 
2011a: 23). By arranging bodily presence in a material context, museum 
curators are now aiming at organising ‘the essence’ of the display: the 
‘sixth sense’ or the synthesis of the five senses coming together into a 
transforming into existential, educational, self-improving experiences 
of totality (O’Dell 2006). Consumer goods and services are becoming 
tools for the body to connect to the place.
This ‘total experience’ is captured in the idea of the multisensory, 
working through bodily practices such as orientating oneself, moving, 
walking, climbing or being still, and as in the case analysed here, being 
absorbed in the totality of the coastal environment. However, such bod-
ily practices depend on the cultural background: needs, habits and tacit 
underlying assumptions (Bosjwijk, Thijssen and Peelen 2007).
Pensioners and young adults
How did a coastal museum in Norway attune to Chinese young adults or 
Northern European pensioners? In practice, visitors often do and think 
unplanned things and are not easily governed. In this respect the pen-
sioners were perhaps more ‘easily managed’ than the Chinese, because 
their cultural background, curriculum knowledge and previous experi-
ences more predictably formed a correspondence between their bodies 
and the Lindesnes Lighthouse landscape. As almost no information was 
translated into a language they could follow, the Chinese found it difficult 
to grasp the instructive ambitions of the museum.
The focus of the Northern European pensioners was on absorbing the 
natural forces of the landscape. They defined the coastline as ‘idyllic’, 
‘lovely’, ‘schön’ and ‘wonderful’ and enjoyed the ‘peace and quiet’, ‘con-
templation’ and ‘purity and freshness’ of the place. They were equipped 
with thermos flasks and sandwiches and dressed in brightly coloured 
Goretex anoraks. They leaned into the wind and said ‘the stormy weather 
is great’, or that it is ‘nice to feel the wind’. They ‘loved’ the maritime 
cultural history of the museum and back in their cottages – either in the 
museum area or at the nearby holiday resorts. They read novels, guide 
books and glossy magazine features about Scandinavian lighthouse 
holidays. They even read historic travel descriptions such as the English 
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philosopher Mary Wollenstonecraft’s Letters Written During a Short 
Residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark (1796/2008). The pensioners 
often travelled in pairs and were unaccompanied by children. They could 
be on a romantic holiday with their partner or travelling with a friend. 
They wanted to take souvenirs home and ‘highly appreciated’ the locally 
produced wooden toy lighthouse for their grandchildren (Kjær 2011b).
The Chinese visitors were equally interested in and impressed by the 
coastal landscape, although they were more interested in the coast-related 
health products. They were ‘overwhelmed’ by the natural environment, 
which the pensioners took for granted and felt very comfortable in and 
secure with.
The young adults were not at all familiar with the rough, cold and 
windswept landscape. They were freezing and not wearing the appro-
priate outdoor clothing. Norway in general was a considerable contrast 
to their everyday life in urban, service-orientated, but also heavily pol-
luted cities which they felt affected their health and wellbeing (Potter 
and Lloyd-Evans 1998: 199). The freshness of nature was very ‘impres-
sive’ to them. They travelled in small and larger groups. Many lived, 
studied and worked in Scandinavia and had sometimes invited their 
elderly relatives and parents for a holiday. More often than not they 
were experienced travellers and compared Norway to other Western 
and Scandinavian destinations. They orientated themselves through 
their smartphones and various social media pages, searching for other 
travellers’ recommendations. They listened to experiences, rumours 
and hearsay on Trip Advisor, Qyer, Weibo and Facebook, or looked up 
information about transportation, places of interest, food and accom-
modation on search engines such as Google or Baidu (Kjær 2014). In 
contrast to the pensioners, they depended on access to the Internet but 
often planned the entire trip from home, preparing their experiences 
in the smallest detail to make sure they did not waste precious time 
by not being able to find accommodation, transport, information and 
shopping possibilities.
Like the pensioners, the Chinese young adults liked to read about 
travel and some chose the novel Norwegian Wood by the Japanese author 
Haruki Murakami (1987). Although the travel literature preferences of 
the pensioners and the Chinese only partly or metaphorically touched 
on the exact travel destination, their choice of reading indicates ways of 
transferring literary meaning, sense-making and underlying assumptions 
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to an outlandish geography. By approaching the two cultural groups and 
their entertainment habits it became clear that onto an ‘under-commu-
nicated’ or ‘self-evident’ natural heritage museum all kinds of signifying 
practices could be projected. For a short moment, the micro-movement 
of eyes connected a situated body with the idea of an entire country while 
at the same time transporting the traveller in time and space.
Ritualising social relationships
The performative museum has been called an ‘emotional factory’ (Skot-
Hansen 2008: 82). It mimics theme parks and amusement parks in the 
sense that it wants to provide for the needs of visitors. This means that 
materiality and service are often constructed so that they aim at facil-
itating for visitors ‘working on’ and ‘improving’ their social and emo-
tional relationships. Global theme park corporations such as Disney for 
example train their service staff using a service principle which they call 
‘emotional contagion’. This means that staff are understood to have an 
emphatic function and are taught to evoke trust and confidence through 
the performance of friendliness. This performance is supposed to be 
need-fulfilling and is meant to ‘rub off’ on the visitor experience in a 
positive way (Voss and Zomerdijk 2007: 110). The Norwegian ethnologist 
Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (2003: 44) has also studied theme parks in 
relation to families and defines this leisure landscape as a place which 
allows ‘modern reconciliation rituals’ to happen. Museum visitors in 
general (Meethan 2001), the pensioners and young adults in this study 
included, also expected emotionalisation from the Lindesnes Lighthouse 
Museum: there should be a support of togetherness and an avoidance of 
unpleasant social friction. Certain rituals and performances, including 
giving the visitor a chance to remember the family back home by pur-
chasing gifts, sending postcards or uploading snapshots on social media, 
were expected. The consumption management of emotions is of course 
not the same as how it felt for a visitor to long for a grandchild in the 
souvenir shop. It is not the same as how a visitor, uploading a snapshot 
on Facebook, would jump when the digital sound from the ‘thumbs-up’ 
responses started to tick in. Museum materiality was an actor in rela-
tionship bonds. In the landscape, there was always a we of some sort.
The Chinese young adult visitors liked to send postcards to their 
families back in China. In the eyes of the Western traveller this may 
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seem like a nostalgic practice, but sharing their visit with family back 
home was a very important documentation of their being there. They 
preferred long-lasting memory tokens – something to put in their 
scrapbook, like a ticket, a postcard, a stamp or a brochure. It is said, 
that Chinese invented paper and due to this cultural history they have 
a particular liking for it (Westerby 2013). The Chinese visitors touched 
paper in the museum’s souvenir shop. They talked about it, felt the 
thickness and the structure, and valued the quality of the different paper 
items on display. Handwritten messages on postcards authenticated the 
visit – they were actually here. At the same time, the postcard sending 
met the expected ways of sustaining social relations with people back 
home. The Chinese visitors documented their presence at the lighthouse 
in autobiographical ways. They collected memory-tokens. In order to 
have something special to look forward to, some would send postcards 
to themselves. Others would unite with both postcards and family. On 
leaving the museum they explained that eventually they would use the 
paper items acquired here in order to transport themselves back to the 
museum (Kjær 2014).
From a museum staff perspective, this particular liking could not have 
been perceived beforehand or understood without knowing the under-
lying assumption of the actual haptic practice of the Chinese. Sensing 
and touching the paper’s materiality connected to the lighthouse feeling.
Body and place
The visitors’ emotional interrelatedness was considered by the museum 
when designing the restaurant, café, hotel apartment, sun lounger areas, 
playgrounds and outdoor recreational areas. The aim of the place organ-
isation was to fulfil the visitor’s exact need. The goal was to try to create a 
flow between comfort zones, pleasure and learning geographies, making 
visitors to stay longer, consume more, move them in the right directions, 
avoiding others, create quiet areas at certain times while surprising them 
at others.
Around 2000 many lighthouse establishments in Scandinavia turned 
to the romantic market. The Lindesnes Lighthouse Museum had adver-
tised the coastal landscape as a romantic getaway. Honeymooning with 
seafood dinners, overnight stays and champagne was a popular product. 
Those pensioners wanting a second blissful moment were receptive. On 
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weekend trips to the lighthouse the loving couple could ‘find silence in 
the ocean void’ and be ‘swept in a haze of romance’. In a lifestyle maga-
zine given to me by the pensioners, the reporter wrote:
Inside we have lit candles. Outside the lighthouse casts its light. 
No TV disturbs us. We watch the beautiful sunset and talk all 
night. We enjoy the sound of the waves and our hiking-trips to 
the peaks. Actually, it would have been great, if we had got stuck 
by a hurricane and by some extreme weather conditions. (Tara, 
November 2008, 193–194)
The romantic experience was preconditioned by marketing and story-
telling in different kinds of media. This type of experience says something 
about how a museum only to a certain extent can manage and market 
a place. The visitors will sometimes ‘micromanage’ the experience to 
perfection. Through the practice of lighting a candle, the moment of 
glancing, the actual decision to turn off the TV, intensify what the 
coastal landscape already dramatizes. A material association between 
body, place and symbolism was established. Being physically moved by 
the storm, wind and waves was also described. In late modern romantic 
consumption, being touched and changed at a profound level (O’Dell 
1999: 264) was possible in the littoral landscape.
In the history of popular culture the immediate relation between the 
romantic body and a coastal landscape has long been defined as passion. 
In the scenic dramas from twentieth-century Hollywood, several roman-
tic films were shot in the dramatic scenery of the Niagara Falls. These 
images eventually led to the place becoming a mainstream honeymoon 
destination. Here, the transforming power of a wedding was supported 
by the equally sublime and intense landscape (Löfgren 1999: 30).
During fieldwork some of the pensioners introduced me to Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s Letters Written During a Short Residence in Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark (1796/2008). By exposing herself to the rough 
Scandinavian countries, her idea was to create a genre of existential travel 
writing. Wollstonecraft explored the sublime scenery on the eastern and 
southern coastline of Norway and writes about how the transformative 
effect of this ‘wild’, ‘dark’ and ‘shadowed’ coastal landscape produced her 
‘tender melancholy’ (ibid. 33). Using the expedition, she set out to ‘close 
the grave’ of her youth. In other words, she went on a Grand Tour to 
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grow and become powerful, and did this by exposing herself to a highly 
unapproachable and demanding landscape. In her diary she wrote:
Nature is the nurse of sentiment, the true source of taste; yet what a 
misery, as well as rapture, is produced by a quick perception of the 
beautiful and sublime when it is exercised in observing animated 
nature, when every beauteous feeling and emotion excites respon-
sive sympathy, and the harmonised soul sinks into melancholy or 
rises in ecstasy. … I cannot, without a thrill of delight, recollect 
views I have seen, which are not to be forgotten, nor looks I have 
felt in every nerve, which I shall never more meet. The grave has 
closed over a dear friend, the friend of my youth. (Ibid. 36, 41)
The pensioners’ entertainment readings added meaning to their time 
spent at the Lindesnes. The same can be said for the Chinese young 
adults equipped with their travel literature. Their preferences in literature 
show how the two groups acted in meaning-seeking ways. Using liter-
ary expressions, what happened at the museum was that the two groups 
created and atmosphere which intensified – or maybe even completed 
– their experience. Approaching the museum landscape in multimodal 
ways, using different types of media, objects and sensory approaches 
in order to engage with the surroundings, the coastal landscape only 
became complete when the visitors connected their certain bodies with 
particular approaches to the place (Sjørslev 2015: 163; cf. Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004).
Landscape likings
The museum could narrate, display and organise artefacts and connect 
them to the museum’s own espoused values. But to a certain degree 
the museum could not anticipate how new visitors would engage with 
or perceive the displayed materiality. The pensioners and young adults 
were two different visitor groups. Still, what they had in common was a 
strong liking for the natural heritage landscape.
The concept of affinity can help to investigate how engagement, affects 
and emotions, sometimes are felt strongly because of connection and rec-
ognition. Affinity can be defined as ‘something’ which makes people and 
things suited for each other. It points to a feeling of closeness because of 
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similar qualities, ideas, or interests. Museums can try to ‘become friends’ 
with visitors by connecting their storyline, brand or experience product 
with the visitor, who immediately should recognise it as something shared 
(Laidler-Kylander and Stenzel 2013: 9, 12, 15). Affinity hence can refer to a 
communication strategy for achieving an intersubjective relation where 
objects, feelings and rhetoric of felt similarity serve to ‘eliminate unpro-
ductive clues’ in the experience (Bosjwijk, Thijssen and Peelen 2007: 23). 
The goal of something shared is to direct the visitor’s perception of the 
landscape to a meaningful, personalised, matter.
Being aware that ‘blue sky is rare in China’ (Kjær 2014), the young 
adults were highly connected to the museum’s coastal-based food prod-
ucts: seaweed, plants, herbs and smoked salmon. Such health-promoting 
products seemed important both as a high-quality restaurant meal and 
as gifts to be shipped home. Products from the sea symbolised the Chi-
nese visitors’ cultural assumptions of a pristine, pure and clean Norway 
(Ooi 2014; Westerby 2013). Thus, improving one’s health by a sojourn 
in the coastal landscape and buying gifts and souvenirs reflecting the 
pure, local and ‘raw’ were meaningful – and affinity-based – things to 
be shared amongst friends and family. Healthy food products aligned 
with the Chinese imagination, while the pensioners’ assumptions were 
about romancing in the isolation offered at the lighthouse. To both the 
pensioners and the young adults, the lighthouse landscape itself was 
considered attractive because it was presenting a cherished idea about the 
untouched nature (Olsen 2007: 44). This can be defined a place-aesthetic 
which may originate in the widespread discourse on natural heritage: the 
coastal landscape is considered authentic as long as it appears non-pre-
arranged and non-commercialised (Jivén and Larkham 2003; Kjær 2011a).
Still, the Chinese visitors did not move as unrestricted as the Northern 
European pensioners. One Chinese exclaimed ‘places in Norway aren’t 
planned like visitor attractions’. Others would ask for ‘more comfort’ when 
exposed to the cold and stormy climate. They wanted opportunities to 
‘enjoy the sunshine in the restaurant’; ‘sit [in furniture with blankets] on 
a big grass lawn’, ‘see the sea view’, ‘have a barbeque’ and have access to 
‘entertainment equipment for children’. One Chinese female biologist said 
that ‘it is so boring here’, while a male engineer wanted more knowledge: 
‘I really want to know more about culture. But the Norwegians cannot be 
very proud of their heritage, because nowhere am I able to read about it 
on the web – neither in English, nor Mandarin’. However, he soon lapsed 
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into personal discomfort: ‘In general, the museums are never open, and 
it is impossible to find out which bus will take you there’. Several other 
Chinese visitors defined the Lindesnes Lighthouse Museum as ‘cold and 
primitive’ and wondered ‘who would ever want to visit here’?
The German geographer Wolfgang Georg Arlt (2006: 198) argues 
that the leisure consumption of the Chinese urban middle classes – like 
the visitors at the lighthouse museum – are more dominated by visual 
symbolism more than bodily sensing. Being used to commercial com-
modities, the Chinese consumers display ‘no limits to consumption’. In 
this investigation, the Chinese explained that at home they were used to 
spending all day at one attraction and doing all kinds of activities. This 
made them ask for more comprehensive information, access to barbeque 
dinners and some sort of children’s playground (Kjær 2014).
Conclusion
In a global order, the local performative museum can accrue location 
and scenery as important assets that need to be shaped, packaged and 
organised as consumer products or as the intake of an entire themed – 
romantic, dramatic or health-improving – environment. In the main it is 
all about an emphasis on the body and its senses, and affective responses 
to the landscape.
The pensioners focused on low-key luxuries, such as being able to 
buy more gifts for their grandchildren and eating candlelit seafood 
dinners. They dreamt about spending nights at the lighthouse estab-
lishment itself. They also wanted to be out in the open landscape enjoy-
ing the view from their sun loungers whilst covered in warm blankets 
and drinking takeaway coffee and eating sweets while talking (mostly 
about the grandchildren) and reading newspapers and novels. To the 
pensioners, the Lindesnes Lighthouse Museum appeared a place with 
territories to be explored through easily choreographed-with-the-wind 
bodily movements. Through hunches and sensing, they engaged with 
the winds, smells and sounds.
Sensing was of course relevant for the Chinese visitors, but in a differ-
ent way. Their expectations of what was on offer at the lighthouse were 
a matter of the bodily experience of health.
The two groups had different expectations about what sensations a 
day at a coastal museum should provide. Both visitor groups expected 
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the museum to facilitate experience, service and commodity consump-
tion. However, although Northern European pensioners appreciated 
the norms of an ‘untouched’ heritage landscape and were able to inter-
pret these espoused values in the museum materiality, Chinese young 
adults were bored, cold and not used to disclosing meanings in an 
under- communicated, unbranded and under-designed landscape.
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Companion Pieces Written 
Through a Drift
Lesley Stern & Kathleen Stewart
These pieces began with a writing experiment. We participated in a 
conference called Ex­Situ organized by Craig Campbell and Yoke-Sum 
Wong at the University of Texas in April 2014. The conference began 
with a workshop of paper presentations in Austin. Then thirty or so 
people traveled by car to Marfa in West Texas, writing along the way. 
In Marfa there was a second workshop presenting the works that had 
come together on the trip out. The journeys out and back ranged from 
3 to 5 days. The two authors of this writing traveled together. Here we 
present two companion pieces written during and after our trip together.
Craig and Yoke-Sum called us together around the concept of ex situ 
with writing such as this (excerpted from the flyer for the workshop):
The concept of being ex-situ seems to hold the potential for us to 
move on a different register. It is a very common situation we find 
ourselves in as mobile bodies in this world: from Paris to Kyzyl to 
Marfa to Edmonton. Ex-situ doesn’t raise a hierarchy but through 
travel and displacement, perhaps, it finds appeal in site-specificity, 
in the terror of knowledge and ideas; ‘here’ might take us ‘there’ 
or ‘everywhere’. Taking account of resonance and echo, the situat-
edness of place/site encompasses connecting experiences. Ex-situ 
plays upon those connections, contingencies, convergences, corre-
spondences, layers – material, emotional and mnemonic.
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In this piece, then, we are describing the thick entanglement of subjects 
and objects, aesthetics and politics, as something that happens on the 
register of affects. Travelling across a vibrant landscape with each other 
and others, and armed with the task of writing, we were transported to a 
register in which ‘things’ of all kinds affect one another and are affected.
The Lion, the Rooster and the Ferrari
Lesley Stern
Marathon, Texas. It is early morning and light is creeping into the motel 
room. Last night we walked back to the motel under a huge black sky, 
so black the stars shone like the burnished feathers of a silver rooster, 
burros brayed, flights of angels winging us to our rest. I remember liv-
ing in San Agustín Etla near Oaxaca, being kept awake and woken and 
harassed all day and night by the sound of braying burros, turkeys, a 
rooster, dogs, people. Gracias a los burros my rooster does not have to 
crow. He stands on the dressing table in front of a mirror so there are 
two of him. Sculptural. Silent. He is double and a doubler. He doubles 
the odds—of detouring discovery. I open the door and step out into the 
dusty parking lot. The sky is now a soft donkey grey, fringed to the east 
with vermilion, redness seeps out of the earth, filtering into the sky.
I can stretch my arm in any direction and reach the edge of solidity 
and then my fingers will close around the sky.
I take the rooster outside and photograph him. He is immobile. His 
coxcomb is scarlet, his body painted in swathes of yellow, green and 
blue. His tail is feathery, the featheriness of sliced tin, a shiny indigo 
blue. He is perfectly proportioned. His toes are splayed giving him a firm 
purchase on the ground, or the dressing table, or wherever he alights. 
Always out of place, he will be my register of place as we travel through 
desert regions towards Marfa.
The rooster joined us before the desert. In Johnson City, home of LBJ 
we find somewhere to pee: a tiny coffee shop in a large yard filled with 
ironware. Flying pigs and alligators and cows. All painted. On the counter 
a faded photo of a Starbucks van, the side door slid open so that ‘tarb’ is 
eliminated. What you see then is the Starbucks icon and the word ‘sucks.’
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While he fixed me an excellent espresso, John and I swapped a few 
minimally anecdotal details—he’d lived in San Francisco, he could tell 
I wasn’t from Texas. Probably not from San Francisco either. The old 
guy he’s swapping yarns with, toothless, dusty, feels like he’s roamed 
the local block for years, and probably drunk every bottle in town, but 
who knows? Who knows peoples’ stories unless you drive with them 
for days and days through the desert and can talk of this and that and 
failed relationships and swap another hilarious story of another disas-
trous episode in the life of love. I asked John who made the rooster and 
the other creatures, where they came from. He looked at me quizzically 
as if to say which leg can I pull, which story will she buy, or as if he were 
asking himself is this a trick question, what’s she after, this foreigner, who 
on this wide Earth wants to know about the provenance of painted tin 
tchotchkes, who gives a flying fuck where the rooster comes from. Then 
he laughs and says Juan, Carlos, Roberto, Ricardo, Miguel… an army 
of anonymous Mexicans. I realize then it was indeed a sneaky question, 
the sort of question that a snooty gardener asks, either to elevate her 
purchase, raise it out of the realm of tourist art and into the realm of 
artisanal individuality, or simply to trip up a pretentious vendor.
I could go back to Old Town in San Diego and buy this rooster, closer 
to the source of its production. Or just nip across the border and buy 
it by the side of the road. Probably I could even nip back to Zimbabwe 
and buy the same rooster.
And yet not exactly the same.
There was a bigger rooster, grander. But as soon as my eyes lit upon 
this one I knew he was the one for me. He is life size, perfectly propor-
tioned, he has stepped out from a child’s picture book, from meticulously 
illustrated Mexican playing cards. R for rooster, G for gallo. Watch out, 
says the old guy, he’s a cantankerous rooster, that one.
Molly, who has turned up at the bakery with Allen and Lynsey, says 
we will photograph the rooster everywhere we stop on our journey 
towards Marfa. He will be our sign, our register of place. The problem is 
Molly drives off with her lovely camera and I only have a phone. Luckily, 
the rooster responds well to iPhone attention. Preens, holds still while 
I teeter and shake.
In Harper, where we get gas, he stands beneath a wall on which is 
painted a much larger than life US flag and under it a large star of David 
and the slogan: Stand By Israel. Over the doorway on the same wall it 
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says Building for Sale. Somehow my focus is screwy and the rooster is 
cut out of the picture.
He does appear, albeit tinily at the bottom of the frame, under two 
bucking broncos, at Lowe’s a local market in Fort Stockton. We had a 
cup of tea at a restaurant here and the young Mexican American who 
served us wouldn’t take any payment; it’s just water he said. I bought a 
bar of fancy dark chocolate with sea salt, an anomalous foreign import, 
and Katie bought a local newspaper. We ate the chocolate at the Rock 
House by the Rio Grande. It was musty.
In Marathon we have breakfast at Nancy’s Coffee Shop. Under the 
large sign is scrawled, faintly, barely legible, ‘Foiled Again.’ He stands 
in the large expanse of the dirt parking lot in front of our rooms. The 
horizon is so low it just peeks over his head.
We drive down into Big Bend National Park. At last and eventually 
we arrive at Terlingua ghost town. There is a row of seats along the 
verandah of the saloon that is also a gift shop and also the hotel, next 
door to the Starlight Theatre and Bar which only opens at 5 pm so we 
will not get there, but it looks enticing, stars are painted on the ceiling. 
On the verandah everyone has a bottle in hand, slow gossip fuels the 
atmosphere. New people in town, everyone is alert but pretends to notice 
nothing. Though they all noticed Norah. Someone has already picked 
up the keys to the Rock House, and when I ask who she says a boy and a 
girl with tattoos. Norah later tells us that on her way out a woman grabs 
her arm to comment on her tattoos and confides loudly that she has her 
ex-boyfriend’s name tattooed on her butt.
At the Rock House the Rooster sits on a table, the Rio Grande behind 
him. And then I bring him in for the night to sit safely at the foot of my 
bed. There are rooster thieves abroad, and vigilance is required. The 
next morning as we drive away we see Mexican cowboys on their horses 
fixing the fence. What a way, I think, to fix the border. But Katie says 
there is no fence here, the river serves as the border between countries, 
the cowboys are just looking out for their cattle that do not know to not 
cross the Rio Grande.
We reach Marfa, the rooster and I. You would not exactly call him 
Juddesque, my rooster. Picturesque, yes. Ex­situ incarnate.

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And then we leave Marfa. As the desert spreads out behind us the radio 
crackles into coherence. The rooster sits silently in the back seat of the 
car, but the air around him is volatile, and even though the car appears 
and feels to us like an airtight razor sharp capsule slicing through space, 
something escapes, the rooster’s colors vibrate, charging the landscape, 
inviting reciprocal attention. A doubler, he is an attraction and he attracts, 
he elicits color, winkling out of desert hues streaks and swathes and seas 
of vivid primary color.
All along the highway on the plateau before the western edge of the 
Texas Hill Country we listen to country music, all along the highway 
where wildflowers bloom: swathes of bluebonnets intermingled with 
red and yellow.
We stop for lunch in Ozona, a small big town, the county seat of 
Crockett County, named for Colonel Davy Crockett, a hero of the Alamo. 
We drive through the town looking for a steak house Katie once ate at 
and remembers hungrily but it is nowhere to be found. The streets of the 
town are deserted on this Sunday, faded tatty shuttered shops are strung 
along the main street fanning out from the civic center—gracious and 
impressive buildings, solidly built of stone. The Café Next Door is the 
only non fast-food place we can find off the freeway. We expect it to be 
full of travelers like ourselves, but it is chock-a-block with families out 
for Sunday lunch, dressed up a little, probably coming here after church. 
The little girls have colored bows in their hair, some of the men wear 
clean and crisply bright red shirts, with black jeans and skinny black 
ties and polished boots and Texan hats. People are eating big, but we 
delicate and discerning city girls order toasted cheese and salad. The 
sandwich has been heated, but the cheese resists melting, its plasticity 
and psychedelic orange hue pronounced by heat. We don’t say anything 
to one another, we are hungry and wolf the sandwich down. But later, 
as we drive through an expanse of nowhere Katie, says, out of the blue, 
‘That cheese was scary.’
In the town of Frederiksburg, with its lovely stone buildings that 
seem to have been eerily transported from an earlier and European era, 
we are again craving tea and so return to the Old German Bakery and 
Restaurant. On the way out to Big Bend and Marfa we had delicious 
bratwurst and sauerkraut here and a pork cutlet that was even better 
cold the next morning in the motel at Marathon watching the sun come 
up. Over the blackboard menu in the Bakery there was a montage of 
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photos, some showing a part of the town invisible to a passer-through: 
faded walls, deserted streets, graffiti; other photos and cuttings showed 
cavalcades, monuments, and John Kennedy’s face cut from a German 
newspaper. The rooster had posed outside the bakery and Molly photo-
graphed him. He will not appear in the Bakery’s montage and I have 
never seen Molly’s photograph, but I have a vivid image of him there, 
casually consecrating the site.
The bakery is closed this Sunday, so we wander round a back street 
and Katie shows me the Sunday houses and tells of how she stayed there 
with her mother and father when they were both still alive. These are 
small weekend houses that the ranchers and farmers built in the late 
1800s so that they could spend a night or two when they came in to town 
for church and perhaps to party. They are small houses, craft houses 
meticulously constructed out of local materials, now mostly rented out 
to tourists. Katie’s voice softens as she tells me about these houses.
We find a cup of tea at a Biergarten where two young girls in their 
sparkling twenties are taking their grandparents out for dinner or lunch 
in this Sunday mid-afternoon, and have to shout a lot, and at the table 
next to us, a party of retirees, just off the coach, are checking out the 
town on their iPhones, comparing maps and statistics.
North of Frederiksburg we pull in to a wildflower nursery, and walk 
through fields of blue, fields of red, whole fields like oceans, like we are 
swimming through a diaphanous red sea, light as air. Yoke Sum, in Marfa, 
had shown us the seed packets she and Derek had purchased here. She 
is going to take them back to England to plant in her garden, where, if 
the bluebonnets grow, they will become exotic rather than native. Here, 
although native, they did not sprout spontaneously along the highway. 
It was Lady Bird Johnson who was largely responsible for getting rid of 
the junkyards and billboards that graced the highway system, replacing 
them with native plantings, through her support for the Beautification 
Act of 1965. Before this road trip if you had tossed to me the words John-
son and 1965, and asked me to say whatever came into my mind I would 
have said Vietnam, napalm, and the Civil Rights Act of the previous year. 
That word, beautification, it slightly churns the stomach and curls the lip. 
Botox and pansies, landscaping and real estate, Sunday best, veneering.
Yet Lady Bird Johnson’s legacy lives on, particularly in the infelicitously 
and far-from-beautifully named Surface Transportation and Uniform 
Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, which requires that at least 0.25 of 1 
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percent of funds expended for landscaping projects in the highway system 
be used to plant native flowers, plants and trees. As we swim through 
the crimson air of the poppy meadows in the flower fields I ponder 
the shiftiness of that word beautification, the slipperiness of terms like 
native and exotic, the chimerical propensity of color and how it can be 
strangely conjured into being through political process and the enact-
ment of policy, but also strangely through the agency of objects charged 
with magical propensity.

I board the plane in Austin, bound for home, buckle up, and with eyes 
closed hear again the night train in Marathon. Movie fragments, night 
sounds, flicker across the screen of memory: the central Australian desert 
in Night Cries, black-and-white images in Killer of Sheep. That wailing 
sound rises, from somewhere within, then fades across the surface of my 
skin. It feels like the after-purring of a large cat, when growling segues 
into purring, and purring slowly ripples into soundlessness, until all that 
remains is a somatic memory.
On the runway all of a sudden lightning streaks across the darkening 
sky and hailstones start falling. The wing of the airplane is soon covered 
in whiteness. A shiver shoots through the plane, there is a quivering in 
the air. We prepare to disembark but then the crisis subsides as quickly 
as it erupted, the sky clears, the mood shifts. Sparks of electricity remain 
in the atmosphere, however, people start talking, there’s an expansiveness 
that wasn’t there before. I am sitting next to a young woman who endears 
herself to me by showing concern for the rooster who, in his overhead 
bin, has been jostled by a bag stuffed in haphazardly by a rough and rude 
young man. She tells me that her mum collects roosters and even has 
some from Soviet-era Russia. I’m not really a collector, I demur. I can 
understand that, she says, he is clearly the one and only.
My surly hermeticism is instantly vanquished, the conviviality of air-
plane small talk sucks me into its orbit. Maria tells me that she volunteers 
as an animal rescuer, fostering creatures from the wild so that they can 
eventually be returned to something like a natural state. As a student 
she worked at the Austin Zoo and Animal Sanctuary. Occupying a large 
acreage in the hill country, this zoo is home to many domestic and exotic 
animals that were either rescued from, or unwanted by, their owners. 
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Toads are rescued, goats, donkeys and snakes, but also coyotes, cougars, 
lions, tigers. All the big cats are endangered in their native habitat, and 
in quasi-legal captivity too, and so zoos often see themselves as places 
of preservation and restoration. A mode of domestic rewilding. Maria 
tells me a story about a lion. My jaw drops inch by inch until it reaches 
the floor and a great gaping hole opens up in my stomach.
The story Maria tells me goes like this. A lion was rescued from a 
church. Used in religious theater he would be wheeled onto the stage 
with a lamb. He had been drugged out of his mind, overfed and mal-
nourished, confined to a small cage in a trailer, never exercised. When he 
was released and stepped on to the ground for the first time he buckled 
under his own weight. All the bones in his feet shattered.
Later I will find on the Internet a photo of a blonde man, a pastor as 
it turns out, in a pink jacket, open-necked shirt and khakis, clutching 
in his arms a lamb. He stands on a stage and you can see, behind him, 
a caged lion. Ed Young is a mega-church pastor, best-selling author and 
televangelist. The lion and the lamb were brought onto stage as part of 
his Wild Sermon series. He is often described as creative, is a flamboyant 
performer, in his services he deploys props, gimmicks, visual theater. He 
is prone to putting into play everyday sayings and of dramatizing biblical 
metaphors through literalization and embodiment.
The lion, you might say, was simply a prop, a visual aid, an illustra-
tion of language. Functionally it was equivalent to the Ferrari which Ed 
Young drove onto the stage one Sunday as part of a sermon illustration 
for his series titled ‘RPM: Relationships. Passion. Marriage.’ ‘God gave 
me a Ferrari,’ Young said, ‘because I am a Ferrari. You’re a Ferrari too. 
God has given you a Ferrari.’ The Ferrari it seems is the body, and at the 
same time you are a Ferrari because you are made in the image of God.
Maria told me that there is a happy end to the story, they eventually 
managed to rehabilitate the lion, and in the zoo he can roam, as though 
in the wild. I cannot say with certainty that Maria’s lion is the same lion 
that Ed Young brought onto the stage. There was a flurry, a media exposé, 
but a spokesman for the Fellowship Church says the lion was back ‘at 
home’ on his California reserve where he has thousands of acres on which 
to roam. No permits were requested for the theatrical sermon because 
none were needed. No prosecutions ensued. The lion, in the media and 
Internet coverage, simply disappeared into some mythical Californian 
savannah, or into thin air.
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The lion and the Ferrari. Each a thing, a prop, a visual aid, a charged 
image. Or perhaps they are objects charged with magical propensity. They 
are things, albeit different sorts of things, yet transformed from thingness 
through embodiment and rhetorical sleight of hand. The theatricality 
of the symbolic dimension. And the rooster, my rooster? Is he a thing, 
a prop, a visual aid? What sort of a thing is he?
The wailing of the train and the roaring of the lion.

I shall take him home this rooster, a Texan I guess, home to California 
where he will be charged to remember all the fantastical details of this 
journey which I shall forget slowly, memory by memory.
Things that Shine
Kathleen Stewart
Lesley and I are participating in an experimental workshop, Ex­Situ. 
There is first a day-long workshop in Austin where, in accordance 
with the experiment, people give papers in a fairly standard academic 
atmosphere. Those presenting have already been charged with the spirit 
of experiment so there is some friction between individual papers and 
members of the audience. There are even some semi-accusations hurled 
as the critics follow along with the papers but come across sticking 
points. Are we going too far, are we letting out secrets, is it ok to be a 
little snarky about your ethnographic subjects? The tone of the room 
wants to play and does become playful, but also, in that very shift, it 
tries to lurch back to the land of the serious, responsible, even a sanc-
timonious counterbalance. We learn things about academia through 
a sensory encounter. There are also objects floating around the room 
and taking off. Partially deflated and yet also energized critiques are 
flopping around with a question of something magically mundane 
or some question of the real. The edges of both the objects and the 




The next day we’re on the road. Right away things are not just calmer 
but peaceful. The light is slightly miraculous. Suddenly I am remember-
ing my life along the trail through Johnson City and beyond. Corporeal 
memories are popping into view with a tree on the side of the road, a 
picnic area where we stopped several times, an ornate Victorian county 
courthouse, the ruined grain mill that had been a utopian artists’ colony. 
We had visited the artists’ colony over the years. Even twenty years ago 
already in an early state of ruin, we had visited the different stages of its 
decay as its slow passing following suit of the building itself and its initial 
industry. At one time, the artists’ colony had occupied a dozen crafts 
shops specializing in woodwork, welding, or candle-making. The first 
time we visited, now twenty years ago, the shops were abandoned and 
left open to the dust, the wind, and visitors. I remember that one of them 
had ancient shoes nailed all over the walls. There were also the remains 
of a carousel and bits of a miniature train extending out across a creek 
and into a field on the other side. The grain elevator itself was covered 
with gigantic sculptures of working men climbing its sides with tools 
in their hands. There was some reference to the Wobblies. There was an 
active theatre in the mill and a barbeque restaurant whose walls were 
covered, every inch, with neon beer signs and plaques embodying old 
West sayings, jokes about marriage, and declarations of war or loyalty. 
I can’t remember now what they said but I remember the overwhelm-
ing sensory immersion in them when you walked in the door. Now the 
theatre and the restaurant are gone, sending my memories skidding 
over different times with different people, most of them now gone too.
Impeckable Aviaries is still in the old storefront in Johnson City. It is, 
as usual, closed to walk-in business. There are bird cries behind the fence 
on the side. You can peer through the cracks into an overgrown bamboo 
paradise, looking for the giant Victorian birdcages that, it seems to me, 
used to be visible. It seems as though I used to see the birds there though 
I don’t really know what Double Yellow-Headed and Lilac-Crowned 
Amazons look like. If I saw them, I have no clear residual visual image. 
But I still feel the presence of the encounter with them.
It has been years since I’ve wanted to buy something sentimental. 
But I am put on pause while Lesley shops for a rooster. She’s intent; she’s 
established a line of inquiry for herself, a search. I am inspired by her. So 
rather than just wait I make a decision to actively drift. I go into a cabin 
with a sign I find obnoxious in its aim at some cowboy-gesturing Western 
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tourist man: ‘This cabin for sale. 21k. Pick it up and haul it away. Sleep 
when you die.’ I ignore this sign, practically covering my eyes from its 
very sight. Yet as I step into the cabin I suddenly remember a shopping 
smell from twenty-five years ago. The memory sensation is set off by a 
dusty-homey smell of the prairie old West tempered by a sweet-home Texas 
smell. The smell is coming from a large antique wooden dresser sitting 
still in a corner. I stand in the middle of the cabin staring at it and then 
slowly let my eyes wander over the other things collected in this cabinet 
of curiosities. Then I stare again at the dresser. Stray fantasy questions 
drift through me, until I have exhausted this little tendril of shopping 
for an object to capture a past partly mine but also always already sat-
urated with outside influences. I wonder, half-heartedly, how I would 
transport the dresser, where it would go in my house, what would have 
to go to make room for it, where I have seen a dresser like this before. 
In my grandmother’s house, I think. But it also seems to me I must have 
had one of my own that was very much like it. Bits and pieces of things 
slide in and out of my head: other trips, other encounters with dressers, 
bedrooms with flowered wallpaper, iron beds, and thin curtains that 
blow in the breeze of opened windows. There are images from movies 
and photographs and stories tangled with some kind of experiences I had 
or must have had. Or it’s as if I had them. Everything is tinted together. 
The stillness settles. I’m touching the Western lamps, thinking of my 
mother’s lamps and the one Justin, my nephew transplanted to Montana, 
made in the manner of her. That one, a Western lamp too but Montana 
made, sits in my living room. I see a cast-iron picture frame with curli-
cues on the top. What sells me is the way the little frame swings on two 
little arms. It was a mistake, it was wrong of me, not to buy it and bring 
it along. I might not have taken pictures of it in places we stopped the 
way Lesley did with her rooster, but maybe I would have squirrelled it 
away in the trunk, secretly opening its imaginary brown wrapping paper 
to look at it from time to time.
By the time we get to Fredricksburg I’m pulling our convoy down side 
streets sparking on the little German Sunday Houses I stayed in years 
ago with my mother and father, my mother and sister, my mother, and 
before that some grad students from UT I didn’t know very well and I 
can’t even remember who they were. Each little house pops into view 
hauling into memory and sensation the (im)materiality of two days here, 
a night there, the stones we marveled over in the kitchen of that place, 
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the flowers in old buckets on the porch there. There are still chairs on 
that porch. The images meeting memories create a pause in me, a sus-
pension poised between the pleasure of the moment then and the (now 
realized) end that was coming.
By now I’m noticing the mugs with names on them in the Old German 
Bakery, the dishwasher-wanted sign. I have a picto-fantasy of dropping 
into a little place like this for a few weeks and becoming simple. A place 
where a person would have something to do that’s out and about with 
others. An ‘as if ’ world. As if you don’t have other things happening in 
your head or to your body or your life. As if things wouldn’t get compli-
cated, people wouldn’t be hurtful or needy, you wouldn’t get tired of it 
all. As if you wouldn’t actually be on the ground in the middle of things 
that push and pull, excite and drain. Lesley cheerfully pulls me out this 
zone. She says we may have to walk off the lunch. But then I skid back 
on a new track. I picture an experiment of setting off to walk to Marfa. 
Let’s say just for four hours, see how far we would get, see what would 
happen. Not far. Someone would have to pick us up. I think I say some-
thing to this effect but it’s not a statement fully in the world and people 
look at me strangely, my half-articulation sitting awkwardly between us 
like an alien visitor we don’t know what to do with.
Allen, Molly, and Lindsey keep showing up right behind us. It’s like 
we’re on a giant rubber band. We pull apart, even for hours, but as we 
home in on a destination they’re back on our tail. There’s some texting 
to coordinate but it’s always beside the point, unnecessary, unwittingly 
after the fact; I’m still typing even as the actual people are already walking 
up the sidewalk on their own. Such a pleasure of unexpected efficiency. 
Somehow we are on one another like glue, but not stuck.
Lesley and I enter the desert – the West arrives in a proper form. We 
are already talking about failed relationships. The stories are long and 
dense, magnetizing people and times and mysterious desires or compul-
sions or something. We don’t know exactly what drove the immersions 
into these worlds that were us for a while. These unfolding worlds get 
interrupted by scenes spied, vistas registered, stops for food, gas, pictures 
of the rooster, encounters with local people or other drivers engaged in 
expressivities of their own – ‘Don’t say anything to him, Katie, people shoot 
each other out here.’ We enter a happy rhythm of deep story drenched 
in unpredictable detail interrupted by a propulsion into some kind of 
action and then back into the stories eagerly taking up where we left off. 
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Each of us remembers where we were in the other’s story – ‘Ok, so what 
happened to the guy with the drugs?’ The talk has vistas of far off places 
and long-gone lives that now overwrite the wide desert vistas around 
us. Everything has become literally amazing. The amazing scenery. The 
amazing situations we once found ourselves in and lived out. Things that 
now seem insane and so completely unlikely.
By the time we get to Marathon for the first night’s stop we have 
magnetized a thick and popping collection of characters, scenes and 
events to a composition hitting notes between us. The sky opens into a 
surround-scene theatre of brilliant color and then a blanket of blackness 
filled with stars. We are not moving anymore. We are in silence. We walk 
into town, buoyed by the magically astonishing sounds of trains passing 
close by, burros braying and whinnying and frog croaks so deep and 
loud we have to stop to wonder what kind of creature that could be. To 
just listen. At the Gage Hotel, well-heeled Texans gather on a vast open 
patio for margaritas laced with cactus and jalapeños and bison steaks.
In the morning I set off early, alone, to get the lay of the land. I come 
across a mural of an alien on an old fence around a dusty house where 
things seem to be spilling out of windows and doors. I think there is 
something funny strange about the intersection of the UFO dream bubble 
of the 1990s with the emergent monster of hoarding. It’s as if this little 
spot in the desert is an extreme contact point where the wild trajec tories 
of times gather and leave their mark. The scene attunes me to other scat-
tered signs of intensities here: a gray-haired, three-legged, skinny dog 
(or coyote?) roaming just on the perimeter, plastic bags blowing down 
the dusty streets, spectacularly old trucks in beautiful faded pastels, an 
ugly beat up car with an open gas cap. I stop at the ancient gas station 
on the outskirts of town. I’m not sure it’s open but the door is unlocked. 
I have to figure out how to use the pump, which is from before my time. 
Then I have to find the owner to pay. He’s very calm. Grease covers the 
walls and the used parts scattered across the shelves. There is water for 
sale and beer. There are old calendars. A truck coming out of Big Bend 
stops to get gas for the trip back to Houston. An older, very fit, couple 
get out and starts to crawl over the gear and kayaks in the open bed of 
the truck, tying things down for the highway. Everything is covered in 
dust – backpacks, skin, picks, tents, water and oil jugs. These two are 
post-wilderness. Blissed out and sunk deep into some kind of happiness. 
We talk a little about what they’ve been doing – rivers and mountains, 
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a cougar. I try to suss out who they are and what they’re thinking. Then 
I go back to the Marathon Motel perched on the edge of the world to 
meet Lesley and go to a charmed breakfast place where we eat the best 
French toast I’ve ever imagined on thick white plates and someone plays 
a guitar on the porch.
We spend the day driving the length of Big Bend, stopping on trails to 
hike and at overlooks to eat sardines and slices of bread. For a stretch of 
time we end up behind a slow driver. Very slow. I say I can’t even figure 
out how he exists. He sees us right behind him but it doesn’t register. At 
all. He’s chewing gum, he’s talking to someone in the passenger seat, he’s 
casually turning his head side to side, checking out what’s happening. 
Talk about blasé. Lesley gets agitated, I think because she thinks I’m 
agitated – ‘Get around him. Flash your lights at him’. But by now I’m on 
an even keel. Though still dumfounded by his.
I am under a spell I remember from earlier trips out here. It comes 
from the driving pace of co-witnessing incarnations of half-natural, 
half-human worlds. It starts at the sudden, inexplicable entrance to the 
desert on the other side of Fredricksburg and then sets in bodies in the 
hour-after-hour of the desert’s unfolding. A nothingness in which things 
nevertheless keep appearing creates a fullness that swells to fill the con-
tainer of the mind in the scenery like jello in a mold. It was on hour six 
of my first trip that I found the cowboy restaurant and bar in Ozona. A 
long wooden building filled with smoke and men eating fantastic steaks 
and baked potatoes. On the other side of the long wooden bar inside, 
men in cowboy hats drank whiskey and played poker. It was an ecology 
I could just see the outlines of. The place sang.
By the time we get to Terlingua we are windswept and acclimated 
to a wildly animated world. Our thinking is piecemeal and saturated. 
Our impressions are not just our own but the result of things coming in 
and out of phase, of objects impinging on another one. So Terlingua’s 
ghost town displayed in all of its excess and the dusty people sitting 
on the long wooden covered sidewalk, drinking beer and watching us 
arrive as if we, too, are a breaking story, is just too much for me. They 
want to talk, they seem to be covered with tattoos and sayings. I have 
to shade my eyes. I keep walking to find a bathroom, get the key to The 
Rock House, and get out of there. Twenty miles down the road, The 
Rock House is a sudden mirage on the Rio Grande. Joey, Nora, Alejan-
dro and Daniel are drinking rum and coke on the expanse of a patio 
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overlooking Mexico. It is stunning and still. We sleep under the stars 
in the remains of a trading post.
The next morning is a rude awakening. By now the packing is in a 
shambles; we are throwing stray shoes and sweatshirts, bags of nuts, and 
bottles of half-drunk water into the car. We are due to present in Marfa. 
We drive the winding road that follows the river and then north, inter-
rupted only by the dramas of crossing a zingy shockingly hyper-official 
very white border checkpoint, though we have never left the country. Our 
cellphones keep telling us welcome back to the United States.
In Marfa the Hotel Paisano is surprisingly gracious with high ceil-
ings and arched doorways. Blue Mexican tile throughout carries a color 
shine across the lobby and into the open courtyard on one side and the 
ornate pool grotto on the other. The film crew and stars had lived at the 
hotel in 1955 while filming Giant. The grand entrances to the hotel are 
lined with film posters. In keeping with its status as a historical building, 
there are no elevators or phones in the hotel. You drag your things up 
a circular stairway and find your room by name. Mine is the Elizabeth 
Taylor room. It’s massive and seems to have the original furniture from 
1930. It has two bathrooms.
All over town there are signs of the artist Donald Judd’s occupation 
of the town since the 1970s. The Chinati Foundation houses his perma-
nent collections in a World War II army base just outside town. There 
are art galleries and modern art installations in old stone buildings and 
public squares. The conference gathers again in a beautiful book store 
supported by the artist colonies here now and the waves of art tourists 
that have joined the outdoor enthusiasts in the visiting zone. We have 
gourmet pizza brought in for lunch while we bleat out our stories and 
show and tell beautiful photographs and spoof film on Paris, Texas. One 
woman reveals maps of underground oil pipes covering every inch of 
Texas including the wild scenic territory we’ve just been through. She 
feeds us Rice Crispie treats so that we can feel the petroleum melting 
down our throats in the form of marshmallow. The bell of a wake-up call 
is ringing but I’m so far gone that it’s just one more thing that shines.
The graduate students are happy. They gather, drinking free gourmet 
mixed drinks out of plastic cups from the foodie festival in the Paisano 
courtyard, at gigantic picnic tables under a shade cover the size of a 
stockyard on the railroad tracks in the middle of town. They run across 
the wide, cattle-steering street for pictures for their Tumblr assemblages.
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The next morning on our way out of town we have breakfast in a poor 
Mexican restaurant that barely feels like a public place. We gaze at men 
eating tripe. It’s Sunday. We make our way back faster than we came, 
sticking to the highway except for a few forays into the few towns along 
the way trying to find again remembered things.
Back in Austin something of this trip stays with me for a while (and 
even now). Living and non-living things seem a little more poised on 
the verge of expression. Thought-feeling ventures into an incipiency. 
There is a sense of the as-if quality of things infused with the surprise 
of accruals, fractures, gestures and losses.
I am back to learning native plants one at a time. Digging dirt in the 
Edward’s Plateau shallow limestone and caliche and the Blackland Prairie 
clay, I come to know Barberry, Arelia, Acanthus, Guava, Cast Iron plant, 
Red Columbine, Coreopsis, Firecracker Fern, Bearded Iris, Shrimpplant, 
Mexican Feathergrass, Texas Wisteria, and Monkey Grass.
One day I am raking leaves in the backyard when I hear loud honking 
and yelling on the street. Thinking one of our dogs or cats has gotten out 
(again), I run through the gate to find neighbors and pedestrians stand-
ing in the street yelling back and forth. ‘What was that? We should call 
the police. Did you get her license plate?’ A woman had been pushing 
a stroller with a dog attached. A car speeding up the street had nearly 
hit her and then stopped to yell ‘GET OUT OF THE ROAD!!!’ before 
screeching off. The woman of a young couple coming down the street 
from the other direction (also with a stroller) says the driver is well known 
as the crazy driver and there’s a YouTube clip of her doing this kind of 
thing. She tells us how to find it online. The police have been called many 
times. Her license plate has been circulated on the neighborhood listserv. 
There’s a pause. We look at each other. The scene feels over-filled with the 
tangled, ricocheting resonances of things but we’re not quite sure what 
things exactly. The things that make people snap or that make people 
follow the crazy snappings of others online. The things that compose a 
neighborhood that watches. I wonder where the crazy woman lives, what 
it’s like inside her house/life/car. My wonderings are shored up by the 
expectation scored into my senses and others’ that things will happen, 
scenes will emerge that are partial revelations suddenly cut adrift in a 
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